



量子信息导论 PHYS5251P

中国科学技术大学
物理学院/合肥微尺度物质科学国家研究中心

陈凯

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第四章 量子通信

徐飞虎：量子通信方案，量子密钥分发**QKD**；非理想条件下量子保密通信方案和实验，数据处理方法；**QKD**安全性分析等

陈凯：量子隐形传态理论和实验，纠缠交换，量子网络等

第四章 量子通信

1. 保密通信
2. QKD基本原理
3. BB84协议过程
4. QKD安全性
5. 诱骗态(Decoy-state QKD)
 - ① Decoy QKD原理
 - ② 实用Decoy QKD
 - ③ Decoy QKD实验
6. QKD的现实安全性
 - ① 探测端的安全性 \rightarrow MDI-QKD
 - ② 设备无关的 \rightarrow DI-QKD
7. 量子隐形传态(Quantum Teleportation) [原理、实验]
8. 量子纠缠交换(Entanglement Swapping)
9. 量子通信网络
10. 量子通信商用公司
11. 量子通信发展与实用化QKD之路

Requirements for unconditional security

1. Eve cannot intrude into Alice's and Bob's devices to access either the emerging key or their choices of settings.
2. Alice and Bob must trust the random number generators that select the state to be sent or the measurement to be performed.
3. The classical channel is authenticated with unconditionally secure protocols, which exist. (Carter and Wegman, 1979; Wegman and Carter, 1981; Stinson, 1995)
4. Eve is limited by the laws of physics. This requirement can be sharpened: in particular, one can ask whether security can be based on a restricted set of laws. In this review, as in the whole field of practical QKD, we assume that Eve has to obey the whole of quantum physics.

Several techniques for security proofs

1. The very first proofs by Mayers were somehow based on the uncertainty principle Mayers, 1996, 2001. This approach has been revived recently by Koashi 2006a, 2007.
2. Most of the subsequent security proofs have been based on the correspondence between entanglement distillation and classical post processing, generalizing the techniques of Shor and Preskill 2000. For instance, the most developed security proofs for imperfect devices follow this pattern Gottesman, Lo, Lütkenhaus, and Preskill, 2004.
3. The most recent techniques use instead information theoretical notions Ben-Or, 2002; Kraus, Gisin, and Renner, 2005; Renner, 2005; Renner, Gisin, and Kraus, 2005.

BOUNDS ON THE BIT ERROR RATE FOR BB84 AND THE SIX-STATE SCHEME

TABLE I

BOUNDS ON THE BIT ERROR RATE FOR BB84 AND THE SIX-STATE SCHEME USING ONE-WAY AND TWO-WAY CLASSICAL POST-PROCESSING. THE LOWER BOUNDS FOR TWO-WAY POST-PROCESSING, 18.9% FOR BB84 AND 26.4% FOR THE SIX-STATE SCHEME, COME FROM THE CURRENT WORK

BB84

	one-way	two-way
Upper bound	14.6%	1/4
Lower bound	11.0%	18.9%

Six-state Scheme

	one-way	two-way
Upper bound	1/6	1/3
Lower bound	12.7%	26.4%

Daniel Gottesman and Hoi-Kwong Lo, Proof of Security of Quantum Key Distribution With Two-Way Classical Communications, IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY, VOL. 49, 457-475 (2003)

Decoy-state quantum key distribution with two-way classical postprocessing




FIG. 3. (Color online) Plot of the key generation rate as a function of the transmission distance with the data postprocessing scheme of GLLP+decoy+B steps method. The parameters used are from the GYS experiment [19] listed in Table I. The GLLP+decoy+B steps scheme surpasses the scheme with 1-LOCC at a distance of 132 km. The maximal secure distance using four B steps is 181 km, which is not far from the upper bound of 208 km.

X.-F. Ma, C.-H. Fred Fung,[†] F. Dupuis, K. Chen, K. Tamaki, and H.-K. Lo, *Phys. Rev. A* 74, 032330 (2006)



Decoy-state quantum key distribution with both source errors and statistical fluctuations

Xiang-Bin Wang, C.-Z. Peng, J. Zhang, L. Yang, Jian-Wei Pan
General theory of decoy-state quantum cryptography with source errors
Phys. Rev. A 77, 042311 (2008)

Xiang-Bin Wang, Lin Yang, Cheng-Zhi Peng, Jian-Wei Pan, Decoy-state quantum key distribution with both source errors and statistical fluctuations, New. J. Phys., 11, 075006 (2009)



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QUANTUM TELEPORTATION

Teleportation of unknown quantum state encompasses the complete transfer of information from one particle to another

Unknown quantum state

$$|y\rangle = a|0\rangle + b|1\rangle$$

EPR source

$$|EPR - pair\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00\rangle + |11\rangle)$$

Total state

$$|y\rangle |EPR - pair\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(a|000\rangle + a|011\rangle + b|100\rangle + b|111\rangle)$$

$$|\Phi^+\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00\rangle + |11\rangle)$$

$$|\Phi^-\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00\rangle - |11\rangle)$$

$$|\Psi^+\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|01\rangle + |10\rangle)$$

$$|\Psi^-\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|01\rangle - |10\rangle)$$

QUANTUM TELEPORTATION

The joint state of three particles

$$|y\rangle |EPR - pair\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (a|000\rangle + a|011\rangle + b|100\rangle + b|111\rangle)$$

can be rephrased as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} |y\rangle |EPR - pair\rangle = & |F^+\rangle \frac{1}{2} (a|0\rangle + b|1\rangle) + |Y^+\rangle \frac{1}{2} (b|0\rangle + a|1\rangle) \\ & + |F^-\rangle \frac{1}{2} (a|0\rangle - b|1\rangle) + |Y^-\rangle \frac{1}{2} (-b|0\rangle + a|1\rangle) \end{aligned}$$

Therefore Bell measurements on the first two particles would project the state of Bob's particle into a variant of $|\psi_1\rangle$ of the state $|\psi\rangle = \alpha|0\rangle + \beta|1\rangle$, where

$$|\psi_1\rangle = \text{either } |\psi\rangle \text{ or } \sigma_x|\psi\rangle \text{ or } \sigma_z|\psi\rangle \text{ or } \sigma_x\sigma_z|\psi\rangle$$


The unknown state $|\psi\rangle$ can therefore be obtained from $|\psi_1\rangle$ by applying one of the four operations

$$I, \sigma_x, \sigma_y, \sigma_z,$$

and the result of the Bell measurement provides two bits specifying which of the above four operations should be applied.

Alice can send to Bob these two bits of classical information using a classical channel (by phone, email for example).

Quantum Teleportation




Scheme showing principles involved in quantum teleportation (a) and the experimental set-up (b).

- ◆ EPR correlations used as a source
- ◆ Teleporting an unknown quantum state not the particle
- ◆ Entanglement between photon 2 and 3
- ◆ Bell-state measurement plus classical communication and recovery operation lead to successful teleportation

D. Bouwmeester *et al.*, Experimental quantum teleportation, *Nature* 390, 575-579 (1997);
M. Zukowski, A. Zeilinger, & H. Weinfurter, Entangling photons radiated by independent pulsed sources. *Ann. NY Acad. Sci.* 755, 91-102 (1995).

Quantum Teleportation




Alice has a quantum system, particle 1, in an initial state which she wants to teleport to Bob. Alice and Bob also share an ancillary entangled pair of particles 2 and 3 emitted by an Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) source. Alice then performs a joint Bell-state measurement (BSM) on the initial particle and one of the ancillaries, projecting them also onto an entangled state. After she has sent the result of her measurement as classical information to Bob, he can perform a unitary transformation (U) on the other ancillary particle resulting in it being in the state of the original particle.

D. Bouwmeester *et al.*, *Nature* 390, 575-579 (1997)

Quantum Teleportation

A pulse of ultraviolet radiation passing through a nonlinear crystal creates the ancillary pair of photons 2 and 3. After retroreflection during its second passage through the crystal the ultraviolet pulse creates another pair of photons, one of which will be prepared in the initial state of photon 1 to be teleported, the other one serving as a trigger indicating that a photon to be teleported is under way.




Alice then looks for coincidences after a beam splitter BS where the initial photon and one of the ancillaries are superposed. Bob, after receiving the classical information that Alice obtained a coincidence count in detectors f1 and f2 identifying the $|y^- \rangle_{12}$ Bell state, knows that his photon 3 is in the initial state of photon 1 which he then can check using polarization analysis with the polarizing beam splitter PBS and the detectors d1 and d2. The detector p provides the information that photon 1 is under way.

Quantum Teleportation

Results

In the first experiment photon 1 is polarized at 45° . Teleportation should work as soon as photon 1 and 2 are detected in the $|\psi^-\rangle_{12}$ state, which occurs in 25% of all possible cases. The $|\psi^-\rangle_{12}$ state is identified by recording a coincidence between two detectors, f1 and f2, placed behind the beam splitter (Fig. 1b).

If we detect a f1f2 coincidence (between detectors f1 and f2), then photon 3 should also be polarized at 45° . The polarization of photon 3 is analysed by passing it through a polarizing beam splitter selecting $+45^\circ$ and -45° polarization. To demonstrate teleportation, only detector d2 at the $+45^\circ$ output of the polarizing beam splitter should click (that is, register a detection) once detectors f1 and f2 click. Detector d1 at the -45° output of the polarizing beam splitter should not detect a photon. Therefore, recording a three-fold coincidence d2f1f2 ($+45^\circ$ analysis) together with the absence of a three-fold coincidence d1f1f2 (-45° analysis) is a proof that the polarization of photon 1 has been teleported to photon 3.




