

WAR, SOCIALISM, AND THE RISE OF FASCISM: AN EMPIRICAL EXPLORATION*

战争、社会主义和法西斯主义的兴起：实证探索[†]

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摘要

The recent ascent of right-wing populist movements in several countries has rekindled interest in understanding the causes of the rise of fascism in the interwar years. In this article, we argue that there was a strong link between the surge of support for the Socialist Party after World War I and the subsequent emergence of fascism in Italy. We first develop a source of variation in socialist support across Italian municipalities in the 1919 election based on war casualties from the area. We show that these casualties are unrelated to a battery of political, economic, and social variables before the war and had a major effect on socialist support (partly because the socialists were the main antiwar political movement). Our main result is that this boost to socialist support (that is “exogenous” to the prior political leaning of the municipality) led to greater local fascist activity as measured by local party branches and fascist political violence, and to significantly larger vote share of the Fascist Party in the 1921 and 1924 elections. We provide evidence that landowner associations and greater presence of local elites played an important role in the rise of fascism. Finally, we find greater likelihood of Jewish deportations in 1943 - 45 and lower vote share for Christian Democrats after World War II in areas with greater early fascist activity.

最近几个国家右翼民粹主义运动的兴起, 重新激发了人们对理解两次世界大战期间法西斯主义兴起原因的兴趣。在这篇文章中, 我们认为第一次世界大战及其后对社会党的支持, 激增意大利法西斯主义的兴起。我们首先要发展社会主义的变异源, 从该地区根据战争伤亡情况, 意大利各市在1919年选举中对社会主义的支持率。我们证明这些伤亡, 与一系列战前的政治、经济和社会变量无关, 并对关于社会主义的支持(部分原因在于社会主义者是主要的反战政治运动力量)产生了重大影响。我们的主要结果是, 这种对社会主义的支持(即对市政当局先前政治倾向的“外生”)导致了更大的地方性以地方党支部和法西斯政治暴力衡量的法西斯活动, 1921年和1924年, 法西斯党的选票份额大幅增加选举。我们提供的证据表明, 土地所有者协会和地方精英更大的存在, 在法西斯主义的兴起中发挥了重要作用。最后, 我们发现1943-45年, 犹太人被驱逐的可能性更大, 二战后, 基督教民主党, 在早期法西斯活动较多的地区的投票率更低。

关键词 (Key words): right-wing, socialism, fascist / 右翼、社会主义、法西斯主义

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经济学季刊 杂志的影响因子

§1 INTRODUCTION

As we approach the centennial of the March on Rome in 1922, which catapulted Benito Mussolini to power in Italy, there is renewed interest in fascism, partly as a result of the rise of right-wing populist movements around the world (e.g., Judis 2016; Finchelstein 2019). These movements are threatening democratic institutions, media freedom, and some key aspects of state capacity (see Guriev and Papaioannou 2020), and as the responses to the COVID-19 pandemic in Brazil, India, Turkey, and the United States under Donald Trump illustrate, these movements are also having first-order effects on critical economic and social policies. Some scholars have argued that these movements are closely connected to fascism and will similarly turn more violent and antidemocratic over time (e.g., Stanley 2018). Understanding the factors that fueled the rise of fascism during the interwar years can shed light on the dangers ahead and the implications of these movements for economic policy and political dynamics.

† 当我们接近1922年罗马大游行一百周年之际, Benito Mussolini (贝尼托·墨索里尼)在意大利掌权,对法西斯主义重新产生兴趣,部分原因是世界各地的右翼民粹主义运动(例如, Judis 2016; Finchelstein 2019)。这些运动正在威胁民主制度、媒体自由和国家能力的一些关键方面(见 Guriev 和 Papaioannou 2020),以及对新冠肺炎在巴西、印度、土耳其和美国的大流行, Donald Trump (唐纳德·特朗普)领导下的各州表明,这些运动也是对关键的经济和社会政策产生一级影响。一些学者认为,这些运动,与法西斯主义密切相关。随着时间的推移,同样会变得更加暴力和反民主(例如 Stanley 2018)。了解两次世界大战期间助长法西斯主义兴起的因素,可以揭示未来的危险,及其影响经济政策和政治动态的运动。

An influential thesis advanced by German historian Ernst Nolte (1965) as well as theories put forward by several Marxist historians in the 1920s and 1930s maintains that fascism was a reaction to the threat of socialism in the immediate aftermath of World War I (see also Snowden 1972; Lyttelton 2003). Yet this perspective has been criticized by many scholars who view fascism as “the expression of an emerging middle class... that up until that moment had remained excluded” (De Felice and Ledeen 1976, 71), and conclude “People who voted for the Fascists in 1921 were probably not reacting to the ‘Red Menace’” (Brustein 1991, 662). This debate is not just academic: if fascism was unique to a period in which World War I and the Soviet revolution had created a threat of socialist revolution in continental Europe, there may be less reason to fear that today’s right-wing populist movements will turn fascist.

† 德国历史学家 Ernst Nolte 一篇颇有影响力的论文, Ernst Nolte (1965), 以及几位马克思主义历史学者提出的理论,坚持认为法西斯主义是战后对社会主义威胁的反应。第一次世界大战期间(另见 Snowden 1972; Lyttelton 2003)。然而,这一观点受到了许多把法西斯主义,看作“新兴中产阶级的表达”的学者的批评,直到那一刻出现,仍然被排除在外。De Felice 和 Ledeen (De Felice 和 Ledeen 1976, 71) 得出结论:“1921年投票支持法西斯的人可能对“红色威胁”没有反应(Brustein 1991, 662)”。这场辩论,不仅仅是学术性的:法西斯主义是否是第一次世界大战时期独有的,和苏联革命创造了欧洲大陆可能面临社会主义革命的威胁,不必担心今天的右翼民粹主义运动会变成法西斯。

In this article, we contribute to this debate by providing evidence that the (perceived) threat of socialism was critical to the rise of fascism in Italy. The Italian Socialist Party was one of the strongest in Europe in the first quarter of the twentieth century and was committed to a hard-line socialist/communist agenda (Tasca 1938). After the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, it allied itself with

Soviet Russia. Because it had opposed Italy's entry into World War I, the hardship suffered by Italians who served in the war and those who remained behind created a groundswell of support for the party, which captured 32.3% of the national vote in the 1919 elections (Maier 1988, 129). At this point, the Fascist Party lacked a coherent program and did not even manage to compete effectively in the election. Subsequently, the fascists started receiving support from many local elites and middle-class Italians alarmed by the socialist threat. By 1920, fascists were better organized, received monetary and political backing from many antisocialist landowners and businessmen, and initiated systematic violence against socialists and other politicians and organizations that opposed them. By 1924, a significant fraction of the right-wing and center-right vote shifted to the Fascist Party, which received more than 65% of the vote in the parliamentary elections (Direzione Generale della Statistica 1924).

† 在这篇文章中，我们通过提供证据证明社会主义的（感知到的）威胁，对意大利法西斯主义的兴起至关重要，从而为这场辩论做出了贡献。意大利社会党是二十世纪第一季度欧洲最强大的政党之一，致力于强硬的社会主义/共产主义议程（Tasca, 1938年）。1917年，布尔什维克革命后，它与苏维埃俄国结盟。由于反对意大利加入第一次世界大战，在战争中服役的意大利人和留下来的意大利人所遭受的苦难，为该党创造了巨大的支持，该党在1919年的选举中获得了32.3%的全国选票（Maier 1988, 129）。此时，法西斯党缺乏，一个连贯的纲领，甚至没有在选举中有效竞争。随后，法西斯分子开始得到许多当地精英和意大利中产阶级的支持，他们对社会主义的威胁，感到震惊。到1920年，法西斯分子组织得更好，得到了许多反社会地主和商人的货币和政治支持，并发起了针对社会主义者和其他反对他们的政客和组织的系统性暴力。到1924年，相当一部分右翼和中右翼选票转向了法西斯党，该党在议会选举中获得了65%以上的选票（Direzione Generale della Statistica 1924）。

Our empirical strategy is to investigate the linkage between the threat of socialism and the rise of fascist politics in Italy. We first substantiate the claim that the war's hardship created a big boost to the Socialist Party in the 1919 parliamentary election, as well as in the municipal elections in 1920. We use the military Roll of Honor to obtain estimates of Italian casualties by municipality during World War I. We document that the casualties of foot soldiers in a municipality were unrelated to any prior political, economic, social, or demographic aspects of municipalities. We show that municipalities with high casualties (and thus greater exposure to the war) experienced a sizable increase in the vote share of the Socialist Party in the 1919 elections (both in absolute terms and relative to the 1913 elections). There is a similar increase in the likelihood of the Socialist Party taking control of municipal governments in 1920. We interpret the World War I casualties as an exogenous source of variation in socialist support and trace the subsequent political responses to this variation.

† 我们的实证策略，是调查社会主义的威胁与意大利法西斯政治兴起之间的联系。我们首先证实了这一说法，即战争的困难，在1919年的议会选举，以及1920年的市政选举中，为社会党带来了巨大的推动力。我们使用军事荣誉榜来获得第一次世界大战期间意大利各市的伤亡人数估计。我们记录了一个市的步兵伤亡人数与该市之前的任何政治、经济、社会或人口方面无关。我们表明，伤亡人数高的城市（因此伤亡人数更多）在1919年的选举中（无论是绝对值还是相对于1913年的选举），社会党的选票份额都大幅增加。1920年社会党控制市政府的可能性也有类似的增加。我们将第一次世界大战的伤亡，解释为社会主义支持变化的外生来源，并追踪随后对这种变化的政治反应。

Our main finding is that municipalities experiencing this boost to socialist support saw a powerful fascist response. We measure the fascist response using four distinct variables. The first two are the presence of local Fascist Party branches in 1921 and the extent of fascist violence between 1920 and 1922, and the next two are the fascist vote shares in the 1921 and 1924 elections. We find that the perceived

socialist threat is associated with significantly higher fascist activity and support for the Fascist Party using all four measures. For example, our estimates suggest that the bulk of fascist violence in the early 1920s and about a quarter of the increase in the vote share of the fascist lists from 1919 to 1924 appear to be related to this “red scare” mechanism. We also show that most of this effect is because of the consolidation of right-wing and center-right votes under the auspices of the Fascist Party.

† 我们的主要发现是，经历了社会主义支持的城市看到了强大的法西斯反应。我们使用四个不同的变量来衡量法西斯的反应。前两个是1921年法西斯党地方分支的存在和1920年至1922年法西斯暴力的程度，后两个是法西斯在1921年和1924年选举中的投票份额。我们发现，感知到的社会主义威胁，与使用所有四种措施的法西斯活动和对法西斯党的支持显著增加有关。例如，我们的估计表明，20世纪20年代初的大部分法西斯暴力事件，和约四分之一1919年至1924年法西斯名单投票份额的增加，似乎与这种“红色恐慌”机制有关。我们还表明，这种影响，主要是由于在法西斯党的主持下巩固了右翼和中右翼选票。

There are several potential threats to our identification strategy. For one, war casualties may be related to other long-run differences across municipalities. Or the effects of war casualties may be working through a different mechanism, for instance, because war veterans supported the fascist cause. We provide several exercises to bolster the validity of our approach and interpretation. First, as mentioned, our instrument is unrelated to a battery of pre-1919 municipality characteristics. Second, we show that the source of variation we exploit is unlikely to be confounded by other, competing explanations. For example, we do not find a consistent pattern of support from veterans for the Fascist Party and their inclusion has no effect on the coefficient estimates for the socialist vote share in 1919. Moreover, our instrument does not predict greater support for the Nationalist Party in the 1919 elections, the building of nationalist (war) memorials, or greater volunteer or special assault troop casualties from the municipality. Third, in places where the Socialist Party was weak, and thus the red scare mechanism is unlikely to be operative, the instrument does not predict greater fascist activity, bolstering our overall causal mechanism. Fourth, we document that the shift toward the Fascist Party was stronger when the threat of socialism coincided with better organized landlords and a larger fraction of elites, and provide additional evidence that this is both because some of the elites supported the Fascist Party and because the middle classes switched their allegiance from center-right parties to the fascists.

† 我们的身份识别策略面临几个潜在威胁。首先，战争伤亡，可能与各市之间的其他长期差异有关。或者战争伤亡的影响，可能是通过不同的机制产生的，例如，因为退伍军人支持法西斯事业。我们提供了几个练习来增强我们的方法和解释的有效性。首先，如前所述，我们的工具与1919年前的一系列市政特征无关。其次，我们表明，我们利用的变异来源不太可能被其他相互竞争的解释所混淆。例如，我们没有发现退伍军人对法西斯党的支持模式是一致的，他们的加入，对1919年社会主义选票份额的系数估计没有影响。此外，我们的工具并没有预测民族主义党在1919年的选举、民族主义（战争）纪念碑的建设、或市政府造成更多的志愿者或特种突击队伤亡。第三，在社会党力量薄弱的地方，红色恐慌机制，不太可能发挥作用，该工具不会预测更大的法西斯活动，从而加强我们的整体因果机制。第四，我们记录了当社会主义的威胁，与组织更好的地主和更大比例的精英相吻合时，向法西斯党的转变更为强烈，并提供了额外的证据，证明这既是因为一些精英支持法西斯党，也是因为中产阶级从中右翼政党转向法西斯。

Finally, as an alternative and complementary strategy, we use two other sources of variation in socialist support — droughts in some municipalities and the differential effects of the Spanish flu epidemic. In both cases, the results are not as precise as our main estimates but are consistent with a causal channel

linking hardship to support for the Socialist Party and from there to the rise of the Fascist Party in the early 1920s.

† 最后，作为一种替代和补充策略，我们使用了社会主义支持的另外两个变化来源——一些城市的干旱和西班牙流感疫情的不同影响。在这两种情况下，结果都不如我们的主要估计精确，但与因果渠道联系一致支持社会党的困难，以及从那里到20世纪20年代初法西斯党的崛起。

We also explore two longer-term effects of fascism. First, we show that support for fascism is associated with greater likelihood of Jews being deported from the area between 1943 and 1945, presumably reflecting local collaboration with the Nazis. Second, we document that in postwar elections center-right parties performed significantly worse and center-left and other left-wing parties performed better in municipalities where the Fascist Party was more successful in the 1920s. This may be because the center-right establishment became partly delegitimized due to its alliance with fascists.

† 我们还探讨了法西斯主义的两个长期影响。首先，我们表明，对法西斯主义的支持与1943年至1945年间犹太人驱逐出该地区的可能性更大有关，这可能反映了当地与纳粹的合作。其次，我们记录了在战后选举中，中右翼政党的表现明显较差，中左翼和其他左翼政党在20世纪20年代法西斯党更成功的城市表现更好。这可能是由于中右翼建制派由于与法西斯分子结盟而部分失去了合法性。

In addition to the historical literature mentioned previously, our article is related to a few works in political economy. First, Elazar (2000), Elazar and Lewin (1999), and Szymanski (1973) also emphasize the red scare hypothesis and document province-level correlations between socialist support, fascist violence, and the fascist takeover of the provinces. Brustein (1991) and Wellhofer (2003), on the other hand, dispute this interpretation and suggest that this correlation is likely driven by disaffected socialist voters switching to the Fascist Party (see also Brustein and Berntson 1999 for a cross-country analysis). These papers do not have the detailed municipal-level data we collect, do not attempt to exploit potentially exogenous variation in socialist support, and do not explore the mechanisms we propose (Wellhofer 2003, as a partial exception, uses data for 570 municipalities).¹

† 除了前面提到的历史文献外，我们的文章还涉及政治经济学的一些作品。首先，Elazar (2000)、Elazar 和 Lewin (1999) 以及 Szymanski (1973) 也强调了红色恐慌假说，并记录了社会主义支持、法西斯暴力和法西斯占领各省。另一方面，Brustein (1991) 和 Wellhofer (2003) 对这一解释提出异议，并认为这种相关性，可能是由心怀不满的社会主义选民转向法西斯党所驱动的（另见 Brustein 和 Berntson 1999 的跨国分析）。这些文件不拥有我们收集的详细市级数据，不要试图利用社会主义支持的潜在外生变化，也不要探索我们提出的机制（Wellhofer 2003，作为部分例外，使用570个市的数据）。

A recent influential literature studies the roots of the Nazi movement in Germany. Voigtländer and Voth (2012) document the links between anti-Semitic pogroms in the Middle Ages and support for the Nazi Party, while Satyanath, Voigtländer, and Voth (2017) demonstrate the role of local associations. Adena et al. (2015) and Voigtländer and Voth (2019) explore the effects of radio propaganda and public works, such as the building of the Autobahn network, on Nazi support. Galofré-Vilà et al. (2021) and King et al. (2008) explore the effects of the economic hardship created by the Great Depression, while Doerr et al. (2020) investigate the consequences of the 1931 banking crisis. Most closely related to our work in this context is the recent paper by Koenig (2020), who studies the link between returning

¹The causal mechanism here is also related to Acemoglu, De Feo, and De Luca (2020b), who argued that the rise of the Sicilian Mafia in the last decade of the nineteenth century was a response to the rise of socialist peasant organizations following the severe drought of 1893. † 这里的因果机制也与 Acemoglu、De Feo 和 De Luca (2020b) 有关，他们认为西西里黑手党，在19世纪最后十年的崛起，是对1893年严重干旱后社会主义农民组织崛起的回应。

war veterans and the fall of the Weimar Republic. Koenig (2020) finds that war veterans were an important source of support for the Nationalist Party, though not directly for the Nazis. This contrasts with our results, which show that the red scare played a critical role in the rise of Italian fascists, with less consistent support from veterans. One difference between the two countries may be the greater disillusionment with the war among Italian veterans, especially those from the older cohorts.

† 最近一篇有影响力的文献研究了德国纳粹运动的根源。Voigtlander和Voth (2012) 记录了中世纪反犹太主义大屠杀，与支持纳粹党之间的联系，而Satyanath, Voigtländer 和 Voth (2017) 展示了地方协会的作用。Adena等人 (2015) 和Voigtlander和Voth (2019) 探讨了广播宣传和公共工程（如高速公路网络的建设）对纳粹支持的影响。Galofré-Vilà et al. (2021) 和 King et al. (2008) 探讨了大萧条造成的经济困难的影响，而Doerr等人 (2020) 则研究了1931年银行业危机的后果。与我们在这方面的工作最密切相关的是Koenig (2020) 最近的一篇文章，他研究了归国退伍军人与魏玛共和国垮台之间的联系。Koenig (2020) 发现退伍军人是民族主义党的重要支持来源，尽管不是直接支持纳粹。这与我们的研究结果形成鲜明对比。研究表明，红色恐慌，在意大利法西斯分子的崛起中发挥了关键作用，而退伍军人的支持则不那么一致。两国之间的一个差异，是意大利退伍军人、尤其是老一辈退伍军人的幻灭，可能更大。。

There is much less research on interwar extremist movements outside of Germany and Italy. Two recent exceptions are Berg, Dahlberg, and Vernby (2019), who look at the role of returning war veterans in Sweden, and Cagé et al. (2020), who explore the role of charismatic leaders in legitimizing right-wing ideology in the context of the Nazi occupation of France. Relatedly, Fontana, Nannicini, and Tabellini (2018) estimate the effect of the Nazi occupation in the north of Italy on subsequent support for leftist parties. There is debate among historians concerning the role of industrial and landed elites and the middle classes in the support for fascism (Lipset 1960; Salvatorelli and Mira 1964). Our evidence suggests that middle-class votes were critical for fascist electoral success, but the rise of the party was helped by support from industrial interests and landowners seeking to counter the socialist threat (Moore 1966; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992).

† 关于德国和意大利以外的两次世界大战期间极端主义运动的研究，要少得多。最近的两个例外，是Berg、Dahlberg 和 Vernby (2019)，他们研究了瑞典归国退伍军人的作用，以及Cagé等人 (2020)，他们探讨了在纳粹占领法国的背景下，魅力领袖在使右翼意识形态合法化方面的作用。与此相关，Fontana, Nannicini 和 Tabellini (2018) 估计了纳粹占领意大利北部对随后左翼政党支持的影响。历史学家们，对工业和土地精英以及中产阶级在支持法西斯主义中的作用，存在争议 (Lipset 1960; Salvatorelli 和 Mira 1964)。我们的证据表明，中产阶级的选票，对法西斯选举的成功，至关重要，但该党的崛起，得益于工业利益集团、和寻求对抗社会主义威胁的土地所有者的支持 (Moore 1966; Rueschemeyer, Stephens 和 Stephens 1992)。

The rest of the article is organized as follows. The next section provides the historical context. Section §3 presents our data and sources. Section §4 explores the relationship between foot soldier casualties and the support for the Socialist Party in the 1919 elections, which will be our first stage. Section §5 presents our main results, focusing on the measures of early fascist activity. Section §6 provides evidence on our proposed mechanism, that the rise of fascism was related to the perceived threat of socialism, and Section §7 discusses estimates using alternative sources of variation. Section §8 looks at medium and long-term outcomes; Section §9 concludes. The [Online Appendix](#) provides additional robustness checks and results.

† 文章的其余部分组织如下。第 §2 节提供了历史背景。第 §3 节展示了我们的数据以及来源。第 §4 节探

讨论了脚与脚之间的关系士兵伤亡和对社会党的支持1919年的选举，这将是我们的第一阶段。第 §5节介绍了我们的主要成果，集中在早期法西斯活动的措施上。第 §6节提供了关于我们提出的机制的证据，即法西斯主义的兴起与社会主义的威胁有关，第 §7节讨论了使用其他来源的估算变化。第 §8节着眼于中长期结果；第 §9节结束。[在线附录](#)提供了额外的稳健性检查和结果。

§2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In this section, we trace the historical roots of fascism in Italy. We describe how Italy entered the war; the postwar social, economic, and political distress; and how the Socialist Party became the beneficiary of this crisis. We document the red scare generated by the surge of the Socialist Party, its takeover of local councils, and the spread of riots and rural and industrial strikes during this era, sometimes referred to as the “red biennium.” We finally discuss the origins of the fascist movement and its seizure of power.

† 在本节中，我们将追溯，法西斯主义在意大利的历史根源。我们描述了，意大利是如何参战的；战后的社会、经济和政治困境；以及社会党如何成为这场危机的受益者。我们记录了社会党激增、接管地方政府所引发的红色恐慌，以及这个时代暴乱、农村和工业罢工的蔓延，有时被称为“红色双年度”。我们最后讨论了法西斯运动的起源及其政权的夺取。

§2.1 Italy and the Great War

Italy joined World War I one year after the rest of Europe against its former allies Germany and Austria. Although there was strong opposition to the war in the population at large and in the parliament, the “interventionist” coalition succeeded in engineering the country’s entry into the war, and the nationalist propaganda spearheaded by Benito Mussolini and the newspaper he headed played a crucial role in this process.