D. Bouwmeester *et al.*, *Nature* 390, 575-579 (1997)



Teleportation of Massive Particles


David Wineland and colleagues from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in Colorado began by creating a superposition of spin up and spin down states in a single trapped beryllium ion (*Nature* 429 737 [2004]). Using laser beams, they teleported these quantum states to a second ion with the help of a third, auxiliary ion (see figure). The NIST technique relied on being able to move the ions within the trap.



Meanwhile, Rainer Blatt and co-workers at the University of Innsbruck performed a similar experiment using trapped calcium ions (*Nature* 429 734 [2004]). However, rather than moving the ions, they "hide" them in a different internal state.


<http://physicsworld.com/cws/article/news/19690>

Experimental quantum teleportation of a two-qubit composite system




Qiang Zhang *et al.*, *Nature Physics* 2, 678-682 (2006)

Experimental quantum teleportation of a two-qubit composite system



Experimental quantum teleportation of a two-qubit composite system



Memory-built-in quantum teleportation with photonic and atomic qubits





Figure 1 Experimental set-up for teleportation between photonic and atomic qubits. The top-left diagram shows the structure and the initial populations of atomic levels for the two ensembles. At Bob's site, the anti-Stokes fields emitted from U and D are collected and combined at PBS₁, selecting perpendicular polarizations. Then the photon travels 7 m through the fibres to Alice's site to overlap with the initial unknown photon on a beam splitter (BS) to carry out the BSM. The results of the BSM are sent to Bob through a classical channel. Bob then carries out the verification of the teleported state in the U and D ensembles by converting the atomic excitation to a photonic state. If the state $|\Psi^+\rangle$ is registered, Bob directly carries out a polarization analysis on the converted photon to measure the teleportation fidelity. On the other hand, if the state $|\Psi^-\rangle$ is detected, the converted photon is sent through a half-wave plate via the first-order diffraction of an AOM (not shown). The half-wave plate is set at 0° serving as the unitary transformation of $\hat{\sigma}_z$. Then the photon is sent through the polarisation analyser to obtain the teleportation fidelity.

Motivation: longer and not only longer

- ◆ Fundamental interest: faithfully transfer of quantum state between two distant locations without physically transmitting carrier itself:
- ◆ Long-distance quantum communication network: quantum relay, quantum repeater.



Quantum Teleportation Progress

I First proof-of-principle verification

Bouwmeester, D. et al. Nature, 390, 575(1997).

Boschi, D. et al. Phys. Rev. Lett., 80,1121(1998).

Furusawa, A. et al. Science 282, 706–709 (1998).

Sherson, J. F. et al. Nature 443, 557–560 (2006).

I Fiber-based long-distance teleportation :


55m: Marcikic, I. et al. Nature 421, 509-513 (2003)

600m: Ursin, R. et al. Nature 430, 849 (2004)

I Optical free-space link is highly desirable for extending the transfer distance

Effective aerosphere thickness: ~equivalent to 5-10 km ground atmosphere

How to **exceed this?**



Polarization Entanglement Source

Bell states – maximally entangled states:

$$|\Phi^\pm\rangle_{12} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|H\rangle_1 |H\rangle_2 \pm |V\rangle_1 |V\rangle_2)$$
$$|\Psi^\pm\rangle_{12} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|H\rangle_1 |V\rangle_2 \pm |V\rangle_1 |H\rangle_2)$$


Singlet:

$$|\Psi^-\rangle_{12} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|H\rangle_1 |V\rangle_2 - |V\rangle_1 |H\rangle_2)$$
$$= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|H'\rangle_1 |V'\rangle_2 - |V'\rangle_1 |H'\rangle_2)$$



where

$$|H'\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|H\rangle + |V\rangle)$$
$$|V'\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|H\rangle - |V\rangle)$$

45-degree
polarization



Polarization Entanglement Source



$$|\Phi^\pm\rangle_{12} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|H\rangle_1 |H\rangle_2 \pm |V\rangle_1 |V\rangle_2)$$

$$|\Psi^\pm\rangle_{12} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|H\rangle_1 |V\rangle_2 \pm |V\rangle_1 |H\rangle_2)$$

■ P. G. Kwiat et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 75, 4337 (1995)

PDC

Modified Rome quantum teleportation scheme

$$|\Psi^-\rangle_{1w2p} = |V\rangle_{1p} \otimes \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|R\rangle_{1w}|V\rangle_{2p} - |L\rangle_{1w}|H\rangle_{2p})$$

I Initial state: $|\Psi\rangle_{1p} = a|H\rangle_{1p} + b|V\rangle_{1p}$


$$|\Psi^\pm\rangle_{1w1p} = (|R\rangle_{1w}|V\rangle_{1p} \pm |L\rangle_{1w}|H\rangle_{1p}) / \sqrt{2}$$

I Bell state:

$$|\Phi^\pm\rangle_{1w1p} = (|R\rangle_{1w}|H\rangle_{1p} \pm |L\rangle_{1w}|V\rangle_{1p}) / \sqrt{2}$$



$$|\Psi\rangle_{1p1w2p} = |\Psi\rangle_{1p} \otimes |\Psi^-\rangle_{1w2p}$$

$$= \frac{1}{2} (|\Psi^-\rangle_{1p1w} + |\Phi^-\rangle_{1p1w} \hat{s}_x - |\Phi^+\rangle_{1p1w} i\hat{s}_y - |\Psi^+\rangle_{1p1w} \hat{s}_z) |\Psi\rangle_{2p}$$




Free-space channel + Stable BSM + Active Feedforward

- I Split-type refracting telescope(SRT): $f=2.372$, $d=0.2\text{m}$, $0.42\mu\text{rad}$ per step, $0.4\sim 1\text{m}$ (point)
- I Off-axis parabolic reflecting telescope (OPRT): $d=0.4\text{m}$, 1000kg , stability $0.3\mu\text{rad}/\text{hour}$
- I Optical link efficiency between SRT and OPRT: $-14\text{ dB} \sim -31\text{ dB}$.



Free-space channel + Stable BSM + Active Feedforward



! Perfect overlap :spatial, temporal, spectral.

Visibility of BSM: ~99.2%

! Active lock BSM interferometer: reverse propagating direction, 633nm

The instability can be suppressed within $\lambda/52$

Teleportation Fidelities

$$F = \text{Tr}(\hat{r}|\Psi\rangle_{1p\ 1p}\langle\Psi|) = \text{Tr}(\hat{r}(|a|^2(\hat{I}+\hat{S}_z) + ab^*(\hat{S}_x + i\hat{S}_y) + ba^*(\hat{S}_x - i\hat{S}_y) + |b|^2(\hat{I}-\hat{S}_z)))/2$$

$$F_{|H\rangle} = \text{Tr}(\hat{r}(\hat{I}+\hat{S}_z))/2$$


$$F_{|V\rangle} = \text{Tr}(\hat{r}(\hat{I}-\hat{S}_z))/2$$

$$F_{|+45^\circ\rangle} = \text{Tr}(\hat{r}(\hat{I}+\hat{S}_x))/2$$

$$F_{|-45^\circ\rangle} = \text{Tr}(\hat{r}(\hat{I}-\hat{S}_x))/2$$

$$F_{|R\rangle} = \text{Tr}(\hat{r}(\hat{I}+\hat{S}_y))/2$$

$$F_{|L\rangle} = \text{Tr}(\hat{r}(\hat{I}-\hat{S}_y))/2$$




! Swap projection: Eliminate the biased effect caused by different detection efficiencies of D7 and D8

! The real teleportation fidelity: $F = 1/(1 + \sqrt{C'_7 C'_8 / C_7 C_8})$


Table 1 | Experimental measurement for teleportation fidelities.

Initial states	$ H\rangle$	$ V\rangle$	$ +45^\circ\rangle$	$ -45^\circ\rangle$	$ R\rangle$	$ L\rangle$
$ \Psi\rangle_{1p}$ (D7)	2,936	4,939	2,027	213	591	631
$ \Psi\rangle_{1p}^\perp$ (D8)	225	391	276	30	83	103
$ \Psi\rangle_{1p}$ (D8)	3,232	5,125	1,279	152	553	300
$ \Psi\rangle_{1p}^\perp$ (D7)	458	605	131	22	74	38
Fidelities	0.906(4)	0.912(3)	0.894(5)	0.875(16)	0.879(9)	0.874(11)



Xian-Min Jin *et al.*, Experimental Free-Space Quantum Teleportation, **Nature Photonics** 4, 376-381 (2010).

- **Developed techniques:**
- **Real-time feedback control for high stability interferometer for single photon Bell state measurement**
- **Active feed-forward manipulation on single photon state for reconstruction of the initial teleported qubit**
- **Novel design of telescopes tailored for teleportation experiment**
- **Achieve quantum teleportation in free-space at a distance 16 km, 20 times longer than the previous implementation**
- **confirms the feasibility of space-based experiments, and presents an important step towards quantum communication applications on a global scale.**



Beam Us Up Teleportation doesn't work for humans — yet — but it works over long distances, a new study reports. *Time Magazine*

隐形传态过程虽然不能够传送人类，然而一个最新的研究显示，它的确可以远距离地传递信息。美国《时代杂志》

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 - Methods & Protocols
 - Pathology & Pathobiology
 - Urology
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 - Earth sciences
 - Evolution & Ecology

Research Highlights

Subject Category: **Physics**

Published online: 2 June 2010 | doi:10.1038/nchina.2010.65

Quantum physics: Teleportation goes long distance
Felix Cheung

Researchers in China have achieved quantum teleportation in free space over a distance of 16 km

Original article citation
Jin, X. M. et al. [Experimental free-space quantum teleportation](#). *Nature Photon.* doi:10.1038/nphoton.2010.87 (2010).

[Full text article available for download](#)

Quantum communication promises the world a completely secure way of transferring information, and quantum teleportation is an information transfer protocol that will one day make quantum communication over long distance possible. Previous studies have demonstrated quantum teleportation using an optical fibre, but photon losses due to decoherence in the fibre are large and the transmission distance is limited to 600 metres. Jianwei Pan at the University of Science and Technology of China in Hefei, Chengzhi Peng at Tsinghua University in Beijing and co-workers¹ have now achieved quantum teleportation in an optical free-space channel over a distance of 16 kilometres.



© (2010) istockphoto.com/Andrey Volodin

The researchers generated an entangled photon pair at Badaling in Beijing using a semiconductor, a blue laser beam and a beta-barium borate crystal. They sent one photon in the pair to 'Alice', situated at Badaling, for measurement. They then sent the other photon in the pair and the results of Alice's measurement to 'Bob' at Huailian in Hebei province — 16 kilometres away — through the free-space channel.

The researchers used specially designed telescopes to optimize the transmission efficiency and improve the stability of the free-space channel. They found that Bob could recover the results of Alice's measurements using the photon it received, thus demonstrating quantum teleportation. The study confirms the feasibility of quantum teleportation in free space and represents an important step towards quantum communication on a global scale.

Blogs / 80beats

« DARPA's New Sniper Ride Offers a Perfect Shot Across 12 Football Fields To Cope With the Chaos of Swarming, Locusts Enlarge Their Brains »

Physicists Achieve Quantum Teleportation Across a Distance of 10 Miles

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How far can you beam information instantaneously? Try 10 miles, according to a study in *Nature Photonics* that pushes the limits of quantum teleportation to its greatest distance yet. At that distance, the scientists say, one can begin to consider the possibility of someday using quantum teleportation to communicate between the ground and a satellite in orbit.

As stories about quantum teleportation usually note, this isn't the *Starship Enterprise's* transporter: The weird quantum phenomenon makes it possible to send information, not matter, across a distance.

It works by entangling two objects, like photons or ions. The first teleportation experiments involved beams of light. Once the objects are entangled, they're connected by an invisible wave, like a thread or umbilical cord. That means when something is done to one object, it immediately happens to the other object, too. Einstein called this "spooky action at a distance." (*Popular Science*)



Discover Magazine

Quantum teleportation achieved over 16 km

May 20, 2010 by Lin Edwards



a, A birds-eye view of the 16-km free-space quantum teleportation experiment. Charlie sends photon 1 to Alice for BSM. Classical information, including the results of the BSM and the signal for time synchronization, is sent through the free-space channel with photon 2, to Bob, before decoding and triggering of the corresponding unitary

transformation. b, Sketch of the experimental system. See the original paper for more details. Image copyright: Nature Photonics, doi:10.1038/nphoton.2010.87

(PhysOrg.com) -- Scientists in China have succeeded in teleporting information between photons further than ever before. They transported quantum information over a free space distance of 16 km (10 miles), much further than the few hundred meters previously achieved, which brings us closer to transmitting information over long distances without the need for a traditional signal.

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« [Electron microscop](#)

Quantum teleportation through open air

By [Physics Today](#) on May 17, 2010 10:17 AM | [No Comments](#) | [No TrackBacks](#)


A central tenet of quantum information processing asserts that an unknown qubit cannot be cloned (see *Physics Today*, February 2009, [page 76](#)). But the unknown state of one qubit can be transferred to another qubit in a process termed quantum teleportation. The first experimental demonstrations succeeded in teleporting a qubit state a meter or so (see *Physics Today*, February 1998, [page 18](#)). Subsequent experiments with photons, whose polarizations form a convenient basis for quantum information, have used fiber optics to achieve teleportation over hundreds of meters. But practical quantum communication will require teleportation over much greater distances. Jian-Wei Pan, Cheng-Zhi Peng, and coworkers at the [University of Science and Technology of China](#) and [Tsinghua University](#) have now transferred a qubit state through free space over a distance of 16 km, from "Alice" in the Beijing suburb of Badaling, across towns and roads, to "Bob" in Huailai, on the other side of Guanting Reservoir. The experiment employed a standard teleportation protocol: Alice and Bob each receive one of a pair of entangled photons; Alice measures hers in combination with an unknown qubit and sends the result, by classical means, to Bob; armed with that result, Bob projects his photon onto the state of the unknown qubit. The new work, though, adds many refinements, including novel telescope designs for open-air transmission, active feedback control for increased stability, and synchronized real-time information transfer. The resulting teleportation fidelity was nearly 90%. Such high-fidelity transmission, say the researchers, could help enable quantum teleportation to orbiting satellites. (X.-M. Jin et al., *Nat. Photon.*, in press, [doi:10.1038/nphoton.2010.87](#).)—Richard J. Fitzgerald

自由空间量子通信

n 国际上距离最远的(16公里)自由空间量子隐形传态 [Nature Photonics 4, 376] (2010)

两院院士评为
“中国十大科技进展新闻”

科技部评为
“中国科学十大进展”



美国物理学家组织的报道




《自然·中国》的报道



美国《今日物理》的报道

Global Quantum Communication Network



About Quantum Teleportation

- ◆ In a quantum teleportation an unknown quantum state can be disambled into, and later reconstructed from, two classical bit-states and an maximally entangled pure quantum state.
 - ◆ Using quantum teleportation an unknown quantum state can be *teleported* from one place to another by a sender who does not need to know - for teleportation itself - neither the state to be teleported nor the location of the intended receiver.
 - ◆ The teleportation procedure can not be used to transmit information faster than light
- but
- ◆ it can be argued that quantum information presented in unknown state is transmitted instantaneously (except two random bits to be transmitted at the speed of light at most).
 - ◆ EPR channel is irreversibly destroyed during the teleportation process.

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5. 诱骗态(Decoy-state QKD)
 - ① Decoy QKD原理
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6. QKD的现实安全性
 - ① 探测端的安全性 \rightarrow MDI-QKD
 - ② 设备无关的 \rightarrow DI-QKD
7. 量子隐形传态(Quantum Teleportation) [原理、实验]
- 8. 量子纠缠交换(Entanglement Swapping)**
9. 量子通信网络
10. 量子通信商用公司
11. 量子通信发展与实用化QKD之路



Entanglement Swapping: Entangling Photons That Never Interacted




FIG. 1. Principle of entanglement swapping. Two EPR sources produce two pairs of entangled photons, pair 1-2 and pair 3-4. One photon from each pair (photons 2 and 3) is subjected to a Bell-state measurement. This results in projecting the other two outgoing photons 1 and 4 onto an entangled state. Change of the shading of the lines indicates the change in the set of possible predictions that can be made.

Entanglement Swapping: Entangling Photons That Never Interacted




FIG. 2. Experimental setup. A UV pulse passing through a nonlinear crystal creates pair 1-2 of entangled photons. Photon 2 is directed to the beam splitter. After reflection, during its second passage through the crystal the UV pulse creates a second pair 3-4 of entangled photons. Photon 3 will also be directed to the beam splitter. When photons 2 and 3 yield a coincidence click at the two detectors behind the beam splitter, they are projected into the $|\Psi^-\rangle_{23}$ state. As a consequence of this Bell-state measurement the two remaining photons 1 and 4 will also be projected into an entangled state. To analyze their entanglement we look at coincidences between detectors D_1^+ and D_4 , and between detectors D_1^- and D_4 , for different polarization angles Θ . By rotating the $\lambda/2$ plate in front of the two-channel polarizer we can analyze photon 1 in any linear polarization basis. Note that, since the detection of coincidences between detectors D_1^+ and D_4 , and D_1^- and D_4 are conditioned on the detection of the Ψ^- state, we are looking at fourfold coincidences. Narrow bandwidth filters (F) are positioned in front of each detector.




FIG. 3. Entanglement verification. Fourfold coincidences, resulting from twofold coincidence $D_1^+ D_4$ and $D_1^- D_4$ conditioned on the twofold coincidences of the Bell-state measurement, when varying the polarizer angle Θ . The two complementary sine curves with a visibility of 0.65 ± 0.02 demonstrate that photons 1 and 4 are polarization entangled.

Multistage Entanglement Swapping




FIG. 1 (color online). Principle of multistage entanglement swapping: three EPR sources produce pairs of entangled photons 1–2, 3–4, and 5–6. Photon 2 from the initial state and photon 3 from the first ancillary pair are subjected to a joint BSM, and so are photon 4 from the first ancillary and photon 5 from the second ancillary pair. The two BSMs project outgoing photons 1 and 6 onto an entangled state. Thus the entanglement of the initial pair is swapped to an entanglement between photons 1 and 6.