† 意大利在[欧洲其他国家](#)反对其前盟友德国和奥地利一年后加入了第一次世界大战。尽管广大民众和议会强烈反对这场战争，但“干涉主义”联盟成功地策划了该国参战，民族主义者 Benito Mussolini (贝尼托·墨索里尼) 及其领导的报纸，在这一过程中，发挥了至关重要的作用。

At the start of the war, the Italian government declared that it would remain neutral, perhaps because it was lagging behind the rest of Europe in terms of military preparedness. The Italian Army had a poor track record, as demonstrated during the first Italo-Ethiopian war of 1895 - 96. Politicians and high-ranking military officials were doubtful about the discipline and preparedness of the troops (Ceva 1999). Moreover, many believed that an alliance with Germany and Austria would have precluded the recapture of Italian territories still under Austrian control and thus prevent the completion of Italy’s unification that had started in 1861 (Ragionieri 1976a, 1962 - 1965). Consequently, the majority of the Members of Parliament, including the Socialists and the Catholics (the Popular Party) were against the war. Even most of the Liberals, led by former Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti, were “neutralists” —opposed to the war and in favor of remaining neutral. A confidential government survey found that the majority of the population, especially in the countryside, was strongly opposed to the war (Bianchi 2014).

† 战争开始时，意大利政府宣布将保持中立，也许是因为它在军事准备方面[落后于](#)欧洲其他国家。意大利军队的战绩不佳，正如1895-96年第一次意大利-埃塞俄比亚战争所证明的那样。政治家和高级军官对部队的纪律和准备情况表示怀疑 (Ceva 1999)。此外，许多人认为，与德国和奥地利结盟将阻

止重新夺回仍在奥地利控制下的意大利领土，从而阻止1861年开始的意大利统一的完成（Ragionieri 1976a, 1962-1965）。因此，大多数议员，包括社会党人和天主教徒（人民党）反对战争。即使是前总理 Giovanni Giolitti 领导的大多数自由党人，也是“中立主义者”，他们反对战争，赞成保持中立。一项机密的政府调查发现，大多数人口，特别是农村人口，强烈反对战争（Bianchi 2014）。

The interventionist movement started gaining momentum after the beginning of the war, however. A diverse coalition comprising nationalist conservatives, liberal radicals, republicans, democratic socialists, and revolutionary syndicalists carried out a campaign of nationalist propaganda and were joined by one of the most prominent newspapers, *Corriere Della Sera*. As summarized by Ragionieri (1976a, 1975): “These ‘storming groups’ exploited the war to create a rupture from the former government indecisiveness. They seized the opportunity to affirm a different Italy, with a different leadership that would be able to save [the country] from its ‘moral crisis’ .”

† 然而，战争开始后，干涉主义运动开始获得势头。由民族主义保守派、自由派激进分子、共和党人、民主社会主义者和革命工团主义者组成的多元化联盟开展了一场民族主义宣传运动，最著名的报纸之一《晚邮报》也加入了进来。正如 Ragionieri (1976a, 1975) 所总结的那样：“这些‘风暴团体’利用了这场战争打破了前政府的犹豫不决。他们抓住机会肯定了一个不同的意大利，一个能够将[国家]从“道德危机”中拯救出来的不同领导层。”

Throughout this process, Mussolini carried out an incessant propaganda campaign for joining the war. Before World War I, Mussolini was a young, combative socialist and one of the leaders of the revolutionary wing of the Socialist Party. In 1913 he became editor of the official Socialist newspaper, *Avanti!* (De Felice 1965, 135). When Austria and Germany were on the verge of declaring war, Mussolini wrote an opinion piece, titled “Down with the War!,” where he suggested that the Italian government should maintain its “absolute neutrality” and help bring the conflict to an end (De Felice 1965, 222). This became the official position of the Socialist Party (Tasca 1938, 8). However, a few months into World War I, Mussolini changed his tune and, while still writing for *Avanti!*, started arguing for the war, collected donations for his own interventionist newspaper, *Il Popolo d’ Italia*, and was subsequently expelled from the Socialist Party (Tasca 1938, 7).

† 在整个过程中，墨索里尼为加入战争进行了不间断的宣传运动。第一次世界大战前，墨索里尼是一位年轻、好斗的社会主义者，也是社会党革命派的领导人之一。1913年，他成为社会党官方报纸《Avanti!》（De Felice 1965:135）的编辑。当奥地利和德国即将宣战时，墨索里尼写了一篇题为《打倒战争!》的评论文章，建议意大利政府保持“绝对中立”，帮助结束冲突（De Felice 1965, 222）。这成为社会党的官方立场（Tasca 1938, 8）。然而，第一次世界大战爆发几个月后，墨索里尼改变了态度，在仍为《Avanti!》写作的同时，开始为战争辩护，为自己的干涉主义报纸《意大利人民报（Il Popolo d’ Italia）》筹集捐款，随后被社会党开除（Tasca 1938, 7）。

Months of interventionist propaganda culminated in demonstrations in spring 1915, which convinced the government and the king to secretly join the war against Austria and Germany. Even though the majority in parliament was still against the war, the government signed, without parliamentary approval, the secret Pact of London on April 26, 1915, committing the country to join the Allies within a month. In exchange, Italy was promised significant territorial compensations (Tasca 1938, 7). On May 24, 1915, Prime Minister Salandra, with the support of the king, declared war on Austria.

† 数月的干涉主义宣传，最终导致1915年春季的示威活动，说服政府和国王，秘密加入对奥地利和德国的战争。尽管议会中的大多数人，仍然反对战争，但政府，在未经议会批准的情况下，于1915年4月26日签署了秘密的《伦敦条约》，承诺该国在一个月内加入盟军。作为交换，意大利，被承诺给予重大的

领土补偿 (Tasca 1938, 7)。1915年5月24日, 萨兰德拉总理, 在国王的支持下向奥地利宣战。

§2.2 Italian Socialism and the Red Scare

The main winners from the postwar political crisis were the Socialist and the Catholic Parties, partly because of their antiwar stance. The Socialist Party became the largest one in parliament, doubling its vote share to 32.3% and trebling its representation in parliament (Ufficio Centrale di Statistica 1920, LV). The interventionist parties suffered a resounding defeat. A contemporary analyst observed: “The Italian electorate has clearly condemned the war by voting en masse for the Socialists and to a lesser extent also for the Populars [Catholics]. The former because the Socialists always stood against the participation in the conflict, the latter because the Populars had no responsibility in the decision to join the war” (Volpi 1919, 237 - 238).

† 战后政治危机的主要赢家是社会党和天主教党, 部分原因是他们的反战立场。社会党成为议会中最大的政党, 其投票份额翻了一番, 达到 32.3%, 在议会中的代表人数增加了两倍 (Ufficio Centrale di Statistica 1920, LV)。干涉主义政党惨败。一位当代分析家观察到: “意大利选民通过集体投票支持社会党, 并在较小程度上谴责了这场战争也为人民[天主教徒]。前者是因为社会主义者总是反对参与冲突, 后者是因为人民在决定加入战争中没有责任” (Volpi 1919, 237-238)。

The Socialist Party, founded in 1892, was a diverse coalition. While its stronghold was the industrial working class of the northwestern industrial triangle, covering the area between Turin, Milan, and Genoa, the party also had a strong following in rural areas, especially in the Po valley. The main division was between the more moderate social democratic and the revolutionary wings of the party. The majority of the party’s membership came from the labor unions, especially the CGL (General Confederation of Labor) and the local work cooperatives. By 1912, the CGL had about 640,000 members, 353,000 industrial workers, and 290,000 rural workers locally organized in leagues and labor unions, while the cooperatives of work and production had more than 800,000 members (Schiavi 1914, 421, 426). Social democrats controlled the leadership of the unions and, largely as a result of this, held the upper hand in the party. This changed as World War I was drawing to a close.

† 成立于1892年的社会党, 是一个多元化的联盟。虽然该党的大本营, 是覆盖都灵、米兰和热那亚之间的西北工业三角地区的工人阶级, 但该党在农村地区, 特别是在波河流域也有强大的追随者。主要的分歧, 在于党内较为温和的社会民主党和革命派之间。该党的大多数成员, 来自工会, 特别是CGL (总工会) 和当地工作合作社。到1912年, CGL约有64万名成员、35.3万名产业工人和29万名农村工人, 他们在当地组织了联盟和工会, 而工作和生产合作社有80多万成员 (Schiavi 1914, 421, 426)。社会民主党人控制了工会的领导权, 并在很大程度上, 因此在党内占据了上风。随着第一次世界大战接近尾声, 情况发生了变化。

The end of the war increased the popular discontent and coincided with a severe economic recession. Gerwarth describes the situation as follows: “In many ways [Italy’ s] post-war experience ... resembled that of the defeated empires of eastern and central Europe more closely than that of France and Britain” (Gerwarth 2016, 6). In fact, contrary to what happened in Paris and London, no parade was organized and the victory was not officially celebrated for two years. Furthermore, Italian expectations for territorial gains were dashed and the war came to be viewed as the *vittoria mutilata* (mutilated victory), a term coined by poet Gabriele d’ Annunzio, who in September 1919 headed a small group of troops to invade the town of Fiume, disputed between Italy and Yugoslavia.

† 战争的结束, 加剧了民众的不满, 并恰逢严重的经济衰退。Gerwarth 将情况描述如下: “在许多方面,

意大利的战后经历与被击败的东欧和中欧帝国的经历,与法国和英国更相似” (Gerwarth 2016, 6)。事实上,与巴黎和伦敦的情况相反,两年来没有组织游行,也没有正式庆祝胜利。此外,意大利人对领土扩张的期望,破灭了,这场战争,被视为 *vittoria mutilata* (残缺的胜利),这是诗人 Gabriele d'Annunzio 创造的一个术语,1919年9月,他率领一小群军队,入侵了意大利和南斯拉夫之间有争议的 Fiume (菲乌梅)镇。

By this point, the balance in the Socialist Party had started changing, with power shifting to the revolutionaries. During the 1918 Congress, the revolutionary wing took control of the party. Their program aspired “to do as in Russia”. A year later the party joined the Communist International (Tasca 1938, 13 - 14), with its new statute explicitly stipulating: “The violent conquest of political power on behalf of the workers will signify the passing of power from the bourgeois class to the proletarian class, thus establishing... the dictatorship of all of the proletariat” (Payne 1996, 89).

† 到那时,社会党的平衡,已经开始改变,权力转移到了革命者手中。1918年国会期间,革命派控制了该党。他们的计划,渴望“像在俄罗斯一样”。一年后,该党加入了共产国际(塔斯卡1938, 13-14),其新章程明确规定:“代表工人,暴力夺取政权,将意味着权力从资产阶级转移到无产阶级,从而建立所有无产阶级的专政”(Payne, 1996, 89)。

In April 1919 the Socialist Party led a general strike, demanding the full and rapid demobilization of the army. The unrest that had started in the north quickly spread to the south, triggering a series of rural strikes and land encroachments “following the gradual demobilization of the army: for the first time, sharecroppers from central Italy joined the massive rural strikes of waged laborers from the North of the country. While in Lazio unions organized farmers and rural workers to occupy land, in the South land occupations were either spontaneous or led by veterans” (Ragionieri 1976a, 2070). As support for socialists grew, the CGL reached more than 2 million members in 1919. The membership of rural unions, which had previously been around 125,000, rose to 760,000, while labor unions in the steel sector saw their membership surge from 16,000 to 300,000 (Ragionieri 1976a, 2071).

† 1919年4月,社会党领导了一次总罢工,要求军队全面迅速复员。在军队逐步复员后,始于北方的动乱,迅速蔓延到南方,引发了一系列农村罢工和土地侵占:这是来自意大利中部的佃农第一次加入了该国北部有薪工人的大规模农村罢工。在拉齐奥,工会组织农民和农村工人占领土地,而在南方,土地占领要么是自发的,要么是由退伍军人领导的”(Ragionieri 1976a, 2070)。随着对社会主义者的支持增加,1919年,CGL的成员超过200万。农村工会的会员人数从之前的12.5万人左右上升到76万人,而钢铁行业的工会会员人数从1.6万人激增到30万人(Ragionieri 1976a, 2071)。

The 1919 victory for socialists, calls of the radical wing for a Bolshevik-style revolution, and industrial strikes generated a red scare in many segments of Italian society. Strikes reached their pinnacle in September 1920 when workers occupied factories all over the country. In the countryside, socialist union organization intensified and started planning for widespread land collectivization (De Felice 1965, 613 - 615). In the local elections at the end of 1920, socialists scored another huge victory, increasing the number of municipalities they controlled from 300 to 2,100, magnifying fears of socialist revolution among landowners and industrialists.

† 1919年社会主义者的胜利、激进派对布尔什维克式革命的呼吁、以及工业罢工,在意大利社会的许多阶层,引发了红色恐慌。1920年9月,工人占领了全国各地的工厂,罢工达到了顶峰。在农村,社会主义联盟组织,加强并开始规划广泛的土地集体化(De Felice 1965613-615)。在1920年底的地方选举中,社会主义者取得了另一场巨大的胜利,他们控制的城市数量,从300个增加到2100个,加剧了,地主和实业家,对社会主义革命的担忧。

§2.3 The Rise of the Fascist Party

In March 1919, Mussolini founded the Fasci di Combattimento, with the aim of restoring the “spirit of May 1915,” when nationalist demonstrations had pushed the government to enter the war. The movement assembled around the nationalist rhetoric of the “mutilated victory” and attracted revolutionary syndicalists, members of the elite shock troops, and a ragtag group of nationalists as well as futurist intellectuals (De Felice 1965). At this stage, it appealed more to the interventionists of 1915 than to war veterans.

† 1919年3月，Mussolini (墨索里尼) 成立了法西斯战斗组织，为了恢复“1915年5月的精神”，当民族主义示威迫使政府进入战争。这场运动，围绕着“残缺的胜利”的民族主义言论聚集在一起，吸引了革命工团主义者，精英突击队成员，一群乌合之众的民族主义者，以及未来主义知识分子 (De Felice 1965)。在这个阶段，它更吸引1915年的干涉主义者，而不是退伍军人。

Although the initial program of the fascist movement was heavily influenced by revolutionary syndicalist and socialist ideas, its prowar stance made an alliance with the Socialist Party impossible. The rift between the two movements intensified on April 15, 1919, when fascist army officials and former shock-troop soldiers assaulted the building of Avanti! and killed three socialists. This was the beginning of fascist violence against leftists that came to define the early 1920s.

† 尽管法西斯运动的最初纲领，深受革命工团主义和社会主义思想的影响，但其潜在的立场，使其无法与社会党结盟。这两个运动之间的分歧加剧了！1919年4月15日，法西斯军官和前突击队士兵，袭击了 Avanti! 大楼，杀害了三名社会主义者。这是20世纪20年代初定义的，针对左派的法西斯暴力的开始。

The 1919 elections were disastrous for the Fascist Party, which failed to win any seats in parliament. Mussolini had been unable to form a coalition with other interventionist forces, and the party’s electoral program was still ill-defined. Two days after the elections, Mussolini and his main collaborators were arrested for the armed assault on a group of socialists celebrating electoral victory, but following Prime Minister Nitti’s request, Mussolini was released the day after.

† 1919年的选举，对法西斯党来说，是灾难性的，它未能在议会中赢得任何席位。墨索里尼未能与其他干涉主义势力组成联盟，该党的选举计划，仍不明确。选举两天后，墨索里尼和他的主要合作者，因武装袭击一群庆祝选举胜利的社会主义者而被捕，但应总理尼蒂的要求，墨索里尼于次日获释。

In the months following the 1919 elections, the fascist movement was in crisis, and many started doubting the viability of the fascist project and the ability of Mussolini to lead the movement, as the party’s local branches closed and many of its members deserted the party (De Felice 1965, 587). Yet Mussolini soon managed to refashion the party as a robust antisocialist force, attracting new members more committed to violent, antisocialist action (De Felice 1965, 590 - 592). As summarized by Lyttelton (2003, 43): “the novelty of Fascism lay in the military organization of a political party,” and this recipe, with the support of the traditional right, became the basis of fascist success after 1920.

† 1919年大选后的几个月里，法西斯运动当时正处于危机之中，许多人开始怀疑，法西斯计划的可行性、以及墨索里尼领导这场运动的能力，随着该党地方分支机构的关闭，许多成员离开了该党 (De Felice 1965, 587)。然而，墨索里尼很快成功地将该党重塑为一支强大的反社会力量，吸引更多致力于暴力、反社会的新成员行动 (De Felice 1965, 590-592)。正如 Lyttelton 所总结的那样 (2003,43):“法西斯主义的新奇之处，在于政党的军事组织，”在传统右翼的支持下，这一配方，成为1920年后法西斯成功的基础。

At this point, the Italian state was fairly weak and unable to control the mounting conflict throughout the country. In this environment, antisocialist violence in the cities started multiplying and an energetic “agrarian fascism” emerged in rural areas. De Felice (1966, 3) emphasizes three aspects of this fascist remaking: “the inclusion of Fascism in mainstream politics; the rise and rapid spread of agrarian Fascism in the rural areas of the Po valley and especially in the Emilia region; the swift ascent of a reactionary-conservative alliance between the landlords and the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie... that had the goal of bringing peace to the country, given that the government seemed unable—or unwilling—to do so.”

† 此时，意大利政府相当软弱，无法控制全国各地日益加剧的冲突。在这种环境下，城市中的反社会暴力开始激增，农村地区出现了充满活力的“农业法西斯主义”。De Felice (1966, 3) 强调了这种法西斯改造的三个方面：“法西斯主义被纳入主流政治；崛起农业法西斯主义在波河流域农村地区迅速蔓延，尤其是艾米利亚地区；地主与工商资产阶级之间的反应保守联盟，迅速崛起，其目标是为国家带来和平，因为政府似乎无法、或不愿意这样做。”

The expansion of agrarian fascism in the countryside was probably the most important component of this transformation and was enabled by the support of farmers and landowners willing to organize against peasant leagues. They opposed demands for higher wages for day laborers, higher shares of revenue, lower costs and guaranteed income for sharecroppers, and better and more sanitary working conditions for both types of workers, spearheaded by socialists across the country. In Lupo’s (2005, 75) summary: “The right-wing components of the Fascist movement, those funded by the large landowners and active in the countryside where the class struggle was more violent, took over the control of Fascist organizations from early urban Fascists who still had links to their Socialist origins.”

† 农业法西斯主义在农村的扩张，可能是这一转变的最重要组成部分，这得益于愿意组织起来反对农民联盟的农民和地主的支持。他们反对要求提高日工的工资、增加收入份额、降低成本和保证佃农的收入，以及为这两种类型的工人提供更好、更卫生的工作条件，这些要求是由全国各地的社会主义者倡导的。在Lupo (2005, 75) 的总结中：“法西斯运动的右翼分子，即那些由大地主资助并活跃在阶级斗争更加暴力的农村的人，从早期仍与社会主义起源有联系的城市法西斯手中，接管了法西斯组织的控制权。”

Fascist organizations were extremely violent, and used “punitive expeditions” against worker associations and socialists to restore the control of landowners in the countryside. These antisocialist actions gained the approval and support of many conservatives, especially because of the perceived impasse created by Prime Minister Giolitti’s policy of neutrality in labor disputes, which was thought to have strengthened workers and the Socialist Party (De Felice 1966).

† 法西斯组织极其暴力，并使用“惩罚性”，反对工人协会和社会主义者恢复农村土地所有者的控制权。这些反社会行为得到了许多人的赞同和保守派的支持，尤其是因为 Giolitti 总理在劳资纠纷中的中立政策所造成的僵局，这被认为，加强了工人和社会主义者的力量 (De Felice 1966)。

Rich landowners, army officials, rentiers, and professionals in urban areas represented the leadership of the first armed fascist squads. These squads were organized in the cities and then directed to the surrounding countryside for punitive expeditions. Armed by the local agrarian association or supplied from the local military depot of the army, the fascist black shirts attacked, intimidated, and killed workers, laborers, and socialists (Tasca 1938, 102 - 103).

† 在城市地区富有的地主、军官、食利者和专业人士，代表了第一个武装法西斯的领导小队。这些小队在城市里组织起来，然后被带到周围的乡村，进行惩罚性探险。由当地农业协会武装或由当地政府提

供军队的军事仓库，法西斯黑衬衫袭击，恐吓，杀害工人、劳工和社会主义者 (Tasca 1938, 102 - 103).

Agrarian fascism would not have been possible without the complicity of the Italian state. A turning point came following the socialist victory in the local elections in Bologna in November 1920, when fascists provoked violence, killed 10 socialists and induced the government prefect to dissolve the council and install a government commissioner. These events then formed a template for fascists, who started to systematically attack local councils held by the socialists (and sometimes by the Popular Party) to force them to resign or create chaos and instability, inducing the government prefect to dissolve the council.

† 如果没有意大利政府的共谋，土地法西斯主义是不可能的。1920年11月，在 Bologna 的地方选举中，社会主义者取得了胜利，法西斯分子挑起暴力，杀害了10名社会主义者，并诱使政府长官解散委员会并任命了一名政府专员，这是一个转折点。这些事件随后成为法西斯分子的模板，他们开始系统地攻击社会主义者（有时是人民党）举行的地方议会，迫使他们辞职或制造混乱和不稳定，诱使政府长官解散议会。

De Felice (1965, 657 - 658) describes the fast spread of the agrarian fascism as follows.

† 德·费利斯 (1965, 657-658) 描述了农业法西斯主义如下。

After the tragedy of Bologna, the landowners gained momentum and started organizing themselves. . . The countryside was vulnerable and favorable to a conservative reaction. The old landowning class — often absentee, apathetic and fearful — feared that the Socialist unrest in 1919 - 1920 was the start of a Soviet-like land expropriation. . . In a few weeks, an increasing number of aggressive Fascists concentrated in the Po Valley, increasing the intensity of violent actions. Following these events, Fascism became a mass movement which was in all regards identical to a “white guard” [the counter revolutionary movement in Russia].

† Bologna 悲剧发生后，地主们获得了动力并开始组织起来。农村很脆弱，有利于保守派的反应。老地主阶级——经常缺席、冷漠和恐惧——担心1919-1920年的社会主义动乱，是苏联式土地的开始征用...在几周内，越来越多的侵略法西斯分子集中在波河谷，暴力行为愈演愈烈。在这些事件之后，法西斯主义变成了一个群体。这场运动在各方面都与“白卫兵”无异(俄国的反革命运动)。

2

On the back of rural support, the Fascist Party soon became one of the largest in the country and

²Indeed, the Fascist Party received critical support from local agrarian associations. For example, the prefect of Pavia on February 28, 1921 wrote: “The landed class sponsors the Fascist movement in this province. . . The committee is in constant contact with the Central committee in Milan. . . and in close relationship with the Agrarian Association in Pavia, which provides large financial support. In exchange for the financial support, the Fasci offer protection against peasant strikes.” The prefect of Vicenza reported on April 4, 1921: “Landowners and local bosses in the countryside established the Agrarian Fasci or Fasci of Social Defense with the goal of fighting against the local peasant leagues. . . The agrarian fasci are much better funded because local bosses and the landowners agreed to fund the organizations.” On March 29, 1921 the prefect of Rome reported that “in Montefiascone on March 13, 1921 local landowners funded a branch of the Fasci with 220 members to counteract a potential strike and the possible violence from the peasants” Archivio Centrale dello Stato (1922). There are similar reports from other prefects. † 事实上，法西斯党得到了当地农业协会的大力支持。例如，Pavia 省长在1921年2月28日写道：“地主阶级与米兰中央委员会保持密切联系，赞助了这个省的法西斯运动。与帕维亚农业协会合作，该协会提供大量资金支持。作为财政支持的交换，法西斯提供保护农民罢工” Vicenza 省长于1921年4月4日报告：“土地所有者和农村的当地老板，建立了农业法西斯或社会保卫法西斯，目的是与当地农民联盟作战... 由于当地老板和土地所有者同意资助这些组织，农业法西斯的资金比农民联盟的资金，要充足得多。” 1921年3月29日，Roma 省长报告说：“1921年3月13日，在 Montefiascone，当地土地所有者资助了一个由220名成员组成的法西斯分支，以对抗潜在的罢工和农民可能的暴力行为” 国家中央档案馆 (1922)。其他省长也有类似的报告。

came to control large areas, especially in the countryside, many of which had previously been socialist strongholds.

† 在农村的支持下，法西斯党很快成为该国最大的之一，并控制了大片地区，尤其是在农村，其中许多以前曾是社会主义据点。

Another turning point, and the inevitable recognition of the Fascist Party's increasing de facto power, came when the liberal government that had formed in June 1920, led by Giolitti, included it in the National Bloc for the general election in 1921. Giolitti had called the election in an attempt to exploit the apparent weakness of the Socialist Party, which had been battered by incessant fascist violence and was disorganized because of its left wing's split to form the Communist Party in the January 1921 Livorno Congress. Giolitti hoped to build a unified conservative and nationalist coalition, including the fascists, to defeat the Bolshevik forces.

† 另一个转折点，以及对法西斯党事实上的权力越来越大，当自由主义者1920年6月由 Giolitti 领导的政府，包括它在1921年的大选中加入了国家集团。乔利蒂宣布选举，试图利用表面上的遭受重创的社会党的弱点，法西斯暴力不断，因左翼而组织混乱1921年1月，温分裂为共产党Livorno 国会。Giolitti 希望建立一个统一的保守派以及包括法西斯分子在内的民族主义联盟，以击败布尔什维克军队。

The elections took place in a climate of widespread violence, mostly perpetrated by the fascists, which resulted in dozens of deaths across the country. There was no clear majority in the voting booth, and socialists kept most of their seats. "The outcome of the elections was clearly contrary to Giolitti's expectations" (De Felice 1966, 92). Unable to form a majority government, Giolitti resigned in July 1921. The ensuing instability created an ideal environment for Mussolini to intensify street violence and ultimately take control of the government.

† 选举，是在普遍存在暴力的气氛中举行的，主要由法西斯分子实施，导致数十起全国各地的死亡人数。投票中，没有明显多数摊位，社会主义者保留了大部分席位。“结果选举的结果显然与 Giolitti 的期望相反” (De Felice 1966, 92)。Giolitti 无法组建多数党政府，1921年7月辞职。随之而来的不稳定，创造了一个理想环境，墨索里尼加剧街头暴力，并最终控制政府。

In late October 1922, Mussolini organized a march on Rome, which gathered about 25,000 black shirts. Prime Minister Luigi Facta wanted to send the troops to stop them, but King Victor Emmanuel III did not agree, and Facta resigned. On October 29, 1922, the king asked Mussolini to form a new government and assemble a right-wing coalition, including Liberal, Democratic, and Catholic ministers. † 1922年10月下旬，墨索里尼在罗马组织了一次游行，收集了大约 25000 件黑衬衫。Luigi Facta 总理想派兵阻止他们，但 Victor 国王 Emmanuel 三世不同意，Facta 辞职。10月29日，1922年，国王要求墨索里尼组建新政府，组建一个右翼联盟，包括自由党、民主党、，天主教牧师。

Once he took the reins of government, Mussolini had no intention of giving them up. In the first months, he consolidated his grip on power, in particular by incorporating fascist paramilitary organizations into the state apparatus and dissolving all remaining socialist local councils.

† 墨索里尼一旦掌权，就没有任何意图放弃他们。在最初的几个月里，他巩固了自己的控制权力，特别是通过合并法西斯准军事组织将组织并入国家机器，并解散所有剩余的社会主义地方议会。

Although he was Prime Minister, Mussolini still faced a largely antifascist parliament, elected in 1921. Mussolini engineered a new electoral law, Legge Acerbo, to facilitate his complete takeover of government. The law was approved in 1923 with the support of many Catholic deputies who went against their leadership's opposition to the law. By instituting a strongly majoritarian electoral system, the law facilitated the consolidation of most right-wing support in fascist hands. In spring 1924, Mussolini dis-

solved the parliament and called new elections where fascist lists won more than 65% of the national vote. † 尽管他是总理，墨索里尼仍然面临1921年选举产生的反法西斯议会。墨索里尼策划新的选举法，Legge Acerbo，以促进他的完整接管政府。该法律得到了许多天主教代表的支持，他们反对领导层对该法律的反，于1923年获得批准。通过建立一个强大的多数派选举制度，法律促进了法西斯手中的大多数右翼支持的巩固。1924年春，墨索里尼解散议会并举行新的选举。法西斯名单赢得了65%以上的全国选票。

The opposition parties approached the elections divided and weakened by years of fascist violence and deprived of the control of local councils. They considered boycotting the election until a few weeks before the vote, pointing out the “arbitrariness and the open violation of the constitutional law” by the government (De Felice 1966, 467). Mussolini’s aim was to co-opt the center-right and isolate the opposition, especially the left (De Felice 1966, 569 - 570). But this also meant that he wanted to limit street violence and prove that fascism could bring order. Violence during the electoral campaign did not cease, and there may have been as many as “hundreds of wounded and several dead” at the hands of the fascists (De Felice 1966, 584).

† 反对党，在选举中因多年的法西斯暴力而分裂和削弱，并被剥夺了对地方议会的控制权。他们考虑抵制选举，直到投票前几周，指出政府“武断和公然违反宪法”（De Felice 1966, 467）。墨索里尼的目的，是拉拢中右翼孤立反对派，尤其是左翼（De Felice 1966, 569 - 570）。但这也意味着，他想限制街头暴力，并证明法西斯主义可以带来秩序。暴力期间竞选活动，并没有停止，而且许多人可能已经在法西斯分子手上被“数百人受伤，数人死亡”（De Felice 1966, 584）。

Although intimidation and interference did take place in the elections, many historians have concluded that there was no centralized attempt to rig the election or coordinate violence, and in most places, the local strength of the Fascist Party determined the extent of interference (see De Felice 1966, 588 - 592; Ragionieri 1976b, 2138 - 2139; Lupo 2005, 186 - 187, among others).³ Episodes of intimidation, violence, and vote rigging were denounced at the opening of the new parliament by Giacomo Matteotti, the leader of the Unitary Socialist Party. Ten days later, Matteotti was kidnapped and killed. The murder provoked a constitutional crisis, resulting eventually in the establishment of the fascist dictatorship. Mussolini exclaimed on the eve of the elections, “This is the last time that we run the elections in this way. Next time I’ ll vote for everyone” (De Felice 1966, 584). Mussolini soon banned local council elections and set up a single-party system, outlawing all other political movements. From 1938 onward, elections were entirely abolished.

† 尽管选举中确实发生了恐吓和干涉，但许多历史学家得出结论，没有集中力量操纵选举或协调暴力，在大多数地方，法西斯党的地方力量决定了干涉的程度（见De Felice 1966, 588-592; Ragionieri 1976b, 2138-2139; Lupo 2005186-187等）。统一社会党领袖，Giacomo Matteotti (贾科莫·马托蒂)，在新议会开幕式上，谴责了恐吓、暴力和操纵选票的事件。十天后，Matteotti 被绑架并杀害。这起谋杀案引发了一场宪法危机，最终导致法西斯独裁政权的建立。墨索里尼在选举前夕喊道：“这是我们最后一次以这种方式进行选举。下次我会投票给所有人”（De Felice 1966584）。墨索里尼很快禁止了地方议会选举，并建立了一党制，取缔了所有其他政治运动。从1938年开始，选举被完全废除。

³There was also violence after the elections, for example in the Monza district, where the Popular Party scored a major success and the fascist list obtained only 16% of the votes. † 选举后也发生了暴力事件，例如在 Monza 区，在那里，公民党取得了重大成功，法西斯名单只获得了16%的选票。

§3 DATA

Our database covers 5,775 municipalities from 64 provinces (out of 69 in the 1921 census).⁴ Data for other periods, which are at times more disaggregated, are mapped to the 1921 municipalities.

† 我们的数据库涵盖了64个省的5775个自治区（1921年人口普查中为69个）。其他时期的数据，有时更为细分，这些数据被映射到1921的自治区。

§3.1 Electoral Data

The official municipality-level data on the three national elections of 1919, 1921, and 1924 are missing from the parliamentary archives. The most complete existing collection of these data was undertaken by Corbetta and Piretti (2009), but contained consistent information for only about 2,000 municipalities. We expanded the coverage of these data for 5,775 municipalities for all three elections, using information from 1,200 local and national historical newspapers and local state archives. The format of newspaper reporting varied significantly, from well-documented tables, like the one in [Online Appendix Figure A1](#), to various reports in the context of other news, which we searched systematically. For municipalities for which we could not get information from local newspapers, we consulted local archives, and in most cases we were able to locate hand-written tables summarizing local results, annotations by electoral authorities, or telegraphic communications from local to central electoral offices (see [Online Appendix Figure A2](#)).

† 议会档案中缺少1919年、1921年和1924年三次全国选举的官方市级数据。Corbetta 和 Piretti (2009年) 对这些数据进行了最完整的收集，但仅包含约2000个城市的一致信息。我们利用1200份地方和国家历史报纸以及地方国家档案馆的信息，扩大了所有三次选举中5775个城市的这些数据的覆盖范围。报纸报道的格式差异很大，如[在线附录](#)中的图 A1所示，我们系统地搜索了其他新闻背景下的各种报道。对于我们无法从当地报纸上获得信息的市政当局，我们查阅了当地档案，在大多数情况下，我们能够找到总结当地结果的手写表格、选举当局的注释或从地方到中央选举办公室的电报通信（见[在线附录图A2](#)）。

Our historical electoral data cover most of Italy, with the exception of a few areas, notably in Calabria and Sicily, for which even local newspapers or state archives did not contain any useful information.

† 我们的历史选举数据，涵盖了意大利的大部分地区，但少数地区除外，特别是 Calabria 和 Sicily，即使是当地报纸或国家档案，也没有包含任何有用的信息。

Our measures of electoral support for fascism, *Fascist vote share in 1919*, *Fascist vote share in 1921*, and *Fascist vote share in 1924* come from these sources. In 1919 the Fascist Party presented candidates only in a few districts. In 1921, with a few exceptions, the party was part of the National Bloc alliance, joined with several conservative parties. Our measure of fascist vote share in 1921 is constructed from votes for fascist lists and votes for fascist candidates in the National Bloc lists, whom we identified from announcements in *Il Popolo d' Italia*. We assigned to the Fascist Party the National Bloc votes in proportion to the share of candidate votes captured by fascist candidates. We were able to collect detailed municipality-level National Bloc candidate votes for 2,188 municipalities, which make up our

⁴In the 1921 census there were 8,355 municipalities in Italy, excluding the recent annexation of Julian Venetia and Trentino. We managed to recover the election data for 5,775 municipalities in the 1919 - 24 elections, which represent our sample. † 在1921年的人口普查中，意大利有8355个自治区，不包括最近吞并的 Julian Venetia 和 Trentino。我们设法恢复了1919-24年选举中5775个自治区的选举数据，这些数据代表了我们的样本。

restricted (noimputation) sample for the 1921 fascist vote share. We extend this sample by imputing the fascist vote share for the remaining municipalities using the most detailed available information on fascist candidate vote share at the district, province, or electoral district level.⁵

† 我们对法西斯主义的选举支持度，即1919年的法西斯选票份额、1921年的法西斯得票份额和1924年的法西斯投票份额，都来自这些资源。1919年，法西斯党只在少数几个地区提出了候选人。1921年，除少数例外情况外，该党是国家集团联盟的一部分，与几个保守党联合。我们对1921年法西斯选票份额的衡量，是根据法西斯名单的选票和国家集团名单中法西斯候选人的选票构建的，我们从《意大利人民报》的公告中确定了这些候选人。我们根据法西斯候选人获得的候选人选票比例，将国家集团选票分配给法西斯党。我们能够，为2188个自治区收集详细的区级国家集团候选人选票，这些选票，构成了我们1921年法西斯选票份额的限制性（非计算性）样本。我们通过使用有关地区、省或选区一级法西斯候选人投票份额的最详细可用信息，对剩余市政当局的法西斯投票份额进行估算，从而扩展了这一样本。

Socialist vote share in 1919, Socialist vote share in 1921, and Socialist vote share in 1924 are also from our historical electoral data, whereas Socialist vote share in 1913 is from Corbetta and Piretti (2009).⁶ We also collected data about the municipality elections in 1920 using reports in *Avanti!* and local newspapers and constructed a dummy for socialist control of the municipality.

† 1919年的社会主义选票份额，1921年的社会主义投票份额，以及1924年的社会主义选票份额也来自我们的历史选举数据，而1913年社会党的选票份额，来自文献 Corbetta 和 Piretti (2009)。我们还使用 *Avanti!* 的报告，收集了1920年市政选举的数据，以及当地报纸，并为社会主义控制该市构建了一个仿制品。

Electoral data for the period 1946 - 2018 are sourced from the official electoral statistics of the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs.⁷

† 1946年至2018年期间的选举数据，来自意大利内政部的官方选举统计数据。

§3.2 Data on Fascist Activity

We collected two further measures of the local fascist activities. Franzinelli (2003) records 2,561 episodes of political violence up to October 1922, of which 2,120 were by fascists, including 709 killings. Using these data, we created a municipality level measure of Fascist violence in 1920 - 22, which records the number of violent episodes per 1,000 inhabitants for the period 1920 - 22. From the same source we created three alternative measures of violence, which we use in our robustness checks: *Fascist killings* in 1920 - 22, focusing on killings only; *Political violence* in 1920 - 22, including all political violence; and *Non-Fascist violence* in 1920 - 22, which excludes fascist violence. We also collected information on

⁵We complement the municipality-level data with National Bloc candidate votes for 39 administrative districts, 23 provinces, and 28 electoral districts. The same approach was used by Brustein (1991) to compute the fascist vote share in 1921, but using only the data at the electoral district or provincial level. † 我们用39个行政区、23个省和28个选区的国家集团候选人选票补充了市级数据。Brustein (1991) 在1921年使用相同的方法计算法西斯选票份额，但仅使用选区或省级的数据。

⁶For the 1913 election the socialist vote share is computed using the votes for the socialist candidates as listed in *Avanti!* (1913). For the 1919 election it is computed using the votes for the official Socialist Party lists, while for the 1921 and 1924 elections it also includes the votes of the breakaway Communist and Unitary Socialist parties. † 对于1913年的选举，社会主义选票份额，是使用 *Avanti!* 中列出的社会主义候选人的选票计算的(1913)。对于1919年的选举，它是使用官方社会党名单的选票计算的，而对于1921年和1924年的选举来说，它还包括脱离共产党的选票和统一社会主义政党。

⁷See <https://elezionistorico.interno.gov.it>.

local branches of the Fascist Party in September 1921 from the prefect reports located in state archives throughout Italy. Finally, we constructed a dummy for the presence of large donors to the Fascist Party in the period 1919 - 25 (*Large donor dummy* (1919 - 25)) from the detailed information provided in Padulo (2010).

† 我们收集了当地法西斯活动的另外两项指标。Franzinelli (2003) 记录了2561起政治暴力事件截至1922年10月, 其中2120起是法西斯分子干的, 包括 709 起谋杀案。利用这些数据, 我们创建了一个自治区级1920-22年法西斯暴力的衡量标准, 记录了1920年至1922年期间, 每1000名居民中发生的暴力事件这一数字。从同一来源, 我们创建了暴力的三种替代指标, 在稳健性检查中使用: 法西斯杀戮1920-22年, 只关注杀戮; 1920年至1922年的政治暴力, 包括所有政治暴力; 1920-22年的非法西斯暴力, 不包括法西斯暴力。1921年9月, 我们还从位于意大利各地国家档案馆的省长报告收集信息。最后, 我们根据Padulo (2010) 提供的详细信息, 为1919-25年期间, 法西斯党的大型捐助者的存在, 构建了一个虚拟模型 [大型捐助者虚拟模型 (1919-25)]。

The distribution of our measures of fascist activities across Italy are depicted in Figures 1, Panels C - F. Figure 1, Panel B displays the socialist vote share in 1919.

† 贯穿整个意大利的法西斯活动指标的分布, 如图 1 中的C-F组所示。图 1, B组显示了1919年的社会主义选票份额。

§3.3 Deportation of Jews

We created two measures of the deportation of Jews from Italian municipalities using the data provided by the Contemporary Jewish Documentation Centre (CDEC).⁸ These are a dummy for any Jews being deported in 1943 - 45 and an estimate of the number of Jews deported divided by the Jewish population as reported in the 1911 census. Since Jewish population is available only at the district level and for the district capital, we apportion noncapital district Jewish population across municipalities according to their total population and cap the ratio of deportations to the local Jewish population at one.

† 使用犹太文献中心 (CDEC) 提供的数据, 我们制定了将犹太人驱逐出意大利自治区的两项指标。对于1943-45年被驱逐的任何犹太人来说, 这些都是一个虚拟的数字, 也是1911年人口普查中报告的被驱逐的犹太人人数, 除以犹太人口的估计数。由于犹太人口, 仅在地区一级和地区首府可用, 我们根据各市的总人口, 将非首都地区的犹太人口按比例分配, 并将驱逐人数, 与当地犹太人口的比例限制在 1。

§3.4 World War I Casualties and Related Data

There are varying estimates of the number of Italian soldiers who died during World War I—ranging from 510,000 to 600,000. We use the military Roll of Honor, which provides information for 529,028 members of the armed forces who died during the war (name, dates of birth and death, places of birth and death, regiment, force, rank). The data have been digitized by the Institute for the History of the Resistance and the Contemporary Society (ISTORECO).⁹ We focus on foot soldier casualties (representing more than 70% of all casualties), because they are less likely to suffer from selection (navy, air force, and special assault forces were more likely to recruit from specific demographic groups and geographic locations).

⁸See <http://www.cdcc.it/i-nomi-della-shoah>.

⁹See <http://www.albimemoria-istoreco.re.it>.

† 对第一次世界大战期间死亡的意大利士兵人数，有不同的估计，从51万到60万不等。我们使用军事荣誉名册，该名册提供了战争中死亡的529028名武装部队成员的信息（姓名、出生和死亡日期、出生和去世地点、团、部队、军衔）。这些数据，已被抵抗运动与当代社会历史研究所（ISTORECO）数字化。我们关注步兵伤亡（占有所有伤亡人数的70%以上），因为他们不太可能受到选拔（海军、空军和特种突击部队，更有可能从特定的人口群体、和地理位置招募）。

Our main instrument, Share of foot soldier casualties, is the number of casualties among foot soldiers originating from a municipality divided by male population over the age of six in the 1911 Italian census. In Figure 1, Panel A, we show the distribution of World War I casualties among foot soldiers. The rich information contained in the Roll of Honor allows us to create a set of regiment dummies to control for the effects of the war experience in a specific theater of war. We also measure casualties among special assault troops and volunteers and identified municipalities with casualties in the highest-mortality battles of the war (defined as days for which more than 1,000 casualties occurred).

† 我们的主要指标，步兵伤亡比例，是来自自治区的步兵伤亡人数按1911年意大利人口普查6岁以上男性人口划分。在图 1 的A组中，我们显示了第一次世界大战步兵伤亡人数的分布。《荣誉榜》中包含的丰富信息，使我们能够制作一套团里的假人，以控制特定战区的战争经验的影响。我们还估计在特种突击部队和志愿者中伤亡人数，并已确认伤亡人数最多的自治区（定义为伤亡人数发现超过1000人的天数）。

Our data on veterans are constructed by subtracting casualties from drafted soldiers, which are sourced from official military statistics (Ministero della Guerra 1927). For each military district, we subtracted casualties by cohort and obtained a measure of returning soldiers over the male population above the age of six, assigning the same value to all municipalities in each military district. We created two additional variables from the same data: one for the veteran cohorts 1874 - 95 and another for the cohorts 1895 - 1900. The first variable includes the veterans who were demobilized before the 1919 elections and therefore could vote in those elections, while the second includes all the veterans who continued to serve until 1920 - 21 and could not vote in the 1919 elections.

† 我们关于退伍军人的数据，是通过从征兵士兵中减去伤亡人数而构建的，这些伤亡人数来自官方军事统计数据 (Ministero della Guerra 1927)。对于每个军区，我们按队列减去伤亡人数，得出了6岁以上男性人口中归国士兵的比例，并为每个军区的所有自治区分配了相同的值。我们从相同的数据中创建了两个额外的变量：一个用于1874-95年的退伍军人队列，另一个用于1895-1900年的队列。第一个变量包括1919年选举前复员的退伍军人，因此可以在这些选举中投票，而第二类包括所有继续服役至1920-21年且无法在1919年选举中投票的退伍军人。

Finally, the data on the location of World War I monuments in 1921 are collected from the official catalog of the Italian Ministry for Cultural Heritage.¹⁰ We created two measures: a dummy for the presence of a World War I monument by 1921 and the number of World War I monuments per 1,000 inhabitants by 1921.

† 最后，1921年第一次世界大战纪念碑的位置数据，是从意大利文化遗产部的官方目录中收集的。我们制定了两项指标：一个是1921年前第一次世界大战纪念碑的虚拟存在，另一个是数字，即到1921年，每1000名居民中的第一次世界大战纪念碑数量。

¹⁰See <http://www.catalogo.beniculturali.it>.