Alexander M. Goebel *et al.*, *Phys. Rev. Lett.* 101, 080403 (2008)

Multistage Entanglement Swapping




FIG. 2 (color online). The focused ultraviolet laser beam passes the first BBO generating photon pair 1–2. Refocused, it passes the second BBO generating the ancillary pair 5–6 and again retroreflected through the second BBO generating pair 3–4. In order to achieve indistinguishability at the interference PBS23 and PBS45 the spatial and temporal overlap are maximized by adjusting the delays and observing “Shih-Alley-Hong-Ou-Mandel-type” interference fringes [19] behind the PBS23 (PBS45) in the \pm basis [20]. With the help of polarizers and half or quarter wave plates, we are able to analyze the polarization of photons in arms 1 and 6. All photons are spectrally filtered by narrow band filters with $\Delta\lambda_{\text{FWHM}} \approx 2.8$ nm and are monitored by silicon avalanche single-photon detectors [21]. Coincidences are counted by a laser clocked field-programmable gate array based coincidence unit.

Experimental Multiparticle Entanglement Swapping for Quantum Networking




FIG. 1 (color online). Configuration of a multiparty quantum network and GHZ entanglement swapping. Initially, users A , B , and C share entangled qubit pairs with the central exchange Ex . If Ex projects the three particles, 1, 3, and 5, into a GHZ state, the other three particles, 2, 4, and 6 belonging to A , B , and C respectively, will be entangled into a GHZ state by entanglement swapping.

Experimental Multiparticle Entanglement Swapping for Quantum Networking




FIG. 2 (color online). Experimental setup for entanglement swapping of a three-photon GHZ state. Ultraviolet laser pulses (with a central wavelength of ~ 394 nm, a pulse duration of ~ 120 fs, and a repetition rate of ~ 76 MHz) are focused on three BBO crystals, producing entangled photon pairs emitted into spatial modes 1–2, 3–4, and 5–6. Photons 1, 3, and 5 are projected into a GHZ state (dashed box, see text and Ref. [18]), and the photons 2, 4, and 6 are analyzed by a combination of a quarter-wave plate (QWP), a half-wave plate (HWP) and a PBS. The photons are spectrally filtered by narrow-band filters ($\Delta\lambda_{\text{FWHM}} = 3.2$ nm) and monitored by fiber-coupled silicon avalanche single-photon detectors (D1, D2T, ..., D6R). The multiphoton events are registered by a laser clocked multichannel coincidence unit.




FIG. 4 (color online). Sixfold coincidence in the measurement basis of: (a) H/V , (b) A/B , (c) $+/-$, and (d) C/D for witnessing the genuine entanglement of the three emerging photons 2, 4, and 6. The accumulation time for each data set is 24 h in (a) and 18 h in (b),(c), and (d). The error bars represent 1 standard deviation deduced from Poissonian counting statistics of the raw detection events.

课后作业

Entanglement Swapping的原理推导




FIG. 1. Principle of entanglement swapping. Two EPR sources produce two pairs of entangled photons, pair 1-2 and pair 3-4. One photon from each pair (photons 2 and 3) is subjected to a Bell-state measurement. This results in projecting the other two outgoing photons 1 and 4 onto an entangled state. Change of the shading of the lines indicates the change in the set of possible predictions that can be made.

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11. 量子通信发展与实用化QKD之路

量子通信网络进展

US

- ✦ DARPA 网络, 连接波士顿市区的哈佛大学、波士顿大学和BBN公司 **10km 链接**。其3个节点之后增加到了10个。
- ✦ NIST 3节点网络 **1km 链接**。

EU

- ✦ 欧盟从2006年起, 成立了“基于密码的安全通信 (SECOQC)”网络, 囊括了来自英国、法国、德国、意大利、奥地利和西班牙等12个国家的41个相关领域的机构和组织。典型的网络 **6个节点, 8个链接**。2008年10月在维也纳演示。采用混合类型的协议和可信中继架构。光纤的环形网络**63 km**, 一个额外节点**85 km**。

Japan

- ✦ 日本国家情报通信研究机构 (NICT) 主导联合项目 ‘Seamless QKD in Metropolitan- and Backbone- Networks’. NEC & Mitsubishi的互联于2006年演示。2010年10月, NICT主导, 联合日本电信电话株式会社 (NTT)、NEC和三菱电机, 并邀请东芝欧洲有限公司, 瑞士ID Quantique公司和奥地利的All Vienna共同协作在东京建成和演示了**6节点城域量子通信网络” Tokyo QKD Network”**。最远通信距离为**90公里**, 45公里距离上点对点通信速率可达**60kbps** (使用超导探测器)

量子通信网络进展


China

- ◆ USTC 潘建伟教授团队 5节点大于16km链接。最远链接60km（延伸至130km）。所有节点互联互通。
- ◆ USTC 郭光灿教授团队7个节点最远10km链接。4节点互通5.6km。


商用量子通信产品公司

- id Quantique: Geneva, Switzerland
- MagiQ Technologies: US, New York
- SmartQuantum, France, Lannion（破产）
- QuintessenceLabs, Australia, Canberra
etc.


The DARPA Quantum Network




The DARPA Quantum Network




BBN Technologies funded by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency




The DARPA Quantum Network 架构



The DARPA Quantum Network 架构




NIST Quantum Communication Testbed



PCI interface high-speed electronics boards for Alice (left) and Bob (right).

1 Mbit/s over 4km (2006年)


NIST 量子网络




集成的高速电路板

视频会议演示

中国科学技术大学 陈凯



NIST QKD Protocol Stack (2006)



SECOQC QKD网络拓扑和分布




Figure 3. Satellite map with the locations of the nodes of the prototype.

SECOQC QKD-链接协议和设备

- ⊕ Attenuated Laser Pulses (Id Quantique)
- ⊕ Coherent-One-Way (University of Geneva)
- ⊕ One-way, decoy states (Toshiba UK)
- ⊕ Entangled photons (University of Vienna)
- ⊕ Continuous Variables (Prof. Grangier)
- ⊕ Access Free Space Link (LMU of Munich)
The “last mile” (80 m, >10kbit/s)

SECOQC QKD节点组成







Figure 5. Photographs of the SECOQC network node racks.

成码率: 0.6~10kbps

SECOQC QKD链接方式




SECOQC QKD节点模块



Tokyo QKD network

In the era of the Internet,
the quantum world reaches *city-scale* thanks to
optical fiber networks.





NICT

Empowered by Innovation

NEC

MITSUBISHI

三菱電機

Changes for the Better

 **NTT**



TOSHIBA

Leading Innovation >>>

Toshiba Research
Europe Ltd (TREL)



Id Quantique (IDQ)



Austrian Institute of Technology




Institute of Quantum Optics
and Quantum Information




**universität
wien**

University of Vienna

} All Vienna




连接点



东京网络基于日本的一个光纤实验床，有6个节点，3个在Koganei，2个在Otemachi，1个在Hongo


Tokyo QKD Network网络拓扑、距离和损耗



NEC, Mitsubishi Electric, NTT, NICT, Toshiba Research Europe Ltd. (UK)
ID Quantique (Switzerland) All Vienna (Austria)

网络架构

- ◆ 基于JGN2plus (Japan's Gigabit Network)
- ◆ 星形结构



Network Layer结构






Fig. 2 Network Layer Structure of the Tokyo QKD Network

Link configuration




Tokyo QKD Network视频会议演示



3节点光量子电话网络

- ◆ 极化编码
- ◆ 4 MHz
- ◆ Decoy BB84
- ◆ 可信中继架构
- ◆ 任意两节点通信距离 ≥ 20 km
- ◆ 信号和诱骗态脉冲: 1550nm; 同步脉冲: 1310 nm 使用WDM


- ◆ 相位涨落的实时稳相
- ◆ 最终成码率 ≥ 1.5 kbps
- ◆ 无条件安全, 考虑了有限长度的密钥统计涨落。



T.-Y. Chen *et al.*, *Optics Express* Vol. 17, Iss. 8, pp. 6540–6549 (2009).

3节点光量子电话网络

- ◆ 任意两节点间的量子电话
- ◆ 任意节点对于另外两个节点的加密广播



Quantum Phone Calls

Certain conversations or transactions meant to be private. Yet despite the of digital communication in one fo

有了这样的演示，量子隐私进入千家万户不会是很遥远的未来。

Sharing quantum mechanically-generated stations. With such a demonstration, photons can provide a secure key to encrypt and send a message, sa

knowledge that the message cannot be opened by an eavesdropper, at least not without alerting you to the breach. **Chen et al. demonstrate a quantum key distribution protocol in a real-world application scenario, with the quantum keys generated over a network consisting of nodes linked by 20 km of commercial fiber-optic cables.** The generated keys can be used solely in the context of encrypted real-time telephone conversations between the separated stations. **With such a demonstration, quantum privacy in your own home may not be a too distant prospect.** — ISO

中国科学技术大学 陈凯

Science的报道

News & Analysis

China creates quantum network

Researchers in China claim to have built what they say is "the world's first quantum cryptography network for telephony". They have used the network to send completely secure telephone messages between three nodes located in Hefei, Anhui Province, in the east of the country. They say that the new system is better suited to real-world applications than networks developed by rival researchers.

Quantum cryptography exploits the principles of quantum mechanics to create keys for encoding and decoding messages with complete security. These keys are made up of the quantum states of subatomic particles, which means that an eavesdropper who tries to observe the keys will alter them and the eavesdropper's presence. Several firms, such as Toshiba and MagiQ Technologies, have built commercial quantum cryptographic devices but usually these are limited to sending encrypted data between two fixed points.

The Chinese network, developed by Jianwei Pan and colleagues at the University of Science and Technology of China, involves three nodes connected in a chain by two 20 km-long commercial fibre-optic cables. Quantum keys consisting of photons with varying phase are shared between the adjacent nodes. Pan and colleagues claim to have used their network to send telephone messages in real time between three users as well as broadcast voice messages from one user to the other two (*Optics Express* 17 6540).

According to Pan's colleague Zeng-Bing Chen, the network has a number of advantages over quantum-cryptographic networks built in other countries because it uses "decoy" photon pulses. He points out that not only do the decoy pulses make the network more secure — by preventing eavesdroppers siphoning off the excess photons generated by imperfect single-photon sources — but they also allow faster key generation and offer potentially longer distances between nodes — up to some 100 km, compared with 30 km for rival technologies. In addition, he says that the equipment used at each node is compact, cheap — costing about € 50000 — and reliable.

However, Christian Morlok, project manager of the European-Union funded Secure Communication based on Quantum Cryptography consortium, which displayed a six-node quantum-cryptography network in Vienna last year (see *Physicist World* November 2008 p10), believes the Chinese set up is not really a network because messages cannot be rerouted if faults occur. He also says that quantum key distribution in the Chinese network is integrated into the telephony applications and so other kinds of secure data transmission — such as document exchange — would require the development of new apparatus, whereas key exchange in the Austrian network is application independent.

Chen says that quantum-key exchange and applications are in fact completely independent in his group's network. He believes that the technology could be used commercially within two or three years, but that the size of the market will depend on further increasing key-generation speeds and extending the maximum distance between links.

Edwin Cartledge

Physics World的报道

T.-Y. Chen et al., *Optics Express* Vol. 17, Iss. 8, pp. 6540–6549 (2009).

5节点星型量子密钥分配网络系统

全通型量子通信网络




Chen *et al.*, *Optics Express* 18, 27217 (2010)
中国科学技术大学 陈凯

实用化城域量子通信网络




合肥全通型城域量子通信网络

Chen *et al.*, Opt. Express 17, 6540 (2009)
Chen *et al.*, Opt. Express 18, 27217 (2010)



金融信息量子通信验证网(2012)



合肥城域量子通信试验示范网 (46个节点, 2012年)

系统集成




实用化城域量子通信网络




合肥全通型城域量子通信网络

Chen *et al.*, *Opt. Express* 17, 6540 (2009)
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第四章 量子通信

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5. 诱骗态(Decoy-state QKD)
 - ① Decoy QKD原理
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- 10. 量子通信商用公司**
11. 量子通信发展与实用化QKD之路



商用QKD产品



MagiQ


- ◆ 1999建立于美国，目前设有Boston总部和纽约Office。
- ◆ 大致从2008年起建立了MagiQ Research Labs，与US Army, DARPA, NASA以及与包括世界500强的多个公司进行联合研究。



MAGIQ QPN™ 8505



MagiQ



MagiQ

MagiQ QPN™: State of the Art Quantum Cryptography

MagiQ QPN is a market leading Quantum Cryptography solution that delivers advanced network security and fool-proof defense against the numerous cryptographic key distribution and management challenges.

Keys generated and disseminated using QPN quantum cryptography consist of truly random characters that are distributed based upon the laws of quantum mechanics, which guarantees that **keys cannot be intercepted during the key exchange session**. Therefore, MagiQ QPN provides security that will remain secure against future advances in algorithms, computational power, hardware design, and even quantum computing.

How It Works

Who Needs It?

Features & Benefits

Protecting **financial information** is one of the highest priorities of corporations and entities involved in financial management and securities exchange. With MagiQ QPN, financial organizations can secure their most critical communication links to prevent intrusion and data theft. MagiQ QPN supports a variety of network architectures and provides the cryptographic key exchange infrastructure to protect the information channels.

Storage area networks offer the promise of protecting corporate assets offsite by creating electronic copies of critical information for future retrieval. Encryption is used to protect the data link to the storage site (data in transit) and to protect the data at the site (data at rest). QPN guarantees high-security in storage area network applications to better meet customer security requirements now and for the future.

Military and Government

Hostile forces are a real and a continuous threat to government and military network security. QPN can safeguard against hackers and unwanted network security breaches by "trusted" insiders attempting to access highly-classified government and military information.

MagiQ QPN enables future-proof quantum security for other industries as well:


- ✓ R&D companies looking to protect trade secrets, intellectual properties, patents and business plans
- ✓ Voice and data service providers who need to secure confidential customer data and/or access to the network command channel
- ✓ Large Power Grid Providers open to terrorist or malicious hacking into the command and control channel interfaces

How it Works

Who Needs It?

Features & Benefits

The security of quantum cryptography lies in its ability to exchange the encryption keys with absolute security – Quantum Key Distribution. By sending the key bits encoded at the single photon level on a photon-by-photon basis, quantum mechanics guarantees that the act of an eavesdropper observing a photon irretrievably changes the information encoded on that photon. Therefore, the eavesdropper can neither copy nor clone, nor read the information encoded on the photon without modifying it; eavesdropping is instantly detected making this key exchange uncompromisingly secure.



QPN implements the BB84 protocol, invented by Bennet and Brassard in 1984. This protocol assumes that the sender and recipient share an optical link (fiber) and a classical (non-quantum) unsecured communication channel, for example, a standard internet link.

QPN sends photons over the fiber to create the secure keys between two QPN stations. A photon is an elementary light particle that has measurable properties, like polarization, which can be 'up' or 'down'. These can be used to encode and transmit a value of a bit from one QPN station to the other. The transmitting QPN station uses a truly random number generator to come up with the value of the bit encoded on the photon.

The security of the BB84 protocol is based on the fundamental Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, that states that observing a photon (eavesdropping) does change its properties, i.e., in the presence of eavesdropping, the values of the received bits will differ from the values of the bits sent. This fundamental principal eliminates the ability of any eavesdropper to hide his/her 'footprints on the photon.'

ID Quantique 产品

◆ id Quantique (IDQ) 在2001年建于Geneva

◆ 公司产品

n Centauris Layer 2 Encryptors: High speed multi-protocol encryptors

n Cerberis: A fast and secure solution of high speed encryption combined with quantum key distribution。典型的基于AES应用

n Clavis²: QKD for R&D Applications

n 探测器，随机数发生器，短脉冲激光源等



Quantum-Safe Network Encryption

<p>Centauris CN9000 Series</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">High assurance, ultra low latency encryptionQRNG-powered 100Gbps encryptionRugged, scalable and simpleUpgradeable to Quantum-Safe Security PRODUCT DETAILS	<p>Centauris CN6000 Series</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">Rugged, business-class encryptionAddressing the most performance-oriented environmentsUltra-reliable, defence-grade for enterprise customersUpgradeable to Quantum-Safe Security PRODUCT DETAILS
<p>Centauris CN4000 Series</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">High assurance, transparent, full-line rate encryptionVersatile, supports all Layer 2 network topologiesCost-effectiveEasy installation and management PRODUCT DETAILS	<p>Centauris CV1000 Virtual Encryptor</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">Agile, scalable solutionMulti-Layer (L2, L3 & L4) network architectures100% interoperability with IDQ Centauris encryptorsCost-effective PRODUCT DETAILS

Quantum Key Distribution

<p>Clavis XG QKD System</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">Long range (up to 180 km)High key rate (>100 Mbit/s)Complex network topologies (ring, hub and spoke, meshed, star)Controlled and monitored centrallyInteroperability with major DDMeth and OTN encryptors PRODUCT DETAILS	<p>Cerberis XG QKD System</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">Short/medium range (up to 50km)Standard key rate (2-6k/s)Complex network topologies (ring, hub and spoke, meshed, star)Controlled and monitored centrallyInteroperability with major DDMeth and OTN encryptors PRODUCT DETAILS
<p>XQR Series - QKD Platform</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">Open QKD platform for R&D applicationsEmbedded KMS for key distributionInterface to external encryptorsUser-friendly interface for technology evaluation and testing PRODUCT DETAILS	<p>Cerberis³ QKD System</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">Complex network topologies (ring, hub and spoke)Interoperability with major DDMeth and OTN encryptorsEasy integration in any data centreCentrally monitored solutionMultiplexing of all channels on single fibre for multipoint star area PRODUCT DETAILS

ID Quantique

2019 SK Telecom Continues to Protect its 5G Network with Quantum Cryptography Technologies

2010 FIFA 世界杯

Durban, South Africa – The first use of ultra secure quantum encryption at a world public event, 基于AES 256




SK Telecom Continues to Protect its 5G Network with Quantum Cryptography Technologies

- SK Telecom applied Quantum Random Number Generator (QRNG) to the subscriber authentication center of its 5G network
- SK Telecom plans to apply Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) technology to the Seoul-Daejeon section of its LTE and 5G networks to prevent hacking and eavesdropping
- SK Telecom is playing a pivotal role in global standardization of QKD and QRNG technologies at ITU-T.