§3.5 Other Data

We constructed two other sources of variation in socialist support. First, from Direzione Generale della Statistica e del Lavoro (1917 - 24) we obtained estimates of Excess mortality in 1918 (relative to pre-World War I mortality for 1911 - 14) as a measure of the effect of the Spanish flu, which was responsible for a large increase in deaths in 1918 in Italy. These data are available only for a much smaller sample of 207 urban municipalities. Second, we constructed a measure of Relative rainfall in winter-spring 1918 - 9 to proxy for local droughts, using data from 427 weather stations (gathered from the Hydrographic Bulletins, 1915 - 79, for the 16 Italian hydrographic compartments).¹¹

† 我们构建了社会主义支持的另外两个变化来源。首先，从 Direzione Generale della Statistics e del Lavoro (1917-24) 中，我们获得了1918年超额死亡率的估计值（相对于1911-14年第一次世界大战前的死亡率），作为衡量西班牙流感影响的指标，西班牙流感，是1918年意大利死亡人数大幅增加的原因。这些数据，仅适用于207个自治区的较小样本。其次，我们利用427个气象站的数据（收集自1915-1979年意大利16个水文分区的《水文公报》）构建了1918-9年冬春季的相对降雨量指标，以代替当地的干旱。

Relative rainfall is measured at the weather station level (aggregating rainfall from December 1918 to May 1919), using the average for the winterspring months for 1915 - 79 as denominator, and then interpolated to the municipality level using the inverse of the distances as weights with a cutoff of 30 km. The relative rainfall measure is then capped at one, so that we only exploit shortfalls of rain relative to its long-term average (see [Online Appendix](#) Figure A3 for the geographic distribution of relative rainfall). We also collected data on an extensive set of controls.

† 相对降雨量，是在气象站一级测量的（1918年12月至1919年5月的总降雨量），使用1915年至1979年冬春季的平均值作为分母，然后使用距离的倒数作为权重，以30公里为界，插值到市级。然后将相对降雨量测量值限制在1，这样我们就只能利用，相对于其长期平均值的降雨量不足（相对降雨量的地理分布，见[在线附录](#)图A3）。我们还收集了大量控制措施的数据。

Geographic variables (municipality log area, elevation of the main center, and maximum elevation), and demographic variables, including total population, the share of population below the age of six, the share of day laborers, the share of sharecroppers, the share of elites (entrepreneurs and rentiers), the share of “bourgeoisie” (defined as professional, white-collar workers, and shopkeepers), and the literacy rate come from the official Italian census (1911, 1921, 1931). Data on day laborers, sharecroppers, elites, and bourgeoisie are available for more than 700 agrarian zones in the census, each comprising several municipalities, and are assigned to all municipalities in the zone. The share of industrial workers and the number of per capita industrial firms are sourced from the 1911 industrial census.

† 地理变量（城市原木面积、主要中心的海拔高度和最大海拔高度）和人口变量，包括总人口、六岁以下人口的比例、日工的比例、佃农的比例、精英（企业家和食利者）的比例、“资产阶级”（定义为专业人士、白领和店主）的比例以及来自意大利官方人口普查（1911年、1921年、1931年）的识字率。人口普查中，有700多个农业区的日工、佃农、精英和资产阶级数据，每个农业区由几个自治区组成，并分配给该地区的所有自治区。工业工人的比例和人均工业企业的数量，来自1911年的工业普查。

From [Ministero della Guerra \(1915 - 18\)](#), we identified municipalities housing war-related production plants, which were sometimes able to secure draft exemptions for their workers as well as large profits during the war. Using the information reported in [Direzione Generale della Statistica e del La-](#)

¹¹The Hydrographic Bulletins are available at † [水文公报](http://www.acq.isprambiente.it/annalipdf/)可用，见 <http://www.acq.isprambiente.it/annalipdf/>.

voro (1912), we created a dummy for municipalities with at least one landowner association, typically set up to deal with local agrarian workers. Data on the number of agrarian strikes in 1920 are gathered from the 1921 Labor Bulletin ([Ministero per il Lavoro e la Previdenza Sociale 1921](#)). Data for the strikes and strikers in both industry and agriculture in 1913 - 14 are from the Labor Bulletins for 1913 and 1914 ([Ministero per il Lavoro e la Previdenza Sociale 1914](#)).

† 从 [Ministero della Guerra \(1915-18\)](#) 中，我们确定了与战争有关的生产工厂所在的市政当局，这些工厂有时能够为其工人获得草案豁免，并在战争期间获得巨额利润。使用 [Direzione Generale della Statistics e del Lavoro \(1912\)](#) 中报告的信息，我们为至少有一个土地所有者协会的市政当局，创建了一个虚拟模型，通常是为处理当地农业工人而设立的。1920年农业罢工次数的数据，来自1921年《劳工公报》([Ministero per il Lavoro e la Previdenza Sociale 1921](#))。1913-14年工业和农业罢工和罢工者的数据，来自1913年和1914年的《劳工公报》([Ministero per il Lavoro e la Previdenza Sociale 1914](#))。

Data on violent crimes and crime rates in 1874 are collected at the level of the 1,813 preture in the statistics published by the Ministry of Justice ([Ministero di Grazia e Giustizia e dei Culti 1875](#)). Finally, dummies for the prevalence of large landholding (Large landholding in 1885) and widespread landownership (Landownership in 1885) come from the 1882 - 85 Parliamentary Inquest ([Jacini 1882 - 85](#)).

† 1874年暴力犯罪和犯罪率的数据，是在司法部公布的统计数据中以1813年的水平收集的([Ministero di Grazia e Giustizia e dei Culti 1875](#))。最后，1882-85年议会调查([Jacini 1882-85](#))为大土地所有权(1885年的大土地所有权)和广泛土地所有权(885年的土地所有权)的普遍性提供了假设。

The summary statistics for the main variables used in our analysis are reported in [Online Appendix Table A1](#).

† 我们分析中使用的主要变量的汇总统计数据，在[在线附录表A1](#)中报告。

§4 WORLD WAR I CASUALTIES AND SUPPORT FOR THE SOCIALIST PARTY

In this section, we document the relationship between World War I casualties and support for socialists, which is interesting itself, but more importantly, it will be our first stage when investigating the impact of the threat of socialism on the rise of fascism. As explained in Section §2, the disruption, hardship, and disillusionment created by the war were the major causes of the surge in the socialist vote share in the 1919 election. Our purpose in this section is to document this relationship across Italian municipalities. As explained in Section §3, we focus on an estimate of foot soldier casualties for this purpose, which excludes casualties among volunteers and special assault troops, such as the Arditi. Foot soldier casualties, which make up over 70% of allWorldWar I deaths, are more directly related to ordinary Italians’ war experiences than are casualties among professional or highly trained elite fighters and are less likely to suffer from “selection” (which would occur if a higher fraction of troops in some regiments came from areas with greater commitment to the war).

† 在本节中，我们将记录，第一次世界大战伤亡与支持社会主义者之间的关系，这本身就很有趣，但更重要的是，这将是我们的调查社会主义威胁，对法西斯主义崛起的影响的第一阶段。正如第 §2 节所解释的那样，战争造成的破坏、困难和幻灭，是1919年选举中社会主义选票份额激增的主要原因。我们在本节中的目的，是记录意大利各市之间的这种关系。正如第 §3节所解释的那样，我们为此目的，重点关注步兵伤亡的估计，其中不包括志愿者和特种突击部队（如Arditi）的伤亡。步兵伤亡，占第一次世界大战所有死亡人数的70%以上，与专业或训练有素的精英战士的伤亡相比，步兵伤亡与普

通意大利人的战争经历更直接相关，并且不太可能遭受“选择”（如果一些团中更高比例的部队来自对战争有更大承诺的地区，就会发生这种情况）。

Our estimating equation can be summarized as: † 我们的估算方程可以概括为：

$$(\text{Socialist vote share})_i^{1919} = \gamma(\text{Share of foot soldier casualties})_i + X_i'\beta + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where $(\text{Socialist vote share})_i^{1919}$ is the vote share of the Socialist Party in municipality i in the 1919 election, and $(\text{Share of foot soldier casualties})_i$ denotes our estimate of foot soldier casualties in the municipality (relative to male population over the age of six). In addition, X_i is a vector of covariates, which includes basic demographic controls, regiment and province fixed effects and in some specifications also geographic controls, the vote share of the Socialist Party in the 1913 election, and various agricultural, urban, and military controls. This last set of controls separately includes the population share of veterans from the birth cohorts 1874 - 95, who made up about 65% of all soldiers, were demobilized earlier and could vote in the 1919 elections, and the population share of veterans from the birth cohorts 1896 - 1900, who were demobilized in 1920 - 21. These younger cohorts could not vote in 1919 and missed some of the more harrowing parts of the war.¹² In this and all subsequent regressions, we report standardized coefficients (computed after standardizing both left-hand-side and right-hand-side variables) to facilitate comparison across different specifications.

† 其中 $(\text{Socialist vote share})_i^{1919}$ 是社会党在1919年选举中在市镇 i 的选票份额，而我们对市镇步兵伤亡的估计（相对于6岁以上的男性人口）用 $(\text{Share of foot soldier casualties})_i$ 表示。此外， X_i 是协变量的向量，其中包括基本的人口控制、团和省的固定效应，在某些规范中还包括地理控制、社会党在1913年选举中的投票份额，以及各种农业、城市和军事控制。最后一组控制措施分别包括 1874-1995 年出生队列的退伍军人的比例，他们约占所有士兵的65%，较早复员，可以在1919年的选举中投票，以及1896-1900年出生队列退伍军人的比例，他们在1920-21年复员。这些年轻人在1919年无法投票，错过了战争中一些更悲惨的部分。在本次和所有后续回归中，我们报告了标准化系数（在标准化左侧和右侧变量后计算），以方便不同规格之间的比较。

Finally, ε_i is a random error term, capturing all omitted factors, which we allow to be heteroskedastic and correlated across municipalities (clustered at the district level).¹³

† 最后， ε_i 是一个随机误差项，它捕获了所有遗漏的因素，我们允许这些因素是异方差的，并在各自治区之间相关（在地区层面聚集）。

The estimates of equation (1) are presented in Table 1. The first column is our most parsimonious specification and includes regiment fixed effects, which are dummies for any deaths from the municipality in a specific regiment and control for other factors that affect soldiers serving in different regiments and theaters of war; province fixed effects, which ensure that our results are not driven by the comparison of different provinces and are also included in all of our specifications; and basic demographic controls (in particular, a quartic in log municipality population and the fraction of the population younger than six in 1911).¹⁴ The foot soldier casualties variable has a standardized coefficient of 0.12 with a

¹²Active soldiers, numbering almost 900,000 according to (1920, XXVI), did not have the right to vote in 1919. † 根据 *Ufficio Centrale di Statistica* (1920, XXVI) 的数据，现役士兵人数近90万，在1919年没有投票权。

¹³Each of the 5,775 municipalities belongs to one of the 181 administrative districts. [Online Appendix](#) Table A2 shows Conley's spatially corrected standard errors. We opted for the district-clustered standard errors in the text, because they tend to be more conservative for the two-stage least squares estimates and very similar for the first stage. † 5775个市镇中的每一个都属于181个行政区中的一个地区。在线附录表A2显示了康利的空间校正标准误差。我们在文中选择了区域聚类标准误差，因为它们在两阶段最小二乘估计中往往更保守，在第一阶段非常相似

¹⁴We always include basic demographic controls since the denominator of the foot soldier casualty variable is an estimate

standard error of 0.02. This coefficient estimate implies that if all foot soldier casualties had been zero, the socialist vote share in 1919 would have been lower by 6.5 percentage points (relative to the total socialist vote share in 1919, 31.6%).

† 方程 (1) 的估计值如表 1 所示。第一列是我们最简约的规范，包括团固定效应，这些是特定团中市政当局死亡的假人，并控制了影响在不同团和战区服役的士兵的其他因素；省固定效应，确保我们的结果不受不同省份比较的影响，也包含在我们的所有规范中；以及基本的人口控制（特别是1911年四分之一的城市人口和六岁以下的人口比例）。步兵伤亡变量的标准化系数为0.12，标准误差为0.02。这一系数估计意味着，如果所有步兵伤亡人数为零，1919年的社会主义选票份额将降低 6.5个百分点（相对于1919年的总社会主义选票份额 31.6%）。

The rest of the table shows that this relationship is robust and quite stable when a range of other covariates are included. In column (2), we include additional geographic controls (in particular, log area, elevation of the main municipality center, and maximum elevation, which proxies for ruggedness of the terrain). The inclusion of these additional controls has hardly any effect on the coefficient estimate for foot soldier casualties. In column (3), we add the socialist vote share in the municipality in the 1913 elections, which controls for permanent differences in political attitudes in the municipality. This reduces the coefficient slightly to 0.10, which also becomes a little more precise (standard error = 0.01) and remains significant at less than 1%. Column (4) includes a range of military controls: the share of veterans in the population from cohorts 1874 - 95 and 1896 - 1900, a dummy for the presence of war-related production plants in the municipality, casualties among special assault troops and volunteers as a share of the male population above the age of six in 1911, and a dummy for any casualties in the most high-mortality battles. These controls have no discernible effect on the coefficient estimate for the share of foot soldier casualties. The veteran variables are significant, but with opposite signs: the share of veterans from older cohorts is positive, and the share of veterans from younger cohorts is negative. We interpret this as evidence that older veterans and their families, who suffered more during the war and may have benefited from the socialist campaign for early demobilization, were more likely to vote socialist. In contrast, the families of younger veterans, who did not benefit from early demobilization, were still under arms and not allowed to vote, may not have had the same favorable attitudes toward the Socialist Party.

† 表格的其余部分表明，当包括一系列其他协变量时，这种关系是稳健的，非常稳定。在列 (2) 中，日志地区 (log area)、主要市中心的海拔高度和代表地形崎岖度的最大海拔高度)。纳入这些额外的控制措施，对步兵伤亡系数估计几乎没有任何影响。在第 (3) 列中，我们增加了在1913年社会主义者在该市选举的投票份额，它控制在市政府的政治态度的永久差异。这也变得更精确了一点，会把系数略微降低到0.10（标准误差 = 0.01）并且在小于1%时仍然显著。第 (4) 列包括一系列军事控制措施：1874-95年和1896-1900年队列中退伍军人在人口中的比例，该市与战争有关的生产工厂的存在，特种突击部队和志愿者的伤亡人数占1911年6岁以上的男性人口份额，以及死亡率最高的战斗中的任

of the male population of draft age. We include province fixed effects, because Italy was recently unified and there were large historical differences across provinces in the first two decades of the twentieth century, and also because province boundaries overlap with electoral districts (thus these fixed effects enable us to absorb differences due to the popularity of candidates and to the presence or absence of specific party lists in different electoral districts). [Online Appendix Table A3](#) shows that the results are similar, though a little less precise, when only demographic controls are included. † 我们总是包括基本的人口控制，因为步兵伤亡变量的分母是对征兵年龄男性人口的估计。我们纳入了省固定效应，因为意大利最近才统一，在20世纪前20年，各省之间存在巨大的历史差异，也因为省边界与选区重叠（因此这些固定效应使我们能够吸收因候选人受欢迎程度和不同选区是否存在特定政党名单而产生的差异）。[在线附录表A3](#)显示，当仅包括人口统计控制时，结果相似，但精确度稍低。

何伤亡。这些控制措施，对步兵伤亡比例的系数估计，没有明显影响。退伍军人变量很重要，但有相反的迹象：来自老年队列的退伍军人比例为正，而来自年轻队列的退伍军人的比例为负。我们将此解释为证据，表明在战争中遭受更多痛苦并可能从社会主义早期复员运动中受益的老年退伍军人及其家人，更有可能投票给社会主义者。相比之下，没有从早期复员中受益的年轻退伍军人的家人，仍然处于武装状态，不允许投票，他们可能对社会党没有同样的有利态度。

Finally, columns (5) and (6) add additional agricultural and urban controls, with very little effect on our estimate of the share of foot soldier casualties.¹⁵ Because the coefficient estimates in these columns is about 17% smaller than the coefficient estimate in column (1), the implied quantitative magnitudes are about 17% smaller than those discussed above.

† 最后，第（5）和（6）列增加了额外的农业和城市控制措施，对我们估计的步兵伤亡比例影响很小。由于这些列中的系数估计值，比第（1）列中的估计值小约17%，因此，隐含的数量幅度，比上述讨论的小约17%。

Figure 2 shows a bin scatter plot of the first stage, focusing on our most demanding specification from column (6). It illustrates the range of variation and shows that the linear model fits the data well.

† 图 2 展示了第一阶段的 bin 散点图，主要关注第（6）列中我们要求最高的规格。它说明了变化范围，并表明线性模型很好地拟合了数据。

Our overall interpretation of the results in Table 1 is that war casualties had a first-order effect on local support for the Socialist Party. However, we do not believe that this estimate captures all of the effects of the war on socialist support. Many of the hardships and discontent caused by the war were common across municipalities and would thus not be captured by the share of foot soldier casualties, and hence the quantitative estimate is likely smaller than the total effect of the war on socialist support. All the same, the strong effect of foot soldier casualties already indicates that the disruption caused by the war intensified the support for socialists.

† 我们对表 1 中结果的总体解释是，战争伤亡对当地对社会党的支持具有首要影响。然而，我们不认为，这一估计能够反映战争对社会主义支持的所有影响。战争造成的许多困难和不满，在各市都很常见，由于步兵伤亡的比例无法反映出来，因此定量估计，可能小于战争对社会主义支持的总影响。尽管如此，步兵伤亡的强烈影响已经表明，战争造成的破坏，加强了对社会主义者的支持。

The patterns shown in Table 1 are highly robust. In [Online Appendix Table A4](#), we construct various alternative instruments, for example, focusing on casualties among reservists and drafted foot soldiers, casualties only among drafted soldiers, or all casualties, and show that the results are very similar. Additional robustness results are discussed in the context of our instrumental variables (IV) estimates in the next section.

† 表 1 中显示的模式，非常稳健。在[在线附录表 A4](#)中，我们构建了各种替代工具，例如，关注预备役军人和应征步兵的伤亡人数、仅关注应征士兵的伤亡人数或所有伤亡人数，并表明结果非常相似。下一节，将在我们的工具变量（IV）估计的背景下，讨论其他鲁棒性结果。

One concern with our foot soldier casualties measure is that despite our regiment and province fixed effects and other controls, municipalities with different historical or current characteristics could have

¹⁵The agricultural controls are the fractions of day laborers and of sharecroppers in the population, and a dummy for the presence of landowner associations in the municipality. The urban controls are the fraction of industrial workers in the male population, the number of industrial firms relative to male population, the literacy rate in 1911, the fraction of entrepreneurs and rentiers, and the fraction of the middle class in the population. † 农业控制是指人口中日工和佃农的比例，也是市政府中土地所有者协会存在的虚拟比例。城市控制是指男性人口中工业工人的比例、工业企业相对于男性人口的数量、1911年的识字率、企业家和食利者的比例，以及人口中中产阶级的比例。

sent soldiers to systematically different theaters of war or might have experienced differential mortality because of variation in the underlying conditions or motivations of the soldiers. To check against this possibility, which is central for the interpretation of the effect of war casualties on socialist support and for our later IV estimates, in Figure 3 we investigate the relationship between foot soldier casualties and a battery of pre- 1919 economic, social, and political characteristics of the municipality.

† 我们的步兵伤亡衡量标准的一个问题是，尽管我们的团和省有固定的影响和其他控制措施，但具有不同历史或当前特征的市政当局，可能会将士兵系统地派往不同的战区，或者可能会因为士兵的基本条件或动机的变化而经历不同的死亡率。为了检验这种可能性，这对于解释战争伤亡，对社会主义支持的影响以及我们后来的第四次估计至关重要，在图 3 中，我们研究了，步兵伤亡与1919年前该市的一系列经济、社会和政治特征之间的关系。

Specifically, we look at the support for socialists in 1913, literacy in 1911, violent crimes (as a share of population) in 1874, the crime rate in 1874, industrial workers as a share of the male population as well as industrial firms normalized by male population in 1911, dummies for the prevalence of large landholdings and widespread landownership in 1885, various measures of industrial and agricultural strikes or number of strikers in the population in 1913 - 14, the share of volunteers and a dummy for any volunteers in the 1866 independence war, the share of population that were members of local associations, and a dummy for any such member in the municipality in the early 1900s. In all cases, we report estimates from the specifications corresponding to columns (1), (4), and (6) from Table 1 (top: black, middle: light blue, and bottom: green, respectively). The first of these is our most parsimonious specification, and the second includes all of our controls except the agricultural and urban ones, and the last one is our most demanding specification.¹⁶ The results in Figure 3 are fairly clear: in none of the 48 specifications for the 16 variables we look at do we see a significant correlation with foot soldier casualties.¹⁷ This pattern bolsters our confidence that our foot soldier casualties variable zeroes in on the random component of World War I casualties and provides an attractive source of variation for investigating the effect of the (perceived) threat of socialism on the rise of fascism in Italy.

† 具体来说，我们考察了1913年对社会主义者的支持、1911年的识字率、1874年的暴力犯罪（占人口的比例）、1874年犯罪率、1911年工业工人占男性人口的比例以及按男性人口标准化的工业公司、1885年大土地所有权和广泛土地所有权盛行的假人、1913-14年工农业罢工的各种衡量标准或罢工人数、1866年独立战争中志愿者和任何志愿者的假人比例、当地协会成员的人口比例，以及20世纪初市政当局中，任何此类成员的假人。在所有情况下，根据表 1 中的列（1）、（4）和（6）相应的规格（顶部：黑色，中间：浅蓝色，底部：绿色），我们都会报告估计值。第一个是我们最吝啬的规范，第二个包括我们所有的控制措施，除了农业和城市控制措施，最后一个是我们要求最高的规范。图 3 中的结果相当清楚：在16个变量的48个规范中，没有一个是我们观察的变量，是否与步兵伤亡有显著相关性。这一模式，增强了我们的信心，即我们的步兵伤亡变量，是第一次世界大战伤亡的随机组成部分，并为调查（感知到的）社会主义威胁，对意大利法西斯主义崛起的影响，提供了有吸引力的

¹⁶When we look at socialist vote share in 1913, literacy in 1911, or industrial workers and firms in 1911 on the left-hand side, these variables themselves, which are otherwise among our controls, are excluded from the right-hand side. † 当我们把1913年的社会主义选票份额、1911年的识字率或1911年的产业工人和企业放在左边时，这些变量本身（原本是我们控制的变量）被排除在右边。

¹⁷In the first specification, the coefficient estimate for socialist vote share in 1913 is somewhat larger than the other two specifications, though still far from statistical significance and also much smaller than the estimate for socialist vote share in 1919 (recall that all coefficients are standardized and are thus directly comparable). † 在第一个规范中，1913年社会主义选票份额的系数估计值，略大于其他两个规范，尽管仍远未达到统计显著性，也远小于1919年社会主义选票比例的估计值（记住所有系数，都是标准化的，因此可以直接比较）。

变化来源。

§5 MAIN RESULTS

In this section we provide our main results on the relationship between the threat of socialism in 1919 and 1920 and the subsequent rise of the Fascist Party. We focus on four variables, measuring various aspects of local support for fascism. The first two concern fascist activity: violence by fascists in the early 1920s and the presence of a local branch of the Fascist Party in 1921. The next two provide information about support for the party among the broader population by looking at the fascist vote share in the 1921 and 1924 elections. We start with our main IV models, where we proxy for the red scare with the vote share of the Socialist Party in the 1919 elections. We provide complementary evidence on local socialist activity and other findings supporting our interpretation in Section §6, where we also systematically discuss various threats to the validity of our IV strategy.