ID Quantique

Quantique and CryptoNext partner to deliver next-gen, quantum-safe messaging



The solution aims at enabling governments, enterprises and organizations of all types to manage sensitive communications for specific groups of people, such as executive teams, and/or specific projects.



Telefonica, Fortinet & IDQ demonstrate the first Quantum-Safe IPVPN connection suitable for managed datacentre interconnect

7th October 2021

Telefonica, Fortinet and IDQ have jointly demonstrated the first Quantum-Safe IPVPN connection suitable for offering a fully managed datacenter interconnection service.

[DISCOVER MORE](#)

量子通信产业化

我们的征程是星辰大海

科大国盾量子技术股份有限公司

用量子技术保护每一个比特 | Quantum Secures Every Bit



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问天量子 服务安全

专业从事量子信息安全服务
我们为政府、金融、军方等需要信息安全保障的部门提供信息安全保障

Manufacturing
Supply chain
Product

科大国盾量子技术股份有限公司 (QuantumCTek Co., Ltd.)


量子保密通信网络核心设备



量子安全应用产品



管控软件



核心组件



科学与科研仪器



大容量商用化超长距量子共纤传输应用



北京农商银行城域网量子技术应用



交通银行企业网银用例建设



网商银行云上量子加密通信案例



工商银行异地数据千公里级量子加密传输应用



骨干网应用



城域网应用



局域网应用



政务应用



金融应用



国盾量子

The image shows a website banner for QuantumCTek. The top part features a scenic landscape with a snow-capped mountain peak and a lake reflecting the sky. The company name 'QuantumCTek' is prominently displayed in white. Below it, the tagline '用量子技术保护每一个比特' (Quantum Secures Every Bit) is written in smaller white text. Further down, the slogan '开拓者 实践者 引领者' (Pioneer, Practitioner, Leader) is shown. The bottom section of the banner has a red background with the slogan '不忘初心 光量未来' (Do not forget the original heart, light up the future) in large, glowing yellow characters. Below this, the text '科大国盾量子技术股份有限公司首次公开发行股票并在科创板上市仪式' (Kuangong QuantumCTek Technology Co., Ltd. IPO ceremony on the STAR Market) is displayed, along with the sponsor '保荐机构 (主承销商): 国元证券股份有限公司' (Sponsor (Main Underwriter): Guoyuan Securities Co., Ltd.) and the date '二〇二〇年七月九日' (July 9, 2020). The QuantumCTek logo and stock information are also present in the bottom left and right corners of the banner.

国盾量子
QuantumCTek

QuantumCTek

Quantum Secures Every Bit

开拓者 实践者 引领者

股票简称: 国盾量子
股票代码: 688027

不忘初心 光量未来

科大国盾量子技术股份有限公司首次公开发行股票并在科创板上市仪式

保荐机构 (主承销商): 国元证券股份有限公司
二〇二〇年七月九日

科大国盾量子技术股份有限公司



量子安全加密路由器

量子安全加密路由器是结合量子保密通信技术与经典通信技术的高保密量子安全产品。该产品采用量子保密通信技术，结合设计理念和模块化可扩展的平台，凭借“安全可靠、性能强劲、一机多能、弹性扩展、轻松易维、绿色节能”六大特性，满足用户当前和未来各种业务部署的需求，为实现信息高安全传送提供智能而有弹性的设备平台。



国盾安全手机A2021H

国盾安全手机 (A2021H) 将量子保密通信技术融入最新一代制程5G终端。产品基于全国量子加密系统和量子安全操作系统实现。与传统加密手机相比，其量子安全加密功能和操作系统在注重隐私保护的同时兼顾高应用性能。

- | | |
|--|--|
| 关键特性 | 典型应用 |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">量子密钥网络安全保护自主安全操作系统防窃听防泄方便易用5G先锋AI智能系统引擎 | <ul style="list-style-type: none">移动办公移动办公/作业移动电子政府物联网移动支付 |



量子安全SSL VPN

量子安全SSL VPN产品是结合量子保密通信技术与SSL VPN技术的一款高保密量子安全产品。该产品为科大国盾量子携手深信服科技推出的量子安全SSL VPN产品，具备量子密钥保护、全面安全、快速接入等特性。

60+比特层叠版



8比特减重版



科大国盾量子技术股份有限公司 (QuantumCTek Co., Ltd.)

阿里云、科大国盾量子合作实现
首个云上量子加密通信服务




阿里云



华北3
华北2
华北1
华东1
华南
香港

科大国盾量子技术股份有限公司 (QuantumCTek Co., Ltd.)



交通银行
BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS
企业网银实时转账远程传输应用


交通银行企业网银系统是以先进的网上银行技术平台构建起来的电子银行服务系统。其服务器安置于上海张江的数据中心。与量子保密通信相结合后，企业客户可访问企业网银门户网站，使用更加安全的转账业务。

第四章 量子通信

1. 保密通信
2. QKD基本原理
3. BB84协议过程
4. QKD安全性
5. 诱骗态(Decoy-state QKD)
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8. 量子纠缠交换(Entanglement Swapping)
9. 量子通信网络
10. 量子通信商用公司
- 11. 量子通信发展与实用化QKD之路**

量子通信的发展

地面量子通信实验在几百公里以上存在技术障碍





- 1、全球量子密钥分发网络
- 2、在空间大尺度下的量子通信实现

Free-Space Quantum Communication

Phase 1:

Test the possibility of single photon and entangled photons passing through atmosphere



- Free-space quantum entanglement distribution ~13km
Peng et al., PRL 94, 150501 (2005)

- Free-space quantum teleportation (16km)
 - Scheme: Boschi et al., PRL 80, 1121(1998)
 - Experiment: Jin et al., Nature Photonics 4, 376 (2010)


Well beyond the effective thickness of the aerosphere!

Free-Space Quantum Communication

Phase 2:

Test the feasibility of quantum communication via high-loss ground-to-satellite channel

Free-Space Quantum Teleportation (97km)



State	Fidelity
H	0.814 ± 0.031
V	0.886 ± 0.024
$+$	0.773 ± 0.031
$-$	0.781 ± 0.031
R	0.808 ± 0.026
L	0.760 ± 0.027

Four-photon quantum teleportation experiment

R Entanglement source: 450000/s

R Four-photon coincidence rate: 1500/s

high-brightness entangled photon source technology used in our 8-photon entanglement experiment

Channel loss:
35-53dB


V. S.

Loss for an uplink of ground to satellite:
45dB

Free-Space Quantum Communication

Free-space quantum entanglement distribution (over 100km)

Yin et al., *Nature* 488, 185 (2012)



Violation of CHSH inequality:
 2.51 ± 0.21

Channel loss:
66-85dB

V. S.

Loss for two-downlink
between satellite and
two ground stations:
75dB

世界首颗量子卫星



中国科学技术大学 陈凯

“墨子号”量子卫星与地面站通信试验照片公布

@曹俊IHEP

转flyingSPACE：墨子号量子卫星和地面兴隆站进行的通信试验，红光为地面发射，绿光为墨子号发射（感谢韩越阳提供照片）

收起 查看大图 向左旋转 向右旋转



@曹俊IHEP



航空航天网
weibo.com/9ifly

“墨子号”量子卫星与地面站量子通信

世界首颗量子科学实验卫星“墨子号”成功发射


千公里级星地双向量子纠缠分发及
空间尺度量子力学非定域性检验

01



1200公里星地量子密钥分发

02



1400公里地星量子隐形传态

03




2017-08-10

热烈祝贺“墨子号”顺利完成
三大科学实验任务

中国率先掌握星地一体广域量子通信网络技术


摘自国盾量子新闻

“墨子号”量子卫星与地面站装置图



Extended Data Figure 2 | The Micius satellite and the payloads. a, A full view of the Micius satellite before being assembled into the rocket. b, The experimental control box. c, The APT control box. d, The optical transmitter. e, Left side view of the optical transmitter optics head. f, Top side view of the optical transmitter optics head.

广域量子通信



城域量子通信网络的规模化 +
可信中继和量子中继器的城际量子网络 +
星地量子通信

➔ 广域量子通信网络

实用化QKD之路

TABLE I. List of quantum hacking strategies.

Attack	Source or detection	Target component	Manner	Year
Photon number splitting (Brassard <i>et al.</i> , 2000; Lütkenhaus, 2000)	Source	WCP (multiphotons)	Theory	2000
Detector fluorescence (Kurtsiefer <i>et al.</i> , 2001)	Detection	Detector	Theory	2001
Faked state (Makarov and Hjelme, 2005; Makarov, Anisimov, and Skaar, 2006)	Detection	Detector	Theory	2005
Trojan horse (Vakhitov, Makarov, and Hjelme, 2001; Gisin <i>et al.</i> , 2006)	Source and detection	Backreflection light	Theory	2006
Time shift (Qi, Fung <i>et al.</i> , 2007; Zhao <i>et al.</i> , 2008)	Detection	Detector	Experiment ^a	2007
Time side channel (Lamas-Linares and Kurtsiefer, 2007)	Detection	Timing information	Experiment	2007
Phase remapping (Fung <i>et al.</i> , 2007; Xu, Qi, and Lo, 2010)	Source	Phase modulator	Experiment ^a	2010
Detector blinding (Makarov, 2009; Lydersen <i>et al.</i> , 2010)	Detection	Detector	Experiment ^a	2010
Detector blinding (Gerhardt <i>et al.</i> , 2011a; Gerhardt <i>et al.</i> , 2011b)	Detection	Detector	Experiment	2011
Detector control (Lydersen, Akhlaghi <i>et al.</i> , 2011; Wiechers <i>et al.</i> , 2011)	Detection	Detector	Experiment	2011
Faraday mirror (Sun, Jiang, and Liang, 2011)	Source	Faraday mirror	Theory	2011
Wavelength (Li <i>et al.</i> , 2011; Huang <i>et al.</i> , 2013)	Detection	Beam splitter	Experiment	2011
Dead time (Henning <i>et al.</i> , 2011)	Detection	Detector	Experiment	2011
Channel calibration (Jain <i>et al.</i> , 2011)	Detection	Detector	Experiment ^a	2011
Intensity (Jiang <i>et al.</i> , 2012; Sajeed, Radchenko <i>et al.</i> , 2015)	Source	Intensity modulator	Experiment	2012
Phase information (Sun <i>et al.</i> , 2012, 2015; Tang <i>et al.</i> , 2013)	Source	Phase randomization	Experiment	2012
Memory attacks (Barrett, Colbeck, and Kent, 2013)	Detection	Classical memory	Theory	2013
Local oscillator (Jouguet, Kunz-Jacques, and Diamanti, 2013; Ma <i>et al.</i> , 2013a) ^b	Detection	Local oscillator	Experiment	2013
Trojan horse (Jain <i>et al.</i> , 2014, 2015)	Source and detection	Backreflection light	Experiment	2014
Laser damage (Bugge <i>et al.</i> , 2014; Makarov <i>et al.</i> , 2016)	Detection	Detector	Experiment	2014
Laser seeding (Sun <i>et al.</i> , 2015)	Source	Laser phase or intensity	Experiment	2015
Spatial mismatch (Sajeed, Chaiwongkhot <i>et al.</i> , 2015; Chaiwongkhot <i>et al.</i> , 2019)	Detection	Detector	Experiment	2015
Detector saturation (Qin, Kumar, and Alléaume, 2016) ^b	Detection	Homodyne detector	Experiment	2016
Covert channels (Curty and Lo, 2019)	Detection	Classical memory	Theory	2017
Pattern effect (Yoshino <i>et al.</i> , 2018)	Source	Intensity modulator	Experiment	2018
Detector control (Qian <i>et al.</i> , 2018)	Detection	Detector	Experiment	2018
Laser seeding (Sun <i>et al.</i> , 2015; Huang <i>et al.</i> , 2019; Pang <i>et al.</i> , 2019)	Source	Laser	Experiment	2019
Polarization shift (Wei, Zhang <i>et al.</i> , 2019)	Detection	SNSPD	Experiment	2019

^aDemonstration on a commercial QKD system.

^bContinuous-variable QKD.



实用化QKD之路


TABLE II. List of decoy-state QKD experiments and their performance.

Reference	Clock rate	Encoding	Channel	Maximal distance	Key rate (bits/s)	Year
Zhao <i>et al.</i> (2006a, 2006b)	5 MHz	Phase	Fiber	60 km	422.5	2006
Peng <i>et al.</i> (2007)	2.5 MHz	Polarization	Fiber	102 km	8.1	2007
Rosenberg <i>et al.</i> (2007)	2.5 MHz	Phase	Fiber	107 km	14.5	2007
Schmitt-Manderbach <i>et al.</i> (2007)	10 MHz	Polarization	Free space	144 km	12.8 ^a	2007
Yuan, Sharpe, and Shields (2007)	7.1 MHz	Phase	Fiber	25.3 km	5.5 K	2007
Yin <i>et al.</i> (2008)	1 MHz	Phase	Fiber	123.6 km	1.0	2008
Wang <i>et al.</i> (2008) ^b	0.65 MHz	Phase	Fiber	25 km	0.9	2008
Dixon <i>et al.</i> (2008)	1 GHz	Phase	Fiber	100.8 km	10.1 K	2008
Peev <i>et al.</i> (2009)	7 MHz	Phase	Fiber network	33 km	3.1 K	2009
Rosenberg <i>et al.</i> (2009)	10 MHz	Phase	Fiber	135 km	0.2	2009
Yuan <i>et al.</i> (2009)	1.036 GHz	Phase	Fiber	100 km	10.1 K	2009
Chen <i>et al.</i> (2009)	4 MHz	Phase	Fiber network	20 km	1.5 K	2009
Liu <i>et al.</i> (2010)	320 MHz	Polarization	Fiber	200 km	15.0	2010
Chen <i>et al.</i> (2010)	320 MHz	Polarization	Fiber network	130 km	0.2 K	2010
Sasaki <i>et al.</i> (2011)	1 GHz	Phase	Fiber network	45 km	304.0 K	2011
Wang <i>et al.</i> (2013)	100 MHz	Polarization	Free space	96 km	48.0	2013
Fröhlich <i>et al.</i> (2013)	125 MHz	Phase	Fiber network	19.9 km	43.1 K	2013
Lucamarini <i>et al.</i> (2013)	1 GHz	Phase	Fiber	80 km	120.0 K	2013
Fröhlich <i>et al.</i> (2017)	1 GHz	Phase	Fiber	240 km ^c	8.4	2017
Liao <i>et al.</i> (2017a)	100 MHz	Polarization	Free space	1200 km	1.1 K	2017
Yuan <i>et al.</i> (2018)	1 GHz	Phase	Fiber	2 dB	13.7 M	2018
Boaron <i>et al.</i> (2018)	2.5 GHz	Time bin	Fiber	421 km ^c	6.5	2018

^aAsymptotic key rate.

^bHeralded single-photon source.

^cUltra-low-loss fiber.



实用化QKD之路

TABLE III. List of MDI-QKD experiments and their performance.

Reference	Clock rate	Encoding	Distance or loss	Key rate (bits/s)	Year	Notes
Rubenok <i>et al.</i> (2013) ^a	2 MHz	Time bin	81.6 km	0.24 ^b	2013	Field-installed fiber
Liu <i>et al.</i> (2013)	1 MHz	Time bin	50 km	0.12	2013	First complete demonstration
Ferreira da Silva <i>et al.</i> (2013) ^a	1 MHz	Polarization	17 km	1.04 ^b	2013	Multiplexed synchronization
Z. Tang <i>et al.</i> (2014)	0.5 MHz	Polarization	10 km	4.7×10^{-3}	2014	Active phase randomization
Y.-L. Tang <i>et al.</i> (2014)	75 MHz	Time bin	200 km	0.02	2014	Fully automatic system
Tang <i>et al.</i> (2015)	75 MHz	Time bin	30 km	16.9	2015	Field-installed fiber
C. Wang <i>et al.</i> (2015)	1 MHz	Time bin	20 km	8.3 ^b	2015	Phase reference free
Valivarthi <i>et al.</i> (2015)	250 MHz	Time bin	60 dB	5×10^{-2}	2015	Test in various configurations
Pirandola <i>et al.</i> (2015) ^a	10.5 MHz	Phase	4 dB	0.1	2015	Continuous variable
Y.-L. Tang <i>et al.</i> (2016)	75 MHz	Time bin	55 km	16.5	2016	First fiber network
Yin <i>et al.</i> (2016)	75 MHz	Time bin	404 km	3.2×10^{-4}	2016	Longest distance
G.-Z. Tang <i>et al.</i> (2016)	10 MHz	Polarization	40 km	10	2016	Include modulation errors
Comandar <i>et al.</i> (2016) ^a	1 GHz	Polarization	102 km	4.6 K	2016	High repetition rate
Kaneda <i>et al.</i> (2017) ^a	1 MHz	Time bin	14 dB	0.85	2017	Heralded single-photon source
C. Wang <i>et al.</i> (2017)	1 MHz	Time bin	20 km	6.3×10^{-3}	2017	Stable against polarization change
Valivarthi <i>et al.</i> (2017)	20 MHz	Time bin	80 km	100	2017	Cost-effective implementation
H. Liu <i>et al.</i> (2018)	50 MHz	Time bin	160 km	2.6 ^b	2018	Phase reference free
H. Liu <i>et al.</i> (2019)	75 MHz	Time bin	100 km	14.5	2019	Asymmetric channels
Wei <i>et al.</i> (2019)	1.25 GHz	Polarization	20.4 dB	6.2 K	2019	Highest repetition or key rate

^aNo random modulations.

^bAsymptotic key rate.



TABLE IV. List of TF-QKD experiments.

Reference	Distance or loss	Key rate (bits/s)	Year
Minder <i>et al.</i> (2019)	90.8 dB	0.045 ^a	2019
Wang, He <i>et al.</i> (2019)	300 km	2.01×10^3 ^a	2019
Y. Liu <i>et al.</i> (2019)	300 km	39.2	2019
Zhong <i>et al.</i> (2019)	55.1 dB	25.6 ^a	2019
Fang <i>et al.</i> (2019)	502 km ^b	0.118	2019
J.-P. Chen <i>et al.</i> (2020)	509 km ^b	0.269	2019

^aAsymptotic key rate.