† 在本节中，我们提供了1919年和1920年社会主义威胁与法西斯党随后崛起之间关系的主要结果。我们关注四个变量，衡量当地对法西斯主义支持的各个方面。前两个涉及法西斯活动：20世纪20年代初法西斯分子的暴力行为、1921年法西斯党地方分支的存在。接下来的两个子节，通过研究法西斯在1921年和1924年选举中的投票份额，提供了有关该党在更广泛人群中的支持情况。我们从主要的IV模型开始，在该模型中，我们用社会党在1919年选举中的选票份额，来代表红色恐慌。我们在第§6节中，提供了关于当地社会主义活动的补充证据、其他支持我们解释的发现，我们还系统地讨论了，对我们IV战略有效性的各种威胁。

§5.1 The Effects of the Red Scare on Local Fascist Activity

Our main outcome variables for fascist activity in an area are fascist violence (squadrisimo) between 1920 and 1922, normalized by municipality population, and the presence of a local Fascist Party branch in 1921. As noted previously, violent, antisocialist action was a hallmark of the Fascist Party and played an important role in its rise. Such action was often coordinated by local party branches. Therefore, these two measures together provide a fairly comprehensive picture of fascist activities in a municipality.

† 我们对一个地区法西斯活动的主要结果变量，是1920年至1922年间的按市政人口正常化的法西斯暴力 (squadrisimo)，以及1921年当地法西斯党支部的存在。如前所述，暴力、反社会行动，是法西斯党的标志，并在其崛起中发挥了重要作用。这种行动，往往由地方党支部协调。因此，这两项措施，共同提供了一个城市法西斯活动的相当全面的图景。

Our main regression model is † 我们的主要回归模型是

$$y_i^t = \alpha(\text{Socialist vote share})_i^{1919} + X_i'\delta + u_i \quad (2)$$

where y_i^t is one of our measures of fascist activity in municipality i during time period t and the socialist vote share in 1919 is our proxy for red scare. The other variables are the same as in equation (1), which will also be the first stage for the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates reported in this section.

† 其中 y_i^t 是我们衡量市政当局 i 在时间段 t 的法西斯活动的指标之一，而1919年的社会主义选票份额为我们对红色恐慌的代理。其他变量与方程 (1) 中的相同，这也是本节报告的两阶段最小二乘法 (2SLS) 估计的第一阶段。

The exclusion restriction for this empirical strategy relies on two premises, both of which are bolstered further in Section §6. First, the foot soldier casualties variable should be uncorrelated with

municipality characteristics affecting local violence and fascist activity—in other words, conditional on demographic controls and regiment and province fixed effects, it should be orthogonal to u_i in equation (2). We believe this is plausible in light of our discussion in Section §4, which suggested that differences in foot soldier casualties were due to random variation in mortality rates across battles and areas. This interpretation is supported by the evidence we provided in Figure 3 (showing that this variable is uncorrelated with a long list of pre-1919 municipality characteristics) and by several other exercises in Section §6. Second, the effects of foot soldier casualties should be fully captured by the vote share of the Socialist Party in the 1919 election. This is potentially more questionable, since other socialist activities or the political behavior of veterans may have contributed to fascist support. In Section §6, we show that the socialist vote share in 1919 is correlated with other potential proxies for red scare and provide similar results using these alternative proxies. We also document that our results are not driven by support for fascists coming from veterans or greater nationalist feeling in municipalities with high foot soldier casualties.

† 这种经验策略的排除限制依赖于两个前提，这两个前提在第6节中得到了进一步的支持。首先，步兵伤亡变量应该与影响当地暴力和法西斯活动的市政特征无关——换句话说，在人口控制和团省固定效应的条件下，它应该与方程(2)中的 u_i 正交。我们认为，根据我们在第4节中的讨论，这是合理的，该节指出，步兵伤亡的差异是由于战斗和地区死亡率的随机变化造成的。我们在图3中提供的证据(表明该变量与1919年前的一长串市政特征无关)和第6节中的其他几个练习支持了这一解释。其次，步兵伤亡的影响，应该完全由社会党在1919年选举中的投票份额来衡量。这可能更值得怀疑，因为其他社会主义活动或退伍军人的政治行为，可能促成了法西斯的支持。在第§6节中，我们表明1919年的社会主义选票份额，与红色恐慌的其他潜在代理相关，并使用这些替代代理提供了类似的结果。我们还记录了，我们的结果，不是由退伍军人对法西斯分子的支持、或高的步兵伤亡城市的更强烈的民族主义情绪推动。

Table 2, Panels A and B present our results for fascist violence, and Panels C and D are for local Fascist Party branches. The structure of this table is identical to that of Table 1.¹⁸

† 表2, A和B组显示了法西斯暴力的结果, C和D组显示了地方法西斯党支部的结果。此表的结构与表1的结构相同。

In all six columns of Table 2 we see a sizable effect of the socialist vote share in 1919 on the subsequent violence by fascists. In our most parsimonious specification in column (1) (which only includes regiment and province fixed effects and demographic controls as in column (1) of Table 1), the coefficient estimate is 0.38 (standard error = 0.19). This magnitude implies that the overall increase in the socialist vote share from 1913, which is 15.6%, should be associated with an increase of 0.036 episodes per 1,000 inhabitants in fascist violence in the early 1920s compared with this variable's mean, 0.04. Our estimate thus implies that the surge of the Socialist Party in 1919 may account for the bulk of the overall increase in fascist violence.¹⁹

† 在表2的所有六列中，我们看到1919年社会主义选票份额对法西斯随后的暴力行为产生了相当大的影响。在我们第(1)列中最简约的规范中(仅包括表1第(1)列中的团和省固定效应和人口控制)，系

¹⁸Online Appendix Table A5 presents the corresponding reduced-form estimates. † 在线附录表A5给出了相应的简化形式估算。

¹⁹In the same way that our first-stage estimates do not capture the total effects of the war on socialist support in 1919, these IV estimates do not incorporate the effects of the common component of the red scare on the rise of the Fascist Party. † 正如我们的第一阶段估计，没有反映1919年战争对社会主义支持的总体影响一样，这些IV估计，也没有包括红色恐慌的共同部分对法西斯党崛起的影响。

数估计值为0.38（标准误差=0.19）。这一规模意味着，自1913年以来，社会主义选票份额的总体增长为15.6%，与该变量的平均值0.04相比，20世纪20年代初法西斯暴力每1000名居民中增加0.036次。因此，我们的估计意味着，1919年社会党的激增可能是法西斯暴力总体增加的主要原因。

The estimates in the remaining columns are quite stable. Columns (2) and (3) add geographic controls and the socialist vote share in 1913, but the estimate for α changes only a little (to 0.39 in column (2) and to 0.42 in column (3)). Column (4) adds the military controls, which have a small effect on the coefficient of the socialist vote share (the estimate goes from 0.42 in column (3) to 0.53 and is statistically significant at less than 1%), and these variables themselves are not statistically significant, with the exception of the dummy for the presence of an army-supplying production plant.²⁰

† 其余列中的估计值相当稳定。第(2)和(3)列增加了地理控制和社会主义投票1913年的份额，但对 α 的估计仅略有变化（在第(2)列中的到0.39，0.42，在第(3)列中的到0.42）。第(4)列增加了军事控制，军事控制对社会主义投票份额系数，有小的影响（估计值从第(3)列中的0.42增加到0.53，统计学意义小于1%），这些变量本身没有统计学意义，但军队供应生产厂存在的虚拟变量除外。

Panel B presents OLS estimates for the fascist violence variable. We see fairly precisely estimated, highly significant, but much smaller effects. For example, in column (1), the OLS estimate is 0.11 (standard error = 0.02), instead of the 2SLS estimate 0.38. This gap between the OLS and IV estimates is not unexpected: OLS estimates are biased toward zero because municipalities that are more left-leaning will vote more for the socialists in 1919 and feature less fascist activity later. We discuss this difference between OLS and IV further in Section §6.

† B组展示了对法西斯暴力变量的 OLS 估计。我们看到了相当精确的估计，非常显著，但影响要小得多。例如，在第(1)列中，OLS 估计值为0.11（标准误差 = 0.02），而不是2SLS估计值0.38。OLS 和 IV 估计值之间的这种差距，并不出乎意料：OLS估计值偏向于零，因为更左倾的市政当局在1919年会更多地投票给社会主义者，以后的法西斯活动也会减少。我们将在第 §6节中进一步讨论OLS和IV之间的差异。

The estimates for the presence of a local fascist branch are presented in Table 2, Panels C and D. The 2SLS estimate in column (1) is 0.39 (standard error = 0.17) and implies a similarly sizable effect: the overall increase in the socialist vote share from 1913 to 1919 now accounts for a 7.9 percentage point increase in the probability of a fascist local branch (about half of this variable's mean of 14.5%). In all panels of the table, the estimates are fairly stable across columns, once again increasing our confidence that the instrumented socialist vote share in 1919 is not capturing omitted municipality characteristics. The OLS estimates continue to be precise and significant but much smaller than the IV estimates.

† 表 2, C和D组中给出了当地法西斯分支存在的估计值。第(1)列中的 2SLS 估计值是0.39（标准误差 = 0.17），意味着同样可观的影响：从1913年到1919年，社会主义选票份额的总体增加，现在导致法西斯地方分支的概率增加了7.9个百分点（约为该变量平均值14.5%的一半）。在表格的所有组中，各列的估计值都相当稳定，这再次增强了我们的信心，即1919年的社会主义选票份额，没有捕捉到遗漏的市政特征。OLS 的估计仍然准确且重要，但比 IV 的估计要小得多。

Overall, the results in this table are uniformly consistent with our hypothesis that the red scare, as proxied by the socialist vote share in 1919, has a large and statistically significant effect on fascist activity.

† 总体而言，本表中的结果与我们的假设一致，即红色恐慌，由社会主义者1919年的投票份额代理，

²⁰Estimates for military controls are shown in [Online Appendix Table A6](#), and their interpretation is discussed in Section §6. † 军事管制的估计数见[在线附录表A6](#)，其解释见第6节。

对法西斯活动，产生了大的且具有统计意义的影响。

§5.2 Electoral Measures of Fascist Support

In Table 3, we present results using our two measures of electoral support for the Fascist Party. These are fascist vote shares in the 1921 and 1924 elections. As highlighted, the 1924 election occurred after the march on Rome. This raises questions about electoral fraud and voter intimidation, which we have no systematic way of ruling out. Nevertheless, because violence and electoral fraud organized by local fascist squads and the party are an indication of their strength in the area, we interpret fascist vote share in 1924 as measuring both support among ordinary Italians and the ability of the local party to mobilize and coerce votes. All the same, results using the 1924 vote share should be interpreted with caution.

† 在表 3 中，我们使用对法西斯党的两种选举支持指标来呈现结果。这些是 1921 年和 1924 年选举中的法西斯选票份额。正如所强调的那样，1924 年的选举，发生在罗马游行之后。这引发了关于选举舞弊和选民恐吓的问题，我们无法系统地排除这种可能性。然而，由于当地法西斯小队和该党组织的暴力和选举舞弊，表明了他们在该地区的实力，我们将 1924 年法西斯选票份额，解释为衡量普通意大利人的支持率和当地政党动员和胁迫选票的能力。尽管如此，使用 1924 年投票份额的结果，应该谨慎解释。

We start with the 2SLS results for fascist vote share in 1921 in Table 3, Panel A, which has the same structure as Table 2.²¹ In all six columns of Table 3, we see a sizable and very stable effect of the red scare on subsequent electoral support for fascists. In the specification in column (6) of Panel A, the coefficient estimate is 0.34 (standard error = 0.18). This magnitude implies that the increase in the socialist vote share from 1913 to 1919 can explain 1.3 percentage points of the vote share of the Fascist Party in the 1921 elections (about a quarter of this variable's mean of 5.1%).

† 我们从 1921 年法西斯选票份额的 2SLS 结果开始，见表 3，A 组，其结构与表 2 相同。在表 3 的所有 6 列中，我们看到红色恐慌，对随后法西斯分子的选举支持，产生了相当大且非常稳定的影响。在 A 组第 (6) 列的规范中，系数估计值为 0.34 (标准误差 = 0.18)。这一规模意味着，从 1913 年到 1919 年，社会主义选票份额的增加，可以解释法西斯党在 1921 年选举中选票份额的 1.3 个百分点 (约为该变量平均值 5.1% 的四分之一)。

The results for the fascist vote share in 1924, presented in Panel C, are very similar. The 2SLS coefficient estimate in the sixth column is 0.51 (standard error = 0.17) and suggests that the red scare now explains an 8 percentage points increase in the fascist vote share, which is smaller as a proportion of the fascist vote in this election, averaging 61.9% across the municipalities in our sample. Though proportionately smaller than the other quantitative magnitudes reported in this section, this effect is still sizable. Another notable difference in this table is that the OLS estimates are now imprecise and insignificant.

† C 组中 1924 年法西斯投票份额的结果，非常相似。第 (6) 列中的 2SLS 系数估计值为 0.51 (标准误差 = 0.17)，表明红色恐慌，现在解释了法西斯选票份额增加了 8 个百分点，这在本次选举中，占法

²¹Online Appendix Table A7 reports first-stage results for the slightly smaller sample used for the fascist vote share in 1921. In addition, Online Appendix Table A11 presents analogous results for the fascist vote share in 1921 using the restricted (no-imputation) sample of municipalities. The qualitative pattern of results is very similar, though the quantitative magnitude of the estimates is larger in this smaller sample. † 在线附录表 A7 报告了 1921 年法西斯选票份额所用的稍小样本的第一阶段结果。此外，在线附录表 A11 显示了 1921 年法西斯选票份额的类似结果，使用了市政当局的限制性 (无插补) 样本。结果的定性模式非常相似，尽管在这个较小的样本中，估计的定量幅度更大。

西斯选票的比例较小，在我们的样本中，各市平均为61.9%。虽然比例上小于本节中报告的其他数量级，但这种影响仍然相当大。该表中的另一个显著差异是，OLS 估计值现在不精确且微不足道。

Figure 4 depicts visually our most demanding specification for our four measures of fascist support using bin scatterplots and indicates that the relationship in each case is approximately linear.

† 图 4 使用 bin 散点图直观地描绘了我们对法西斯支持的四种指标的最苛刻的规范，并表明每种情况下的关系都是近似线性的。

§5.3 Robustness

Further robustness checks for the results in this section (and for the first-stage relationship discussed in the previous section) are provided in the [Online Appendix](#). Briefly, [Online Appendix Table A8](#) shows that the results are very similar when the south, where fascism was initially weaker, is excluded. [Online Appendix Table A9](#) documents the robustness of our results to alternative constructions of the foot soldier casualties variable. In [Online Appendix Table A10](#) we replace regiment fixed effects with either front times semester or front times month fixed effects to more finely control for other aspects of war experience. Finally, [Online Appendix Table A11](#) demonstrates that our results are robust when we use alternative measures of local violence and fascist electoral support, when we focus on the no-imputation sample for 1921, when we control for vote shares in the 1919 elections, and when we compute the party's vote shares in 1924 focusing only on the official Fascist lists.

† 在线附录中提供了本节结果（以及上一节讨论的第一阶段关系）的进一步稳健性检查。简而言之，在线附录表A8显示，当排除法西斯主义最初较弱的南方时，结果非常相似。在线附录表A9记录了我们的结果，对步兵伤亡变量替代结构的稳健性。在线附录表A10中，我们用前线时间学期或前线时间月固定效果，替换团固定效果，以便更精细地控制战争经验的其他方面。最后，在线附录表A11表明我们的结果，情况分别对应于：当我们使用当地暴力和法西斯选举支持的替代指标时，当我们关注1921年的无插补样本时，当在1919年选举中控制投票份额时，以及当我们仅关注官方法西斯名单计算1924年该党的投票份额时。

§6 INVESTIGATING THE MECHANISM

In this section, we first provide evidence supporting our interpretation that the socialist electoral victory in 1919 led to a red scare and that the vote share of the party in this election is a reasonable proxy for local strike and organizational activities led by socialists. We deal systematically with a number of threats to our identification strategy, providing several pieces of evidence bolstering the reliability of our instrument and our overall interpretation. We explore how support from landowners and elites contributed to the rise of fascism.

† 在本节中，我们首先提供支持我们的解释的证据是，1919年社会主义选举的胜利，导致了红色恐慌，该党在这次选举中的投票份额，是社会主义者领导的地方罢工和组织活动的合理代表。我们系统地处理了我们的识别策略面临的一些威胁，提供了一些证据来支持我们的工具和整体解释的可靠性。我们探讨了，地主和精英的支持，是如何促成法西斯主义的兴起的。

§6.1 Socialist Vote Share and Agrarian Strike Activity

A first concern with our strategy is that even if our instrument is valid, the socialist vote share in 1919 may not be adequately proxying for red scare. To develop our causal mechanism further,

we now show that two measures of local socialist activity that were important in the early 1920s are correlated with the socialist vote share in 1919. The first is a dummy for socialist wins in the 1920 municipal elections. As mentioned in Section §2, these elections took place at the height of the red wave and after the leftward shift of the Socialist Party. In the elections, socialists gained control of about 2,100 municipalities, where local power passed “from the hands of the traditional ruling classes to the representatives of the wage earners.

† 我们战略的首要问题是即使我们的工具是有效的，1919年的社会主义选票份额可能也不足以代表红色恐慌。为了进一步发展我们的因果机制，我们现在证明，20世纪20年代初重要的两个地方社会主义活动指标与1919年的社会主义投票份额有关。第一个是1920年市政选举中社会主义者获胜的假象。正如第2节所述，这些选举是在红潮最高潮和社会党左倾之后举行的。在选举中，社会主义者控制了大约2100个城市，地方权力“从传统统治阶级手中转移到工薪阶层的代表手中”。

Members of the middle classes found themselves ousted from local and provincial bodies they had come to regard as theirs almost as a matter of course” (Snowden 1972, 274). Fears among the middle classes and landowners intensified when confronted with “red flags hoisted in triumph and waving from the city halls” (Ragionieri 1976a, 2100) and a fairly radical agenda by new local governments, including large social spendings, tax increases, and plans to have local authorities adjudicate labor disputes (Direzione PSI 1920). “Faced with this sort of threat...the landlords reacted massively and with violence. It is no accident that in such crucial centers as Cremona, Bologna, and Ferrara the development of the Fascist squads began in earnest in the autumn of 1920, after the local elections and after the landlords had been forced to sign a series of pacts incorporating substantial gains for the [workers’] Leagues” (Snowden 1972, 275). Our second measure is also related to these events: agrarian strikes in 1920, which were often associated with demands for higher wages and better working conditions.

† 中产阶级成员，发现他们自己被驱逐出他们视为理所当然的地方和省级机构” (Snowden 1972, 274)。中产阶级和土地所有者的恐惧，在面对“胜利升起的红旗，从市政厅” (Ragionieri 1976a, 2100) 和相当激进的议程新的地方政府，包括大量的社会支出、税收增加，并计划让地方当局裁决劳资纠纷 (Direzione PSI 1920)。“面对这种威胁...地主们做出了大规模的暴力反应。在 Cremona, Bologna, and Ferrara 等关键中心，法西斯小队的发展始于1920年秋天，在地方选举之后，在地主被迫签署一系列为[工人]联盟带来实质性利益的协议之后，这绝非偶然” (Snowden 1972, 275)。我们的第二个指标，也与这些事件有关：1920年的农业罢工，这通常与要求更高的工资和更好的工作条件有关。

The results with both variables are presented in Table 4. Panels A and B are for the former variable, corresponding to 2SLS and OLS, respectively, and Panels C and D are for the latter. For socialist wins in local elections, we see strong correlations with the socialist vote share in the 1919 national elections. The 2SLS estimates in Panel A are once again larger than the OLS, though the gap is much smaller than those in previous tables, and the OLS and the 2SLS estimates are quite stable across our six specifications. For agrarian strikes, we see a somewhat different pattern. In Panel D, there is a strong OLS association with the socialist vote share in 1919, but the 2SLS relationship is weaker and not statistically significant.²²

† 两个变量的结果如表 4所示。A和B组用于前一个变量，对应于2SLS 面板C和D分别用于后者。对

²²The lack of significant IV estimate in this case may be because of the smaller sample where the agrarian strike variable is relevant (rural municipalities) or because initiating new agrarian strikes may have required a longer-term organization in the area. † 在这种情况下，缺乏重要的 IV 估计，可能是因为与农业罢工变量相关的样本较小（农村城市），或者因为发起新的农业罢工可能需要该地区的长期组织。

于社会主义在地方选举中的胜利，我们看到与1919年全国选举中的社会主义选票份额有很强的相关性。A组中的2SLS估计值再次大于OLS，尽管差距远小于前表中的差距，并且OLS和2SLS估计在我们的六个规格中非常稳定。对于农业罢工，我们看到了一种略有不同的模式。在D组中，1919年OLS与社会主义选票份额有很强的关联，但2SLS关系较弱，在统计上并不显著。

The results in Table 4 support a particular causal mechanism: a high vote share for the Socialist Party in a municipality was associated with more socialist-led activities, many of which, in the turbulent days of the early 1920s, took the form of strikes and revolutionary action, intensifying the perceived threat of socialist takeover, especially among landowners and elites (see also later discussion).

† 表 4 中的结果，支持了一种特殊的因果机制：社会党在市政当局的高投票份额，与更多的社会主义主导活动有关，其中许多活动在20世纪20年代初的动荡时期，以罢工和革命行动的形式出现，加剧了社会主义接管的威胁，尤其是在地主和精英中（另见稍后的讨论）。

In Online Appendix Table A12, we go one step further and present IV estimates that use as an endogenous variable either the dummy for socialist wins in the 1920 local elections (Panel A) or an index of socialist activity (red scare index) constructed as an unweighted average of the (standardized) measures of socialist vote share in the 1919 national elections, the dummy for a socialist win in the 1920 local election, and agrarian strike activity. The results are very similar, both quantitatively and qualitatively, to those presented in the text.

† 在在线附录表A12中，我们更进一步提出 IV 估计，将1920年地方选举中社会主义胜利的虚拟值（A组）或社会主义活动指数（红色恐慌指数）用作内生变量，该指数，是1919年全国选举中社会主义投票份额（标准化）指标的未加权平均值，1920年地方大选中社会主义胜利和土地罢工活动的虚拟值。结果在数量和质量上都与文中所述。

Finally, our causal mechanism suggests a simple falsification exercise. If the effects of the foot soldier casualties instrument are working through perceived socialist threat, then the instrument should not predict greater fascist activity or votes in municipalities where this perceived threat is weak. This exercise is in the spirit of the statistical procedures proposed in Bound and Jaeger (2000), Angrist (2004), and D’Haultfoeuille, Hoderlein, and Sasaki (forthcoming), who explore whether there is a marginal causal effect in subsamples of “never-takers” (units that have zero or very small probability of treatment). Specifically, we focus on two subsamples of never-taker municipalities where socialists were weak. The first is municipalities where predicted socialist vote share in 1919 from the first-stage specification in column (1) of Table 1 is in the bottom quartile,²³ and the second is municipalities where the Socialist Party did not field a candidate in 1913.

† 最后，我们的因果机制表明一个简单的伪造练习。如果步兵伤亡工具的效果是通过感知到的社会主义威胁发挥作用的，那么该工具不应该预测在这种感知到的威胁较弱的城市会有更大的法西斯活动或投票。这项工作符合统计程序的精神Bound和Jaeger（2000）、Angrist（2004）以及 D’Haultfoeuille、Hoderlein 和 Sasaki 提出（即将发布），他们探索在“从不服用”的子样本（治疗概率为零或非常小的单位）中是否存在边际因果效应。具体来说，我们关注两个子样本，即社会主义者较弱的从不采取行动的城市。第一个是自治区，该区预计了社会主义者1919年的投票份额，从表 1 第（1）列第一阶段规范，到位于底部的四分位数，第二个是市镇，在那里1913年，社会党没有派出候选人。

²³We chose the most parsimonious first-stage specification to focus on the variation coming from foot soldier casualties, rather than the other covariates, such as the party’s vote share in the 1913 election. The results are similar when we use the predicted values from other columns in Table 1. † 我们选择了最简洁的第一阶段规范，来关注来自步兵伤亡而非其他协变量的变化，比如该党在1913年选举中的选票份额。当我们使用表中其他列的预测值。

Results from this falsification exercise are presented in Figure 5, which first shows the reduced-form relationship between our instrument and the four measures of fascist support (for specifications 1, 4, and 6 as usual). It then depicts the same reduced-form relationship for the two subsamples of never-takers. The effects of foot soldier casualties are small and insignificant in these never-taker subsamples, and except for the fascist vote share in 1924, the estimates are very precise and two standard deviation confidence intervals exclude the estimates from the full sample.

† 这种证伪练习的结果如图5所示，它首先显示了在我们的工具和法西斯支持的四项措施之间的简化的形式关系（通常用于规格 1、4 和 6）。然后，它描述了两个子样本中从不索取者的相同简化形式关系。在这些从不取样的子样本中，步兵伤亡的影响很小，微不足道，除了1924年的法西斯投票份额外，估计值非常精确，两个标准差置信区间，排除了整个样本的估计值。

In [Online Appendix Table A13](#) we show that estimates from the full sample and the never-taker subsamples are statistically different from each other using standard Chow tests and report p-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing that confirm that the never-taker estimates are jointly insignificant. Overall, this falsification exercise increases our confidence in the validity of our instrument and, more importantly, in the specific channel via which this instrument is hypothesized to affect fascist activity in the early 1920s.

† 在[在线附录表A13](#)中，我们使用标准 Chow 检验表明，全样本和从不接受的子样本的估计值，在统计学上彼此不同，并报告了经多重假设检验调整的 p-值，这些检验证实从不接受的估计值，共同不显著。总的来说，这种伪造行为，增加了我们对我们工具有效性的信心，更重要的是，增加了对该工具，被假设影响20世纪20年代初法西斯活动的具体渠道的信心。

§6.2 Threats against Instrument Validity

There are several concerns about the validity of the foot soldier casualty instrument. We group these concerns into two. First, foot soldier casualties may be correlated with various crossmunicipality differences that might have direct effects on both 1919 election outcomes and political conflict in the 1920s. Though this possibility cannot be fully ruled out, the battery of tests reported in Figure 3 confirm that our instrument is orthogonal to a large number of pre-1919 characteristics. The case for such orthogonality is also bolstered by the fact that in all of the results reported so far, the coefficient estimates are fairly insensitive across specifications, suggesting that any conditional correlation between various municipality characteristics and foot soldier casualties is small.

† 步兵伤亡工具的有效性有几个问题。我们将这些担忧分为两类。首先，步兵伤亡可能与各种跨市因素有关这些差异可能对1919年的选举结果，和20世纪20年代的政治冲突产生直接影响。虽然不能完全排除这种可能性，但图 3中报告的一系列测试，证实了我们的工具是正交的，具有大量1919年前的特征。正交性这种情况也得到了以下事实的支持：在所有结果中，据报道，到目前为止，系数估计值，跨规范相当不敏感，表明各城市的特点和步兵伤亡人数之间的任何条件相关性小。

Second, foot soldier casualties, even if orthogonal to pre-1919 municipality characteristics, may be working through other channels. The most important alternative here is that this instrument may be correlated with direct right-wing support or nationalist sentiments from returning veterans. A related concern is that our instrument may be simultaneously generating greater support for both socialists and fascists.

† 第二，步兵伤亡，即使与1919年前正交市政府特征，可能通过其他渠道发挥作用。这里最重要的替代方案是，这一工具，可能与直接的右翼支持或归国退伍军人的民族主义情绪有关。一个相关的担

忧是，我们的工具，可能同时为社会主义者和法西斯主义者提供更大的支持。

We now discuss why these concerns are unlikely to apply in our setting. To start with, our coefficient estimates are not affected when we do or do not control for the fraction of returning veterans in the population.²⁴ The coefficient estimates for these variables, in turn, do not support the view that they were strongly opposed to socialists—we saw in Table 1 that the fraction of veterans from the 1874 - 95 classes in the population is positively correlated with the socialist vote share, and similar results are presented in [Online Appendix Table A6](#).

† 反过来，这些变量的系数估计值，并不支持他们强烈反对社会主义者的观点—我们在表 1 中看到，1874-95 年人口中退伍军人的比例，与社会主义者的投票份额呈正相关，类似的结果在[在线附录表 A6](#) 中给出。我们现在讨论，为什么这些担忧，不太可能适用于我们的环境。首先，当我们控制或不控制人口中退伍军人的比例时，我们的系数估计值，不会受到影响。

More directly, in Figure 4 we investigate whether there is any evidence of rising nationalist or prowar support in or shortly after 1919 in municipalities with greater foot soldier casualties. We look at the vote share of the two main prowar parties, fascists and nationalists, in the 1919 elections, and two measures of prowar monuments built between 1919 and 1921. We find fairly precise zero estimates for the last three outcomes. For the 1919 fascist vote share, the point estimates are positive, but statistically insignificant. The comparison to the effects on the socialist vote share in 1919, shown at the top, indicates that the quantitative magnitude of this effect is also small.

† 更直接地说，在图 4 中，我们调查了 1919 年或之后不久，在步兵伤亡人数较多的城市中，是否有任何证据表明民族主义或潜行者的支持率上升。我们看看法西斯这两个主要政党的投票份额，1919 年选举中的民族主义者，以及 1919 年至 1921 年间建造的两座普瓦尔纪念碑。我们发现最后三个结果的估计值相当精确。对于 1919 年法西斯的投票份额，点估计是积极的，但统计上并不显著。与上图所示的 1919 年对社会主义选票份额的影响相比，这种影响的数量规模也小。

Even if there is no population-wide increase in prowar or nationalist feeling in the years right after World War I, one might be worried that a subset of the returning veterans that had very strong nationalist or militaristic feelings may have been at the center of fascist activities. Indeed, there are well-known World War I veterans, such as Dino Grandi, Italo Balbo, or Cesare Maria De Vecchi, who played major roles in the fascist movement. Two groups of veterans may be particularly important for this channel: the special assault troops, the Arditi, and volunteers (recall that our foot soldier casualties measure does not include casualties among assault troops or volunteers). The rest of Figure 6 looks at four measures of casualties among these groups—the Arditi by themselves, volunteers by themselves, the two combined, and a dummy for any Arditi or volunteer casualties in the municipality. In these

²⁴This finding is in line with recent historical contributions that propose a more nuanced view of the role of veterans than the previous historiography. For example Alcalde (2017, 65 - 66) summarizes his view as follows: “the alleged antisocialist orientation of the Italian veterans was a contingent and constructed phenomenon, the product of a long evolution of discourses and representations, in which Fascism played a crucial role. . . . The Italian veterans as a mass were not the anti-Bolshevik, national-revolutionary men of action that the fascist imagined.” Moreover, after the 1919 elections, “the Italian Camera dei Deputati was composed of 27.97 percent ex-servicemen. Ironically, the Italian Socialist Party was the group with the highest percentage of veterans among its parliamentary representatives (47.4 percent)” (Alcalde 2017, 75). † 这一发现，与最近的历史贡献相一致，这些贡献，对退伍军人的作用提出了比以前的史学更微妙的观点。例如，Alcalde (2017, 65-66) 将他的观点总结如下：“意大利退伍军人所谓的反社会倾向，是一种偶然和建构的现象，是话语和表征长期演变的产物，其中法西斯主义发挥了至关重要的作用. . . . 意大利退伍军人作为一个整体，并不是法西斯想象中的反布尔什维克、民族革命的行动者。”此外，1919 年选举后，“意大利代表团由 27.97% 的退伍军人组成。具有讽刺意味的是，意大利社会党是其议会代表中退伍军人比例最高的团体 (47.4%)” (Alcalde 2017, 75)。

exercises, the related military variable is never included on the right-hand side. We detect no evidence of a statistical association between our foot soldier casualties instrument and any one of these four measures.

† 即使在第一次世界大战后的几年里，全国范围内的徘徊或民族主义情绪没有增加，人们也可能担心，一部分有着强烈民族主义或军国主义情绪的退伍军人可能是法西斯活动的中心。事实上，有著名的第一次世界大战退伍军人，如 Dino Grandi、Italo Balbo 或 Cesare Maria De Vecchi，他们在法西斯运动中发挥了重要作用。对于这个渠道来说，两组退伍军人可能特别重要：特种突击部队、Arditi 人和志愿者（请记住，我们的步兵伤亡指标，不包括突击部队或志愿者的伤亡）。图 6 的其余部分，着眼于这些群体中伤亡的四种指标——阿迪蒂人自己、志愿者自己、两者结合，以及阿迪蒂或该市志愿者伤亡的虚拟指标。在这些演习中，相关的军事变量从未包含在右侧。我们没有发现，步兵伤亡工具与这四项指标中的任何一项之间，存在统计关联的证据。

Overall, we find no evidence of greater nationalist or fascist views, votes, or activities before the red biennium or of greater concentration of volunteers and special assault troops in municipalities with more foot soldier casualties. These results argue against a simple relationship between foot soldier casualties and support for right-wing, prowar political groups or any type of polarization before the red scare. As such, they bolster our interpretation that the buildup of support for the Fascist Party came after the red scare and was most likely a response to it.

† 总体而言，我们没有发现红色双年度之前，有更大的民族主义或法西斯观点、投票或活动的证据，也没有发现，志愿者和特种突击部队，更集中在步兵伤亡更多的城市的证据。这些结果表明，在红色恐慌之前，步兵伤亡与对右翼、潜行者政治团体的支持，或任何类型的两极分化之间存在简单的关系。因此，他们支持我们的解释，即对法西斯党的支持，是在红色恐慌之后出现的，很可能是对它的回应。

§6.3 OLS versus IV

The arguments in the previous two subsections on the validity of our IV strategy notwithstanding, the gaps between the OLS and IV estimates may appear concerning. In this subsection, we argue that these gaps are in fact quite plausible. Intuitively, the OLS relationship between socialist support and fascist activity should be significantly biased toward zero. This is because there is a natural source of negative correlation between the socialist vote share in 1919 and the error term u_i in our second-stage equation (2): when we focus on the entire source of variation in the socialist vote share, we are capturing the fact that some municipalities have a more left-leaning population, voting for socialists in greater numbers, and will thus be less likely to support fascism subsequently.

† 尽管前两小节中关于我们的IV战略有效性的论点，但OLS和IV估计值之间的差距，可能令人担忧。在本小节中，我们认为这些差距，实际上是相当合理的。直观地说，社会主义支持和法西斯活动之间的OLS关系，应该明显倾向于零。这是因为社会主义1919年的投票份额，与我们第二阶段方程（2）中的误差项 u_i 之间，存在着天然的负相关关系：当我们关注社会主义选票份额变化的整个来源时，我们发现了这样一个事实，即一些城市的人口更左倾，投票给社会主义者的人数更多，因此随后不太可能支持法西斯主义。

But does this explanation hold up under scrutiny? We use the Bayesian procedure developed by DiTraglia and García-Jimeno (2021), which tackles exactly this question. Briefly, their procedure takes as input moments from the data as well as priors on two important variance/covariance terms. The first is the extent of measurement error—signal-to-noise ratio κ —in our key right-hand-side variable,

socialist vote share in 1919. This measurement error is present in large part because our variable is only an imperfect proxy for the extent of red scare. The second is the correlation between the endogenous right-hand-side variable and the second-stage error term, denoted by ρ_{SVSu} (using the notation in equation (2) and with SVS denoting the socialist vote share in 1919). The procedure then jointly estimates the possible range of correlation ρ_{FCu} between the instrument, foot soldier casualties FC, and the second-stage error term, u_i (which would lead to biased IV estimates), and the implied value of the causal effect purged of this bias, α .

† 但这种解释在仔细审查后是否成立? 我们使用 DiTraglia 和 Garca-Jimeno (2021) 开发的贝叶斯程序, 该程序恰好解决了这个问题。简而言之, 他们的程序将数据中的矩以及两个重要方差/协方差项的先验作为输入。第一个, 是测量误差的程度——信噪比 κ ——在我们的关键右侧变量1919年的社会主义投票份额中。这种测量误差的存在, 在很大程度上是因为我们的变量, 只是红色恐慌程度的不完美代表。第二个, 是内生性右侧变量与第二阶段误差项之间的相关性, 用 ρ_{SVSu} 表示(使用方程(2)中的符号, SVS 表示1919年的社会主义选票份额)。然后, 该程序联合估计工具、步兵伤亡 FC 和第二阶段误差项 u_i (这将导致有偏差的 IV 估计) 之间可能的相关范围 ρ_{FCu} , 以及消除这种偏差的因果效应的隐含值 α 。

In [Online Appendix Table A14](#), we report the results from this procedure. We take κ to be in the range (0.5, 1]. The correlation between the socialist vote share in 1919 and the dummy for socialist win in the 1920 local elections, for example, is only 0.616, confirming that neither is a perfect proxy for perceived red scare. We set $\rho_{SVSu} \in [-0.1, -0.9]$, which represents a range of values for the contribution of persistent left-leaning attitudes to socialist votes 1919. For instance, $\rho_{SVSu} = -0.1$ implies that 10% of variation in socialist vote share is due to this persistent ideological component.

† 在[在线附录表A14](#)中, 我们报告了该程序的结果。我们假设 κ 在(0.5, 1]范围内。例如, 1919年的社会主义选票份额与1920年地方选举中社会主义胜利的假人之间的相关性, 仅为0.616, 这证实了, 两者都不是感知到的红色恐慌的完美代表。我们设置了 $\rho_{SVSu} \in [-0.1, -0.9]$, 它代表了1919年持续的左倾态度对社会主义选票的贡献的一系列值。例如, $\rho_{SVSu} = -0.1$ 意味着社会主义选票份额的10%的变化, 是由于这种持续的意识形态成分造成的。

The results are encouraging for our interpretation of the gaps between the OLS and IV estimates. In all cases, this Bayesian procedure implies that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of zero correlation between the instrument and the second-stage error term (the confidence interval for ρ_{FCu} always includes zero). Moreover, the Bayesian estimates of α are always statistically significantly different from zero and the confidence intervals always include our IV estimates.

† 这些结果令人鼓舞, 有助于我们解释OLS和IV估计值之间的差距。在所有情况下, 这种贝叶斯程序, 意味着我们不能拒绝工具和第二阶段误差项之间零相关性的零假设 (ρ_{FCu} 的置信区间总是包括零)。此外, α 的贝叶斯估计, 在统计上总是与零有显著差异, 置信区间总是包括我们的 IV 估计。

Overall, we conclude that the differences between the OLS and the IV estimates are in line with a sizable endogeneity problem in the OLS and thus confirm the importance of focusing on an exogenous source of variation in the local support for the Socialist Party.

† 总体而言, 我们得出结论, OLS 和 IV 估计值之间的差异, 与 OLS 中相当大的内生性问题相一致, 从而证实了, 关注当地对社会党支持的外生变化来源的重要性。

§6.4 Where Did Fascist Votes Come From?

We explore where fascist votes in the 1921 and 1924 elections came from in Table 5. The first six columns in Panel A report 2SLS estimates with vote shares of the Popular Party and the traditional right-wing parties in 1921 on the left-hand side.²⁵ These estimates indicate that socialist vote share in 1919 is associated with declines in the vote shares of these parties.²⁶ Columns (7) - (9) turn to the Socialist Party's vote share in 1921 (including the votes of the newly formed Communist Party). The 2SLS coefficient estimates for the effect of the socialist vote share in 1919 are now sizable and positive (around 0.85), suggesting that socialists in 1921 retained most of the additional votes they gained in 1919 because of the local population's reactions to the war—as captured by our foot soldier casualties instrument.

†我们在表5中探讨了1921年和1924年选举中法西斯选票的来源。A组报告2SLS的前六栏估计,1921年人民党和传统右翼政党的选票份额,在左侧。这些估计表明,1919年的社会主义选票份额与这些政党的选票份额下降有关。第(7)-(9)列转向1921年社会党的选票份额(包括新成立的共产党的选票)。1919年社会主义选票份额影响的2SLS系数估计值,现在相当可观且为正值(约0.85),这表明社会主义者1921年,由于当地居民对战争的反应,他们保留了1919年获得的大部分额外选票,正如我们的步兵伤亡工具所捕捉到的那样。

Panel B presents corresponding reduced-form estimates for the 1921 election. Using the national vote totals and reduced form coefficients, we can derive rough estimates of where fascist votes in 1921 came from. First, the total fascist votes increased by about 426,000 between the 1919 and 1921 elections. Because the electorate also expanded (in particular with the addition of over 500,000 veterans who could not vote in 1919), the vote totals of the Popular and the Socialist Parties increased as well (by 139,000 for the former and 48,000 for the latter). Other traditional right-wing parties lost votes. Second, we can use our reduced-form estimates to obtain some upper bounds on how much of the increase in fascist votes in 1921 came from those who voted for socialists because of the hardships created by the war in 1919 but then switched to fascists in 1921. Formally, we use the reduced-form estimates from Panel B for this computation.²⁷ The reduced-form estimates imply that foot soldier casualties predict a decrease of 216,000 votes for the Popular Party, 107,000 for other traditional right-wing parties, and 46,000 for the socialists. These estimates are upper bounds, especially for socialists, because we do not know whether, say, former socialist voters who switched away from the party voted for fascists, or for some other party,

²⁵The traditional right-wing parties include those taking part in the National Bloc, such as the Nationalist, Liberal, Liberal Democrat, and Agrarian Parties, but exclude the Popular Party and of course the fascists. †传统的右翼政党包括参加国家集团的政党,如公民党、自由党、自由民主党和农业党,但不包括人民党,当然还有法西斯主义者。

²⁶In Online Appendix Table A15 we show that the results are similar when we include on the right-hand side the relevant parties' 1919 vote shares to control for mean reversion in the support for a party (we cannot do this for the socialists, since their vote share in 1919 is our endogenous variable). †在在线附录表A15中,我们发现,当我们在右侧包括相关政党1919年投票份额以控制对一个政党的支持均值回归时,结果是相似的(我们不能为社会主义者这样做,因为他们在1919年的投票份额是我们的内生变量)。

²⁷We focus on reduced forms to make the vote losses of the Socialist Party comparable to those of the other parties. In particular, we compute the losses of the other parties by using reduced-form estimates and evaluating them at the mean of the foot soldier casualties variable. We compute socialist losses by estimating the reduced form for the 1919 and 1921 vote shares of the party, converting them into vote losses/gains using the size of the total electorate in the different elections and then taking the difference. †我们专注于简化形式,使社会党的选票损失,与其他政党的选票损失相当。特别是,我们通过使用简化形式的估计,并在步兵伤亡变量的平均值上对其进行评估来计算其他各方的损失。我们通过估算1919年和1921年该党选票份额的缩减形式,来计算社会主义损失,使用不同选举中的总选民人数,将其转换为选票损失/收益,然后取差额。

or abstained. Overall, we see that the increase in the support for the Fascist Party in 1921 was modest (relative to the total electorate of over 6.5 million) and came mostly from the Popular Party and other traditional right-wing parties, though fascists may have marginally benefited from the votes of former socialist supporters as well.

† B小组提出了1921年选举的相应简化估算。使用全国选票总数和简化系数，我们可以粗略估计1921年法西斯选票的来源。首先，在1919年至1921年的选举中，法西斯选票总数，增加了约42.6万张。由于选民人数也增加了（特别是1919年增加了50多万不能投票的退伍军人），人民党和社会党的选票总数，也增加了，前者增加了139000人，后者增加了48000人。其他传统右翼政党，失去了选票。其次，我们可以使用简化形式的估计，来获得一些上限，即1921年法西斯选票的增加，有多少来自那些因为1919年战争造成的困难而投票给社会主义者，但后来在1921年转向法西斯主义者的人。从形式上讲，我们使用B组的简化估计，进行此计算。简化后的估计表明，步兵伤亡人数预计人民党将减少21.6万张选票，其他传统右翼政党将减少10.7万张，社会主义者46000人。这些估计是上限，尤其是对社会主义者来说，因为我们不知道，比如说，脱离该党的前社会主义选民，是投票给法西斯分子，还是投票给其他政党，还是弃权。总体而言，我们看到，1921年法西斯党的支持率增长幅度不大（相对于650多万选民总数），主要来自人民党和其他传统右翼政党，尽管法西斯分子可能获得从前社会主义支持者的选票，也是如此。

Fascist votes increased much more in the 1924 election. Panels C and D present 2SLS and reduced-form estimates for this election, and we again see declines in the vote shares of the Popular and other traditional right-wing parties in both panels. The pattern for the Socialist Party is different than in 1921, however. For example, in Panel C, columns (7) - (9), the 2SLS estimate for the Socialist Party votes in 1921 is still positive but much smaller than in Panel A, implying that the socialists retained only a fraction of the additional votes they obtained in the 1919 election.