^bUltra-low-loss fiber.

实用化QKD之路

TABLE V. List of some recent CV-QKD experiments and their performance.

Reference	Clock rate	Distance or loss	Key rate (bits/s)	Year	Notes
Jouguet <i>et al.</i> (2013)	1 MHz	80.5 km	~250	2013	Full implementation
Qi <i>et al.</i> (2015)	25 MHz	2015	Local LO
Soh <i>et al.</i> (2015)	250 kHz	2015	Local LO
Huang, Huang <i>et al.</i> (2015)	100 MHz	25 km	100 K	2015	Local LO
Pirandola <i>et al.</i> (2015)	10.5 MHz	4 dB	0.1	2015	CV MDI-QKD
Huang, Lin <i>et al.</i> (2015)	50 MHz	25 km	~1 M	2015	High key rate
Kumar, Qin, and Alléaume (2015)	1 MHz	75 km	490	2015	Coexistence with classical
Zhang <i>et al.</i> (2020)	5 MHz	202.8 km ^a	6.2	2020	Long distance

^aUltra-low-loss fiber.

TABLE VI. List of chip-based QKD experiments.

Reference	Clock rate	Distance or loss	Key rate (bits/s)	Year	Notes
C. Ma <i>et al.</i> (2016)	10 MHz	5 km	0.95 K	2016	Silicon, decoy BB84
Sibson <i>et al.</i> (2017)	1.72 GHz	4 dB	565 K	2017	InP, DPS
Sibson, Kennard <i>et al.</i> (2017)	1.72 GHz	20 km	916 K	2017	Silicon, COW
Bunandar <i>et al.</i> (2018)	625 MHz	43 km	157 K	2018	Silicon, decoy BB84
Ding <i>et al.</i> (2017)	5 kHz	4 dB	~7.5	2018	Silicon, high dimension
G. Zhang <i>et al.</i> (2019)	1 MHz	16 dB	0.14 K	2019	Silicon, CV-QKD
Paraíso <i>et al.</i> (2019)	1 GHz	20 dB	270 K	2019	InP, modulator free
Wei <i>et al.</i> (2019)	1.25 GHz	140 km	497	2019	Silicon, MDI-QKD



其他QKD协议

TABLE VII. List of recent experiments of other QKD protocols.

Reference	Clock rate	Distance or loss	Key rate (bits/s)	Year
Quantum access network (Fröhlich <i>et al.</i> , 2013)	125 MHz	19.9 km	259	2013
Centric network (Hughes <i>et al.</i> , 2013)	10 MHz	50 km	...	2013
RRDPS (Guan <i>et al.</i> , 2015)	500 MHz	53 km	~118.0	2015
RRDPS (Takesue <i>et al.</i> , 2015)	2 GHz	20 km	2.0 K	2015
RRDPS (S. Wang <i>et al.</i> , 2015)	1 GHz	90 km	~800	2015
RRDPS (Li <i>et al.</i> , 2016)	10 kHz	18 dB	15.5	2016
High dimension (Lee <i>et al.</i> , 2014)	8.3 MHz	...	456	2014
High dimension (Zhong <i>et al.</i> , 2015)	cw	20 km	2.7 M	2015
High dimension (Mirhosseini <i>et al.</i> , 2015)	4 kHz	...	6.5	2015
High dimension (Sit <i>et al.</i> , 2017)	...	0.3 km	~30 K	2017
High-dimension (Islam <i>et al.</i> , 2017)	2.5 GHz	16.6 dB	1.07 M	2017
Coherent one way (Korzh <i>et al.</i> , 2015)	625 MHz	307 km	3.2	2015
Modulator free (Yuan <i>et al.</i> , 2016)	1 GHz	40 dB	~10	2016



其它量子安全协议

TABLE VIII. List of recent developments of other quantum-cryptographic protocols beyond QKD.

Protocol	Theory or experiment	Notes
Noisy quantum storage (Damgård <i>et al.</i> , 2008; Wehner, Schaffner, and Terhal, 2008; König, Wehner, and Wullschlegel, 2012)	Theory	Unconditional security
Oblivious transfer (Erven <i>et al.</i> , 2014)	Experiment	Noisy-storage model
Bit commitment (Ng <i>et al.</i> , 2012)	Experiment	Noisy-storage model
Bit commitment (Kent, 2012)	Theory	Relativistic assumption
Bit commitment (Lunghi <i>et al.</i> , 2013; Liu <i>et al.</i> , 2014)	Experiment	Relativistic assumption
Bit commitment (Chakraborty, Chailloux, and Leverrier, 2015; Lunghi <i>et al.</i> , 2015; Verbanis <i>et al.</i> , 2016)	Experiment	Long commitment time
Digital signature (Clarke <i>et al.</i> , 2012)	Experiment	First demonstration
Digital signature (Collins <i>et al.</i> , 2014; Dunjko, Wallden, and Andersson, 2014)	Experiment	No quantum memory
Digital signature (Donaldson <i>et al.</i> , 2016; Yin <i>et al.</i> , 2017a)	Experiment	Insecure channel
Coin flipping (Berlín <i>et al.</i> , 2011; Pappa <i>et al.</i> , 2014)	Experiment	Loss tolerance
Data locking (Fawzi, Hayden, and Sen, 2013; Lloyd, 2013; Lupo, Wilde, and Lloyd, 2014)	Theory	Loss tolerance
Data locking (Liu <i>et al.</i> , 2016; Lum <i>et al.</i> , 2016)	Experiment	Loss tolerance
Blind quantum computing (Broadbent, Fitzsimons, and Kashefi, 2009; Barz <i>et al.</i> , 2012)	Theory and experiment	No quantum memory
Blind quantum computing (Reichardt, Unger, and Vazirani, 2013; Huang <i>et al.</i> , 2017)	Theory and experiment	Classical clients



QKD发展

TABLE IX. List of reviews related to QKD.

Reference	Subject
Gisin <i>et al.</i> (2002)	Experimental basics of QKD
Scarani <i>et al.</i> (2009)	Theoretical basics of QKD
Lo, Curty, and Tamaki (2014), Diamanti <i>et al.</i> (2016), and Zhang <i>et al.</i> (2018)	Practical challenges of QKD
Jain <i>et al.</i> (2016))	Quantum hacking attacks
Xu, Curty, Qi, and Lo <i>et al.</i> (2015)	Measurement-device- independent QKD
Hadfield (2009) and Zhang <i>et al.</i> (2015)	Single-photon detector
X. Ma <i>et al.</i> (2016) and Herrero-Collantes and Garcia-Escartin (2017)	Quantum random number generator
Coles <i>et al.</i> (2017)	Entropy uncertainty relation
Weedbrook <i>et al.</i> (2012), Diamanti and Leverrier (2015), and Laudenbach <i>et al.</i> (2018)	Continuous-variable QKD
Sangouard <i>et al.</i> (2011), Pan <i>et al.</i> (2012), and Munro <i>et al.</i> (2015)	Quantum repeaters
Kimble (2008) and Wehner, Elkouss, and Hanson (2018)	Quantum internet
Brunner <i>et al.</i> (2014)	Bell nonlocality or device-independent QKD
Fitzsimons (2017)	Blind quantum computing
Xavier and Lima (2020)	High-dimensional QKD



自由空间量子光学实验

C.-Y. Lu *et al.*: Micius quantum experiments in space




FIG. 18. Full view of the Micius satellite and the main payloads. (a) Photograph of the Micius satellite prior to launch. (b) Transmitter 1 for QKD, entanglement distribution, and teleportation. (c) Transmitter 2, especially designed for entanglement distribution. (d) Experimental control box. (e) Entangled-photon source.




FIG. 25. Typical receiving ground station for the Micius satellite. (a) Two-axis gimbal telescope. (b) Beacon laser and coarse camera. (c) One of the two layers of the optical receiver box. (d) Typical optical design of the receiver including the receiving telescope, the ATP system, and the QKD-detection module. From Liao *et al.*, 2017a.




FIG. 27. Tracking and QKD processes during an orbit. From Liao *et al.*, 2017a.

Class. Quantum Grav. 29 (2012) 224011

D Rideout *et al*




Figure 1. Overview of the distance and velocity scales achievable in a space environment explorable with man-made systems, with some possible quantum optics experiments at each given distance.

C.-Y. Lu *et al.*, Micius quantum experiments in space, Rev. Mod. Phys., 94 (2022) 035001.

中国科学技术大学 陈凯

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Decoy QKD

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MDI-QKD

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
TF-QKD

Lucamarini, M., Z. Yuan, J. Dynes, and A. Shields, *Nature* 557, 400 (2018) .


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谢谢

乔布斯语录： 2005年斯坦福大学毕业典礼上的讲话



Your time is limited, so don't waste it living someone else's life. Don't be trapped by dogma, which is living with the results of other people's thinking. Don't let the noise of other's opinions drown out your own inner voice.



And most important, have the courage to follow your heart and intuition. They somehow already know what you truly want to become. Everything else is secondary.



乔布斯语录

Innovation distinguishes between a leader and a follower.

The only way to do great work is to love what you do. If you haven't found it yet, keep looking. Don't settle. As with all matters of the heart, you'll know when you find it.

Design is not just what it looks like and feels like. Design is how it works.