† 法西斯选票在1924年的选举中，大幅增加。C和D组给出了2SLS，并对选举进行了简化估算，我们再次看到，人民党的选票份额下降以及两个小组中的其他传统右翼政党。然而，社会党的模式与1921年不同。例如，在C组第(7)-(9)列中，2SLS对1921年社会党选票的估计仍然是正的，但比A组小得多，这意味着社会主义者，只保留了他们在1919年选举中获得的额外选票的一小部分。

What do these estimates imply about the contribution of former socialist voters to the rise of the Fascist Party in 1924? This question is more difficult to answer because we do not know whether voters who had previously supported the Socialist Party actually managed to cast their ballot. First, as noted above, although there was no centralized coordination of fascist actions, party cadres undertook violent acts and intimidated voters in several municipalities, and much of this was targeted at preventing socialists from voting. Giacomo Matteotti, the leader of the Unitary Socialist Party, in his last parliamentary speech on May 30, 1924, before being kidnapped and murdered by fascists, denounced that “In the Po Valley, in Tuscany, and in other regions... electors voted under the control of the Fascist Party... Only a small minority of citizens could freely express their voting preferences: for the most part only those who were not suspected of being Socialists. Our [comrades] were impeded by violence.”²⁸

† 这些估计意味着关于1924年前社会主义选民对法西斯党崛起的贡献？这个问题更难回答，因为我们不知道，以前支持社会党的选民是否真的投了票。首先，如上所述，虽然法西斯行动没有集中协调，但党的干部进行了暴力行为和恐吓几个城市的选民，其中大部分是针对性的阻止社会主义者投票。统一社会党领袖贾科莫·马泰奥蒂在1924年5月30日被法西斯分子绑架和谋杀之前的最后一次议会演讲中谴责道：“在波河流域、Tuscany和其他地区...选民在法西斯分子的控制下投票聚会...只

²⁸See <https://storia.camera.it/regno/lavori/leg27/sed004.pdf>.

有少数公民，可以自由表达他们的投票偏好：在很大程度上，只有那些不被怀疑是社会主义者的人。我们的[同志]受到了暴力的阻碍。”

This repression did not start with the election, and as Ebner explains: “Political violence in the years after the March on Rome continued to serve the same purposes as before: it suppressed opposition, [and] replaced Socialist and non-Fascist administrations” Ebner (2010, 37), but it was intensified to discourage antifascist votes during the 1924 election. Second, there is evidence that, expecting systematic intimidation and a fascist victory, many socialists did not turn out. Indeed, as mentioned in Section II, socialists and other opposition parties considered boycotting the elections (De Felice 1966, 584). The Socialist newspaper *Avanti!* summarized the party’s position as: “the electoral day is over, and all around us we see...the preferred weapons of the reactionary bourgeoisie, coercion, arbitrary decisions, violence,” and this perception, too, contributed to low turnout among its supporters (reported in Visani 2014, 111). Third, even those former Socialist Party supporters who managed to cast their ballots but did not vote for socialists may have switched to more moderate parties than the fascists. These caveats notwithstanding, we can again provide an upper bound estimate of the votes that came from former Socialist Party supporters.

† 这种镇压并非始于选举，正如 Ebner 所解释的那样：“罗马大游行后的几年里，政治暴力继续与以前一样：它镇压反对派，[并]取代了社会主义和非法西斯政府”埃卜纳（2010，37），但在1924年的选举中，为了阻止反法西斯选票，暴力愈演愈烈。其次，有证据表明，许多社会主义者，在期待系统性恐吓和法西斯胜利的情况下没有参加。事实上，正如第二节所述，社会主义者和其他反对党考虑抵制选举（De Felice 1966，584）。社会主义报纸《Avanti!》该党的立场总结为：“选举日已经结束，我们周围到处都是...反动资产阶级的首选武器，胁迫、任意决定、暴力”，这种看法，也导致其支持者投票率低（据Visani 2014，111报道）。第三，即使是那些设法投票，但没有投票给社会主义者的前社会党支持者，也可能已经转向比法西斯分子更温和的政党。尽管有这些警告，我们可以再次提供前社会党支持者投票的上限估计。

To start with, at the national level the Socialist Party votes declined from about 1.83 million to 1.05 million between 1919 and 1924. Thus we can view the difference, 780,000 votes, as an upper bound on the vote switch from socialists to fascists. This is about 17% of the 4.67 million votes the Fascist Party received in 1924. In comparison, the total number of votes lost by the Popular Party and other traditional right-wing parties is significantly larger, 2.16 million.

† 首先，在1919年至1924年期间，社会党在国家一级的选票，从约183万下降到105万。因此，我们可以将78万张选票的差异，视为从社会主义者到法西斯主义者的选票转换的上限。这大约是法西斯党1924年获得的467万张选票的17%。相比之下，人民党和其他传统右翼政党失去的选票总数，要大得多，为216万张。

In addition, using the same strategy outlined in note 27, the reduced-form estimates imply that foot soldier casualties predict a decrease of 106,000 votes for the Popular Party, 104,000 votes for other traditional right-wing parties, and 258,000 for the Socialist Party. Thus, the source of variation we are focusing on generates only a small part of the 4.67 million additional votes the Fascist Party received in the 1924 election. The party may have received a bigger boost from new, younger voters. Indeed, even though there is no detailed data on votes by demographic group, contemporary accounts suggest that many of the younger voters supported the Fascist Party. Petersen, for example, notes that among fascists, “there was an exceptionally thick presence of students from high schools and universities” (Petersen 1975, 659).

† 此外，使用注释 27 中概述的相同策略，简化形式后的估计表明，步兵伤亡人数预计人民党将减少106000票，其他传统右翼政党将减少104000票，社会党将减少258000票。因此，我们关注的变化来源，只产生了法西斯党在1924年选举中获得的467万张额外选票中的一小部分。该党可能从新的年轻选民那里，得到了更大的支持。事实上，尽管没有按人口群体分列的详细投票数据，但当代的说法表明，许多年轻选民，支持法西斯党。例如，Petersen指出，在法西斯分子中，“高中和大学的学生特别多”（Petersen 1975, 659）。

Overall, a large portion of the increase in the support for the Fascist Party in 1924 appears to have been driven by national trends. The contribution of voters who, as a reaction to the hardships of the war, supported the socialists in 1919 and then switched to fascists in 1924 seems to be modest.

† 总体而言，1924年法西斯党支持率的增加，在很大程度上似乎是由国家趋势推动的。作为对战争苦难的反应，选民在1919年支持社会主义者，然后在1924年转向法西斯主义者，他们的贡献似乎不大。

§6.5 Local Elites and Fascist Activity

As discussed in Section §2, the historical record suggests that the fascist movement may have received considerable support from local elites, especially in rural areas where major landholders and some smallholders were alarmed by agrarian strikes and the new socialist local governments. We investigate this issue further in Table 6, where we look at whether the surge in socialist vote share in 1919 led to a stronger fascist reaction when the elites were better organized. We use two (imperfect) measures of elite organization: the presence of a landowner association in rural areas, and the share of entrepreneurs and rentiers in the population, which may be more relevant for urban areas. Our focus is the interaction of these variables with the increase in socialist vote share in 1919. We present these results in two ways. In Panels A and C, we focus on IV models, where we have two endogenous variables—the socialist vote share in 1919 and its interaction with the measure of elite organization—and both are instrumented, with foot soldier casualties and their interaction with the elite variables. To save space we look at the specifications from columns (1), (4), and (6) and do not show the first stages (just reporting the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics). In Panels B and D, we present reduced-form estimates, where we directly interact the share of foot soldier casualties with the elite organization variables. It should be noted that because these elite organization variables are not exogenous to other characteristics of the municipality, their interactions may still suffer from endogeneity, and these results should be interpreted with greater caution than our other estimates.

† 正如第2节所述，历史记录表明，法西斯运动可能得到了当地精英的大力支持，特别是在农村地区，主要土地所有者和一些小农户对农业罢工和新的社会主义地方政府感到震惊。我们在表 6 中进一步研究了这个问题，在表中我们研究了1919年社会主义选票份额的激增是否导致了精英们组织得更好时更强烈的法西斯反应。我们使用了两种（不完美的）精英组织衡量标准：农村地区土地所有者协会的存在，以及企业家和食利者在人口中的份额，这可能与城市地区更相关。我们的重点是这些变量与1919年社会主义选票份额增加的相互作用。我们以两种方式呈现这些结果。在A组和C组中，我们关注IV模型，其中我们有两个内生变量——1919年的社会主义选票份额及其与精英组织衡量标准的相互作用——这两个变量都被工具化，包括步兵伤亡及其与精英变量的相互作用。为了节省空间，我们查看第（1）、（4）和（6）列的规格，不显示第一阶段（只报告 Kleibergen Paap F 统计数据）。在B和D组中，我们提出了简化形式的估计，其中我们直接将步兵伤亡比例与精英组织变量进行交互作用。应该指出的是，由于这些精英组织变量，不是市政当局其他特征的外生变量，它们的相互作用，仍可能受到内生性的影响，因此对这些结果的解释，应该比我们的其他估计更谨慎。

We see in Panels A and B that the interactions with the landowner associations are important for the early rise of fascism, including the party's vote share in the 1921 election. This pattern is consistent with the historical record, where the support of large landholders for the fascist cause, and against agrarian strikes and against worker and sharecropper demands, was critical for the rise of the Fascist Party in the countryside. These interactions do not appear to be important for the vote share in 1924. In contrast, the presence of entrepreneurs and rentiers matters more for the party's vote share in 1924, consistent with the business community and both small and large entrepreneurs supporting, voting for, and organizing the vote for the Fascist Party in 1924.

† 我们在A和B组中看到，与土地所有者协会的互动，对法西斯主义的早期崛起很重要，包括该党在1921年选举中的投票份额。这种模式与历史记录一致，其中大地主支持法西斯事业，反对农业罢工和反对工人和佃农的要求，对法西斯党在农村的崛起，是至关重要的。这些互动，似乎对1924投票份额并不重要。相比之下，企业家和食利者的存在很重要。1924年，该党获得了更多的选票份额，这与商界和大小企业家在1924年支持、投票和组织法西斯党的投票，是一致的。

In addition, [Online Appendix Table A16](#) looks at a dummy for sizable donations to the Fascist Party from the area as an outcome variable. Socialist vote share in the 1919 elections does not have a statistically significant main effect on this variable, but it has a significant interaction with local elite presence. This suggests that in areas where there were landowner associations or more entrepreneurs and rentiers in the population, a higher vote share for socialists made the economic elite more likely to make significant donations to fascists. This result, too, is consistent with large landowners and business interests turning to the Fascist Party when they started fearing further demands and gains by socialists.

† 此外，[在线附录表A16](#)将该地区向法西斯党提供的大量捐款，作为结果变量。1919年选举中的社会主义选票份额，对这一变量没有统计学上的显著主效应，但它与当地精英的存在，有显著的相互作用。这表明，在有土地所有者协会或人口中企业家和食利者较多的地区，投票率较高社会主义者的份额，使经济精英更有可能向法西斯分子捐款。这一结果也与大地主和商业利益集团，在开始担心社会主义者的进一步要求和利益时，转向法西斯党是一致的。

§7 RESULTS WITH OTHER SOURCES OF VARIATION

Our main hypothesis—that the effect of the perceived threat of socialism in post-World War I Italy contributed to the rise of fascism—would also suggest that other sources of variation generating greater support for the Socialist Party should have similar effects on fascist activities and support. We now investigate this question looking at the effects of the Spanish flu and drought-induced economic hardship.

† 我们的主要假设是，第一次世界大战后，意大利所感知到的社会主义威胁的影响，促成了法西斯主义的兴起，这也表明，其他变异来源也会产生对社会党的更大支持，也应该对法西斯活动和支持产生类似的影响。我们现在研究这个问题，看看西班牙流感和干旱造成的经济困难的影响。

The Spanish flu pandemic, which affected Europe in 1918 and killed about 50 million people around the world (Johnson and Mueller 2002), was almost as deadly and disruptive as World War I in Italy (Istituto Centrale di Statistica 1958).²⁹ The hardship and the economic distress it created also

²⁹We computed the deaths in 1918 compared with 1911–14, which leads to about 494,500 excess deaths. This estimate, even if larger than the severely undercounted official estimate of 275,000, is in line with others, for example, Tognotti (2015), and is also comparable to the number of Italian soldiers who died in the war, estimates of which range between 510,000 and 600,000. † 我们计算了1918年的死亡人数，与1911年至1914年相比，死亡人数增加了约494500人。这一估

fueled discontent with the existing regime and increased the electoral appeal of socialists.

† 1918年，西班牙流感大流行，影响了欧洲，导致全球约5000万人死亡（Johnson 和 Mueller 2002），其致命性和破坏性，几乎与意大利的第一次世界大战（Istituto Centrale di Statistica 1958）相当。战争造成的困难和经济困境，也加剧了人们对现政权的不满，增加了社会主义者的选举吸引力。

Online Appendix Table A17, Panel A shows results exploiting this source of variation.³⁰ The first three columns (once again corresponding to the same three specifications we focus on throughout) show a precisely estimated positive effect of excess deaths on the socialist vote share in 1919, which is again our proxy for red scare. The rest of the columns show the 2SLS estimates using this source of variation. There is a positive effect on the fascist vote share in 1924 and fascist branches in 1921, but these estimates are only marginally significant or just below significance. We do not find a systematic relationship between red scare and fascist violence or the 1921 vote share of the Fascist Party when using this source of variation. The implied quantitative magnitudes are similar to those we saw with our main results.

† 在线附录表A17, A组显示了利用这一变异源的结果。前三列（再次对应于我们一直关注的三个规范）显示了1919年超额死亡，对社会主义选票份额的精确估计的积极影响，这也是我们对红色恐慌的代表。其余列显示了使用此变异源的 2SLS 估计。对1924年的法西斯选票份额，和1921年的法西斯分支机构都有积极影响，但这些估计值，仅略高或略低于显著性。在使用这一变异来源时，我们没有发现红色恐慌，与法西斯暴力或法西斯党1921年的投票份额之间，存在系统性的关系。隐含的定量量级，与我们在主要结果中看到的相似。

Our next source of variation is from drought in agricultural areas.³¹ A medium-size drought in the winter-spring of 1918 - 19 (the second most severe of the years between 1915 and 1928 after the 1921 European drought) affected parts of Italy, including the Po valley, Tuscany, and Sardinia. Here

计，即使大于严重低估的官方估计275000人，也与其他人一致，例如Tognotti（2015），也与意大利士兵的死亡人数相当战争期间，估计人数在51万至60万之间。

³⁰One appealing aspect of this source of variation is that while our main sample is dominated by rural municipalities and the drought instrument we use in this section is mainly for the countryside as well, the Spanish flu affected urban areas more than the rural areas, and our sample for this exercise includes 207 urban municipalities. For example, using data from Direzione Generale della Statistica e del Lavoro (1917 - 1924) we compute an 83% average excess rate in 1918 for urban municipalities as compared to 69% excess mortality for rural municipalities with respect to the 1911 - 14 average. We also verified in Online Appendix Figure A4(a) that excess deaths from Spanish flu are broadly uncorrelated with the same pre- 1919 economic, social, and political variables that we studied in Figure III. Though we see one negative and one positive statistical association with these variables, the vast majority of the coefficients are not statistically different from zero, bolstering the case that the intensity of the Spanish flu was uncorrelated with a diverse range of municipality characteristics. † 这种变异来源的一个吸引人的方面是，虽然我们的主要样本由农村自治市和我们在这一使用的干旱仪器主导该部分主要针对农村地区，西班牙流感影响的城市地区超过农村地区，我们的样本包括207个城市市政府。例如，使用统计总局的数据del Lavoro（1917 - 1924）我们计算出1918年城市的平均超额率为83% 相比之下，农村城市的死亡率比1911-14年的平均水平高出69%。我们还在在线附录图 A4(a) 中进行了验证西班牙流感导致的超额死亡与之前的疫情基本无关-1919年我们在图三中研究的经济、社会和政治变量。尽管我们看到这些变量有一个负统计关联和一个正统计关联，绝大多数系数在统计上与零没有差异，这增强了西班牙流感的强度与城市特征的多样性。

³¹Acemoglu, De Feo, and De Luca (2020b) showed that the severe drought in 1893 in Sicily boosted the support for peasant organizations, which were strongly allied with the Socialist Party. For other works on the effects of rainfall and droughts on political outcomes, see, among others, Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004); Brückner and Ciccone (2011); Hsiang, Meng, and Cane (2011); Dell (2012); Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel (2013); Madestam et al. (2013); Waldinger (2013); Dell, Jones, and Olken (2014); Bonnier et al. (2015). † Acemoglu, De Feo和De Luca (2020b)表明1893年，西西里岛的农民组织得到了大力支持与社会党结盟。关于降雨影响的其他研究政治结果的干旱，除其他外，见米格尔、萨蒂亚纳斯和塞尔根蒂(2004); Brückner和Ciccone (2011); 香、孟、甘 (2011); 戴尔(2012); 香、伯克和米格尔 (2013); 马德斯塔姆等人 (2013); 瓦尔丁格(2013); 戴尔、琼斯和奥尔肯 (2014); Bonnier等人 (2015)。

we investigate whether drought-induced hardships and discontent also increased the support for the Socialist Party in the 1919 elections and whether this boosted subsequent fascist activity. We adopt the same parameterization as in Acemoglu, De Feo, and De Luca (2020b) and measure the extent of drought conditions by relative rainfall (benchmarked to rainfall in 1915 - 1979) and cap this variable at one (so that we do not exploit the variation coming from more rain than usual).³² The results presented in Online Appendix Table A17, Panel B show a fairly precise relationship between our relative rainfall variable and the socialist vote share in 1919. The remaining columns show that there is a positive association between the instrumented socialist vote share in 1919 and the fascist vote share in 1924, but we do not detect a significant relationship with our other measures of fascist support.

† 我们的下一个变异来源，是农业干旱地区。1918-19年冬春季的一场中等规模的干旱，（1915年至1928年间仅次于1921年欧洲干旱的第二严重干旱），影响了意大利的部分地区，包括波河流域、Tuscany 和 Sardinia。在这里，我们调查了干旱引起的困难和不满，是否也增加了1919年选举中对社会党的支持，以及这是否促进了随后的法西斯活动。我们采用与 Acemoglu、De Feo 和 De Luca (2020b) 中相同的参数化方法，通过相对降雨量（以1915-1979年的降雨量为基准）来衡量干旱条件的程度，并将该变量限制在 1（这样我们就不会利用，比平时更多的降雨带来的变化）。在线附录表A17 B组中的结果显示，我们的相对降雨量变量与1919年的社会主义选票份额之间，存在相当精确的关系。其余栏目显示，1919年的工具社会主义选票份额与1924年的法西斯选票份额之间，存在正相关关系，但我们没有发现与我们的其他法西斯支持指标之间存在显著关系。

Overall, even though these results are weaker and have to be interpreted with greater caution, they are consistent with our key argument—that events that increased socialist support led to a counterreaction from urban and rural elites and the middle classes, contributing to the rise of Italian fascism.

† 总的来说，尽管这些结果较弱，必须更加谨慎地解释，但它们与我们的关键论点是一致的，即增加社会主义支持的事件，导致了城乡精英和中产阶级的逆反应，导致了意大利法西斯主义的兴起。

§8 MEDIUM-TERM AND LONG-TERM OUTCOMES

Did the support for and the rule of the Fascist Party in Italy have a longer-term effect? There is no consensus answer to this question. The fascist takeover of power was an epochal event, which could have altered Italy's subsequent economic or political trajectory. On the other hand, the fascist government lost most of its legitimacy and disintegrated in September 1943, as the Allied forces invaded southern Italy and set up the “Kingdom of the South,” and the puppet “Republic of Sal’o,” headed by Mussolini but de facto ruled by German Nazis, came to control the north. The Sal’o regime conclusively collapsed at the end of World War II, and Mussolini was duly executed. Given its abrupt end, it is possible that fascist rule had minimal effect on later events, including postwar political developments. We briefly investigate these issues in this section. We start with the potential effect of local fascist activity on the deportation of Jews from Italy, and then turn to its potential effects on postwar political alignments.

³²See Online Appendix Figure A3 for the geographic distribution of relative rainfall in winter-spring of 1918 - 19. Online Appendix Figure A4(b) shows that our relative rainfall variable is uncorrelated with most of the pre-1919 economic, social and political characteristics. Comfortingly, Online Appendix Table A18 documents that there is no association between relative rainfall in other years (which do not feature a drought-induced surge in socialist support) and fascist electoral performance in 1924 except for 1925 - 26. † 相关地理分布见在线附录图A3 1918-19年冬春季的降雨。在线附录图 A4(b) 显示了我们的相对降雨量变量与1919年前的大多数经济、社会、经济和政治特征无关。令人欣慰的是，在线附录表 A18 文件其他年份的相对降雨量之间没有关联（确实如此没有干旱引发的社会主义支持激增）和法西斯选举1924年演出，1925年至1926年除外。

† 对意大利法西斯党的支持和统治是否产生了长期影响？这个问题没有一致的答案。法西斯夺权是一个划时代的事件，它可能会改变意大利随后的经济或政治轨迹。另一方面，法西斯政府失去了大部分合法性，并于1943年9月解体，盟军入侵意大利南部，建立了“南方王国”，由墨索里尼领导但事实上由德国纳粹统治的傀儡“萨洛共和国”控制了北方。萨洛政权在第二次世界大战结束时彻底崩溃，墨索里尼被正式处决。鉴于其突然结束，法西斯统治对后来的事件，包括战后的政治发展，可能影响甚微。我们将在本节中简要探讨这些问题。我们从当地法西斯活动对意大利驱逐犹太人的潜在影响开始，然后转向其对战后政治联盟的潜在影响。

§8.1 Deportation of Jews

About 9,000 Jewish citizens and refugees were deported from Italy to various concentration camps toward the end of the war, mostly under the Republic of Saló. Anti-Jewish laws were first introduced in Italy in 1938 and barred Jews from public employment, schools, and universities. Measures including concentration camps and forced labor were discussed at the beginning of the war, and “after the armistice of September 8, 1943, there was a new harshening of anti-Jewish measures driven and sometimes even initiated by the lower ranks of the party hierarchy. . . . New measures were being invoked by the base of the reborn Fascist Party from September 1943 onward, and in October, calls from the Fascist press began to demand a definitive ‘solution’ to the problem” (Levis Sullam 2018, 43 - 44).

† 战争结束时，约有9000名犹太公民和难民，从意大利被驱逐到各个集中营，其中大部分是在萨洛共和国统治下。1938年，意大利首次引入反犹太法律，禁止犹太人进入公共就业、学校和大学。战争开始时，人们讨论了包括集中营和强迫劳动在内的措施，“1943年9月8日停战后，反犹太措施再次收紧，有时甚至是由党内较低阶层发起的……从1943年9月份开始，新生的法西斯党的基础，开始援引新的措施，10月份，法西斯媒体的呼吁开始要求对问题进行明确的‘解决’” (Levis Sullam 2018, 43-44)。

Although the early literature downplayed the role of Italians in the atrocities against Jews (De Felice 1961; Zuccotti 1996), recent studies have emphasized the major role of Italian forces and fascist sympathizers in Jewish deportations (Sarfatti 2006; Levis Sullam 2018). In the words of Levis Sullam, they were “men motivated by ideology—though not necessarily by antisemitism,” hunting down partisans, antifascist soldiers, and Jews, and “made no distinction among their victims: they were all traitors or enemies of Fascism, enemies of the nation” (Levis Sullam 2018, 36).

† 尽管早期文献淡化了意大利人在对犹太人暴行中的作用 (De Felice 1961; Zuccotti 1996)，但最近的研究，强调了意大利军队和法西斯同情者，在犹太人驱逐中的主要作用 (Sarfatti 2006; Levis Sullam 2018)。用 Levis Sullam 的话说，他们是“受意识形态驱使的人——尽管不一定是反犹太主义驱使的人”，追捕游击队员、反法西斯士兵和犹太人，并且“对受害者一视同仁：他们都是法西斯主义的叛徒或敌人，国家的敌人” (Levis Sullam 2018, 36)。

In Table 7, we look at the relationship between local support for fascists in the 1920s and the deportation of Jews from the same area two decades later. Namely, we estimate regressions similar to equation (2), except that the key right-hand-side variable is the vote share of the Fascist Party in 1924, which we view as the most comprehensive measure of fascist support. This variable is now instrumented with the foot soldier casualties variable as in equation (1). The results are very similar when we use a fascist support index, computed as an unweighted average of all our (standardized) measures ([Online Appendix Table A19](#)), when we simply look at the reduced form with foot soldier casualties ([Online Appendix Table A20](#)), or when we restrict the sample to municipalities in the Republic of Saló, which was under German control after 1943 ([Online Appendix Table A21](#)).

† 在表 7 中，我们查看了本地支持之间的关系，20 世纪 20 年代的法西斯分子和 20 年后犹太人被驱逐出同一地区。也就是说，我们估计了类似于方程 (2) 的回归，除了关键的右侧变量是 1924 年法西斯党的选票份额，我们认为这是衡量法西斯支持率的最全面指标。这个变量现在用步兵伤亡变量来表示，如方程 (1) 所示。当我们使用法西斯支持指数时，结果非常相似，该指数，是我们所有（标准化）指标的未加权平均值（在线附录表 A19），当我们简单地查看步兵伤亡的简化表格时（在线附录表格 A20），或者当我们样本，限制在 1943 年后受德国控制的萨尔共和国的城市时（在线附件表格 A21）。

In Table 7, Panel A, we consider a dummy variable for whether any Jews were deported from the municipality. In Panel B, we focus on estimates of deported Jews relative to the Jewish population in the municipality (as explained in Section §3). Finally, in Panel C, we consider a similar measure but exclude all municipalities with concentration camps in which Jews from other areas were temporarily held and later deported to Nazi camps, since this source of variation may not be as informative about local support for Jewish deportations. In all panels, we present the same six specifications used in our main tables. In addition, these models also control for the duration of German occupation of the municipality, which may have directly affected Jewish deportations from the area, and for the estimated share of Jewish population from the 1911 census.

† 在 A 组的表 7 中，我们考虑了一个虚拟变量，用于判断是否有犹太人驱逐出该市。在 B 组中，我们重点关注，被驱逐的犹太人相对于该市犹太人口的估计数（如第 3 节所述）。最后，在 C 组中，我们考虑了一项类似的措施，但排除了所有有集中营的城市，在这些集中营中，来自其他地区的犹太人被临时关押，后来被驱逐到纳粹营地，因为这种差异来源，可能无法提供有关当地支持驱逐犹太人的信息。在所有面板中，我们展示了与主表中使用的六种规格相同的规格。此外，这些模型还控制了德国占领该市的持续时间，这可能直接影响了犹太人驱逐出该地区，以及 1911 年人口普查中估计的犹太人口比例。

In all cases, we find statistically significant and sizable associations between local fascist activity (proxied by the fascist vote share in 1924) and Jewish deportations. For example, the coefficient of 0.82 (standard error = 0.43) in Panel A, column (6) implies that a one standard deviation increase in the fascist vote share in 1924 is associated with 22% greater likelihood of Jews being deported from that municipality. Overall, these findings show that local fascist support may have had some medium-run effects and also support the more recent historiography on the role of Italian fascists in the deportation of Jews.

† 在所有情况下，我们发现，当地法西斯活动（以 1924 年法西斯投票份额表示）与犹太人驱逐之间，存在统计上显著和相当大的关联。例如，A 组第 (6) 列中的系数 0.82（标准误差 = 0.43）意味着 1924 年法西斯选票份额每增加一个标准差，犹太人被驱逐出该市的可能性就增加 22%。总体而言，这些发现表明，当地法西斯的支持，可能产生了一些中期影响，也支持了最近关于意大利法西斯分子在驱逐犹太人中的作用的史学。

§8.2 Postwar Political Alignments

We investigate whether there were any durable political consequences of Italian fascism. In Table 8, we look at longer-term political effects of fascist vote share in the 1924 election, and instrument this variable with *equation* (1). It is a priori unclear whether greater local support for fascism in the 1920s should translate into a persistent advantage for the right, or whether it may have created a backlash, disadvantaging center-right parties in the postwar era.

† 我们调查，意大利法西斯主义是否有任何持久的政治后果。在表 8 中，我们研究了 1924 年选举中法

西斯选票份额的长期政治影响，并用方程（1）对这一变量进行了分析。目前尚不清楚20世纪20年代，当地对法西斯主义的更大支持，是否应该转化为右翼的持续优势，或者它是否可能在战后时期造成了反弹，使中右翼政党处于不利地位。

In terms of outcomes, we focus on the vote shares of various parties in post-World War II elections. Since the number and names of parties have changed in Italy over the past 70 years, we group different parties into four categories: left, center-right, extreme left, and extreme right. For example, the center-right includes the Christian Democrats for most of the postwar elections, and the left includes socialists and communists (which by the early 1970s had largely assumed a social democratic platform). The extreme right includes various nationalist or neofascist movements, such as MSI (Italian Social Movement) until 1992 and its successors, and the extreme left includes the Communist Internationalist Party (in the 1946 and 1948 elections) and then DP (Proletarian Democracy) and other minor lists, which in the 1960s and 1970s filled the space on the left vacated by the communists.

† 在结果方面，我们关注的是二战后选举中各政党的投票份额。由于过去70年来意大利政党的数量和名称，发生了变化，我们将不同的政党分为四类：左翼、中右翼、极左翼和极右翼。例如，在战后的大部分选举中，中右翼包括基督教民主党，左翼包括社会主义者和共产主义者（到20世纪70年代初，他们基本上已经采取了社会民主党的纲领）。极右翼包括各种民族主义或新法西斯主义运动，如1992年之前的MSI（意大利社会运动）及其继任者，极左翼包括共产主义国际主义党（在1946年和1948年的选举中），然后是DP（无产阶级民主）和其他小名单，这些名单在20世纪60年代和70年代填补了共产党腾出的左翼空间。

Table 8, column (1) pools data from all elections between 1946 and 2018, while the remaining 19 columns (9 in Panel A and 10 in Panel B) look at one election at a time. In all specifications, we focus on the set of covariates used in our most demanding specification, column (6) in our usual table structure. We find a consistent and sizable negative effect of the local support for the Fascist Party in the 1924 election on the center-right vote share in almost all elections. In the pooled specification, the coefficient estimate is -0.60 (standard error=0.24), which implies that a 10 percentage point greater support for the Fascist Party is associated with more than a 4 percentage point decline in the vote share of the center-right parties. Most of this vote loss goes to the left, but some of it is captured by the extreme left. In only two elections do we see a small and marginally significant positive effect on the extreme right.³³

† 表 8 第 (1) 列汇集了1946年至2018年期间所有选举的数据，而其余19列（A组9列，B组10列）一次只查看一次选举。在所有规范中，我们关注的是在我们最苛刻的规范中使用的协变量集，即我们通常的表结构中的第 (6) 列。我们发现，1924年选举中当地对法西斯党的支持，对几乎所有选举中的中右翼选票份额，都产生了持续且相当大的负面影响。在合并规范中，系数估计值是 -0.60 （标准误差=0.24），这意味着法西斯党的支持率每增加10个百分点，中右翼政党的投票份额，就会下降4个百分点以上。大部分选票损失都流向了左翼，但其中一些被极左翼所控制。在仅有的两次选举中，我们看到了，对极右翼的微小而轻微的积极影响。

Our interpretation for these results is that the center-right's fall behind fascists in the 1920s may have damaged their longterm reputation. We should note that we are not able to rule out an alternative interpretation: the instrumented fascist vote share in 1924 may also be capturing some of

³³Online Appendix Table A22 shows that the results are once again very similar when we use the index combining all four measures of fascist support, rather than the 1924 vote share. † 在线附录表A22显示，当我们使用结合所有四种法西斯支持度指标的指数，而不是1924年的投票份额时，结果再次非常相似。

the longer-term effects of the socialist support in the 1919 election. The reason we are not favoring this interpretation is that as our results in Table 5 demonstrated, much of the boost that the socialists had received from war disruption had already dissipated by 1924, and we suspect that it is not the cause of the long-term effects on the political fortunes of center-right parties in the municipality.

† 我们对这些结果的解释是，中右翼在20世纪20年代落后于法西斯分子，可能损害了他们的长期声誉。我们应该注意到，我们不能排除另一种解释：1924年的法西斯选票份额，也可能反映了1919年选举中社会主义支持的一些长期影响。我们不赞成这种解释的原因是，正如我们在表5中的结果所表明的那样，到1924年，社会主义者从战争破坏中获得的大部分推动力，已经消散，我们怀疑，这不是对该市中右翼政党政治命运产生长期影响的原因。

§9 CONCLUSION

This article revisited the rise of fascism in Italy. We argued that the Fascist Party benefited from the perceived threat of socialism in the aftermath of World War I, which made many landowners, businesses, and center-right voters turn to it to combat socialist demands. The Socialist Party was in the ascendancy after the war and had shifted to the left because of its internal dynamics and the impact of the Bolshevik Revolution.

† 本文重新审视了法西斯主义在意大利的兴起。我们认为，第一次世界大战后，法西斯党从社会主义的威胁中受益。许多土地所有者，企业和中右翼选民，转而反对社会主义要求。社会党在战后处于优势地位，由于其内部动态、布尔什维克革命的影响，已经转向左翼。

We documented a strong association between World War I casualties in an area and the vote share of the Socialist Party in the 1919 elections. We argued that this relationship is not explained by any pre-1919 economic, social, or political characteristics of municipalities. Rather, it captures the effects of the hardship and disillusionment felt by soldiers and their families. We bolstered this interpretation by showing that casualties are not associated with greater votes for nationalist or prowar parties in the 1919 elections. Nor are they correlated with the subsequent erection of nationalist symbols, such as war memorials. We then used this source of variation to isolate the growth in local support for fascists in response to this perceived threat of socialism.

† 我们记录了，在1919年的选举中社会党的选票份额，与第一次世界大战一个地区的伤亡人数之间的密切联系。我们认为，这种关系1919年之前城市的任何经济、社会或政治因素，都无法解释。相反，它捕捉到了对士兵及其家人感受到的困难和幻灭的影响。我们通过表明，伤亡人数与民族主义者或1919年选举中普瓦尔人的政党获得更多选票无关，来支持这一解释。它们也与随后树立了民族主义象征，如战争纪念碑无关。然后，我们使用这种变异源，来隔离当地对法西斯分子的支持，以应对这种感知到的社会主义威胁。

We further reinforced this interpretation by providing various pieces of evidence in support of our proposed mechanism. We also showed that the effects are larger in municipalities where business or landowning interests were organized and supported the fascist cause.

† 我们通过提供各种支持我们提出的机制的证据，来进一步强化这种解释。我们还表明，对于法西斯事业，在商业或土地所有权利益方面有组织和支持的城市，影响更大

Our analysis suggests two tentative lessons about the current right-wing populist movements from this episode in Italy. The first turns on the role of a specific perceived threat (in this instance, the red

scare) that convinced the elites to support fascists and the middle classes to vote and sometimes join them as a counterweight to socialists, especially when traditional parties appeared not up to the task. The second related lesson, however, suggests that in many ways Italian fascism, just like Nazism in Germany, may have been unique to the post-World War I era, in which society and politics had become militarized and the threat of a socialist/ communist revolution appeared real to many. If so, the recent surge in the popularity of right-wing populist parties is unlikely to turn into classic fascism. Nevertheless, in line with the first lesson, some other perceived threats, such as disruptive cultural change or immigration, could embolden far-right political movements while broadening their appeal (Skocpol and Williamson 2016). It is therefore important to investigate this issue in future work, for example, by exploring whether local support for extreme right-wing movements increases when there are more fundamental threats to existing social arrangements or greater economic hardship as in the post-World War I era.

† 我们的分析从意大利的这一事件中得出了关于当前右翼民粹主义运动的两个初步教训。第一个问题涉及一种特定的感知威胁（在这种情况下，红色恐慌）的作用，这种威胁说服精英阶层支持法西斯主义者和中产阶级投票，有时加入他们作为对社会主义者的制衡，尤其是在传统政党似乎无法胜任这项任务的情况下。然而，第二个相关的教训表明，在许多方面，意大利法西斯主义，就像德国的纳粹主义一样，可能是第一次世界大战后时代所特有的，在这个时代，社会和政治已经军事化，社会主义/共产主义革命的威胁对许多人来说是真实的。如果是这样，最近右翼民粹主义政党的受欢迎程度激增，不太可能变成经典的法西斯主义。然而，根据第一条教训，一些其他感知到的威胁，如破坏性的文化变革或移民，可能会助长极右翼政治运动同时扩大他们的吸引力（Skocpol和Williamson 2016）。因此，今后调查这个问题非常重要例如，通过探索当地是否支持极端当有更根本的问题时，如同第一次世界大战后的艰难时期那样，右翼运动就会增加对现有社会安排威胁或更大经济困难。

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

An Online Appendix for this article can be found at the *Quarterly Journal of Economics* online.

DATA AVAILABILITY

Data and code replicating the tables and figures in this article can be found in Acemoglu et al. (2021) in the Harvard Dataverse, <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/CLJTSC>.

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表 1 THE IMPACT OF FOOT SOLDIER CASUALTIES IN WORLD WAR I ON THE SOCIALIST VOTE SHARE IN 1919 † 第一次世界大战步兵伤亡人数对1919年的社会主义者投票份额的影响

TABLE I
THE IMPACT OF FOOT SOLDIER CASUALTIES IN WORLD WAR I ON THE SOCIALIST VOTE SHARE IN 1919

Dep. variable: Socialist vote share in 1919						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Share of foot soldier casualties	0.12 (0.02)	0.11 (0.02)	0.10 (0.01)	0.10 (0.01)	0.10 (0.01)	0.10 (0.01)
Veterans (classes 1874–95)				0.18 (0.07)	0.17 (0.07)	0.17 (0.07)
Veterans (classes 1896–1900)				–0.13 (0.05)	–0.12 (0.05)	–0.12 (0.05)
Assault tr. + volunt. casualties				0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Regiment/province FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographic controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Socialist share in 1913			✓	✓	✓	✓
Military controls				✓	✓	✓
Agriculture controls					✓	✓
Urban controls						✓
Observations	5,775	5,775	5,775	5,775	5,775	5,775
R-squared	0.60	0.62	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.70
Number of clusters	181	181	181	181	181	181
F-stat.	41.68	42.29	56.39	55.24	51.69	50.59

Notes. The foot soldier casualty variable is the count of World War I foot soldier casualties from a municipality divided by the total male population over the age of six in 1911. Standardized coefficients are reported. Column (1) includes regiment and province fixed effects and demographic controls (quartic in log population and share of population below the age of six in 1911). Column (2) additionally includes geographic controls (log area, elevation of the main center, and maximum elevation). Column (3) adds socialist vote share in 1913. Column (4) adds military controls (veterans from classes 1874 - 95 and from classes 1896 - 1900 as well as casualties among special assault troops and volunteers as a share of the male population above the age of six in 1911, a dummy for the presence of army-supplying production plants, and a dummy for any casualties in the highest-mortality battles). Column (5) includes agricultural controls (share of day laborers, share of sharecroppers, and a dummy for the presence of local agrarian associations). Finally column (6) adds urban controls (industry workers and industrial firms over male population in 1911, literacy rate in 1911, the share of entrepreneurs and rentiers, and the share of the bourgeoisie). See the text for further details. Standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses.

表 2 2SLS AND OLS ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF SOCIALIST VOTE SHARE IN 1919 ON FASCIST VIOLENCE IN 1920 - 22 AND FASCIST PARTY LOCAL BRANCHES IN 1921 † 1919年社会主义选票份额对1920-22年法西斯暴力与1921年法西斯党地方支部的影响的 2SLS 和 OLS 估计

TABLE II
2SLS AND OLS ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF SOCIALIST VOTE SHARE IN 1919 ON FASCIST VIOLENCE IN 1920-22 AND FASCIST PARTY LOCAL BRANCHES IN 1921

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dep. variable: Fascist violence in 1920-22 (episodes per 1,000 inhabitants)						
Panel A: 2SLS						
Socialist vote share in 1919	0.38 (0.19)	0.39 (0.19)	0.42 (0.21)	0.53 (0.21)	0.50 (0.21)	0.50 (0.20)
Panel B: OLS						
Socialist vote share in 1919	0.11 (0.02)	0.10 (0.02)	0.08 (0.03)	0.08 (0.02)	0.07 (0.02)	0.07 (0.02)
Dep. variable: Presence of local branches of the Fascist Party in fall 1921						
Panel C: 2SLS						
Socialist vote share in 1919	0.39 (0.17)	0.41 (0.18)	0.44 (0.20)	0.50 (0.21)	0.50 (0.21)	0.50 (0.20)
Panel D: OLS						
Socialist vote share in 1919	0.06 (0.02)	0.06 (0.02)	0.06 (0.02)	0.06 (0.02)	0.06 (0.02)	0.06 (0.02)
Regiment/province FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographic controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Socialist share in 1913			✓	✓	✓	✓
Military controls				✓	✓	✓
Agriculture controls					✓	✓
Urban controls						✓
Observations	5,775	5,775	5,775	5,775	5,775	5,775
Number of clusters	181	181	181	181	181	181

Notes. 2SLS (Panels A and C) and OLS (Panels B and D) regressions of the fascist violence (episodes per 1,000 inhabitants) in 1920 - 22 (Panel A and Panel B) and the presence of local fascist branches in the fall of 1921 (Panel C and Panel D) on the socialist vote share in 1919. The excluded instrument is the count of World War I foot soldier casualties from a municipality divided by the total male population over the age of six in 1911. Standardized coefficients are reported. Column (1) includes regiment and province fixed effects and demographic controls (quartic in log population and share of the population below the age of six in 1911). Column (2) includes geographic controls (log area, elevation of the main center, and maximum elevation). Column (3) adds socialist vote share in 1913. Column (4) adds military controls (veterans from classes 1874 - 95 and from classes 1896 - 1900 as well as casualties among special assault troops and volunteers as a share of the male population above the age of six in 1911, a dummy for the presence of army-supplying production plants, and a dummy for any casualties in the highest-mortality battles). Column (5) includes agricultural controls (share of day laborers, share of sharecroppers, and a dummy for the presence of local agrarian associations). Finally column (6) adds urban controls (industry workers and industrial firms over male population in 1911, literacy rate in 1911, the share of entrepreneurs and rentiers, and the share of the bourgeoisie). Standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses.

表 3 2SLS AND OLS ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF SOCIALIST VOTE SHARE IN 1919 ON FASCIST VOTE SHARE IN 1921 AND 1924 † 1919年社会主义选票份额对1921年和1924年法西斯投票份额的影响的 2SLS 和 OLS 估计

TABLE III
2SLS AND OLS ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF SOCIALIST VOTE SHARE IN 1919 ON
FASCIST VOTE SHARE IN 1921 AND 1924

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dep. variable: Fascist vote share in 1921						
Panel A: 2SLS						
Socialist vote share in 1919	0.30 (0.17)	0.33 (0.16)	0.37 (0.18)	0.36 (0.19)	0.36 (0.20)	0.34 (0.18)
Panel B: OLS						
Socialist vote share in 1919	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
Observations	5,358	5,358	5,358	5,358	5,358	5,358
Number of clusters	175	175	175	175	175	175
Dep. variable: Fascist vote share in 1924						
Panel C: 2SLS						
Socialist vote share in 1919	0.40 (0.17)	0.45 (0.16)	0.50 (0.17)	0.54 (0.17)	0.53 (0.17)	0.51 (0.17)
Panel D: OLS						
Socialist vote share in 1919	-0.02 (0.05)	0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Observations	5,775	5,775	5,775	5,775	5,775	5,775
Number of clusters	181	181	181	181	181	181
Regiment/province FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographic controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Socialist share in 1913			✓	✓	✓	✓
Military controls				✓	✓	✓
Agriculture controls					✓	✓
Urban controls						✓

Notes. 2SLS (Panels A and C) and OLS (Panels B and D) regressions of the fascist vote share in 1921 (Panels A and B) and fascist vote share in 1924 (Panels C and D) on the socialist vote share in 1919. The excluded instrument is the count of World War I foot soldier casualties from a municipality divided by the total male population over the age of six in 1911. Standardized coefficients are reported. Column (1) includes regiment and province fixed effects and demographic controls (quartic in log population and share of the population below the age of six in 1911). Column (2) includes geographic controls (log area, elevation of the main center, and maximum elevation). Column (3) adds socialist vote share in 1913. Column (4) adds military controls (veterans from classes 1874 - 95 and from classes 1896 - 1900 as well as casualties among special assault troops and volunteers as a share of the male population above the age of six in 1911, a dummy for the presence of army-supplying production plants, and a dummy for any casualties in the highest-mortality battles). Column (5) includes agricultural controls (share of day laborers, share of sharecroppers, and a dummy for the presence of local agrarian associations). Finally column (6) adds urban controls (industry workers and industrial firms over male population in 1911, literacy rate in 1911, the share of entrepreneurs and rentiers, and the share of the bourgeoisie). Standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses.

表 4 2SLS AND OLS ESTIMATES OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIALIST VOTE SHARE IN 1919, LOCAL ELECTIONS, AND AGRARIAN STRIKES IN 1920 †
对1919年社会主义选票份额与地方选举和1920年的土地罢工之间关系的影响的 2SLS 和 OLS 估计

TABLE IV
2SLS AND OLS ESTIMATES OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIALIST VOTE SHARE IN 1919, LOCAL ELECTIONS, AND AGRARIAN STRIKES IN 1920

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dep. variable: Socialist majority dummy in 1920						
Panel A: 2SLS						
Socialist vote share in 1919	0.82 (0.15)	0.83 (0.15)	0.85 (0.16)	0.77 (0.15)	0.75 (0.16)	0.76 (0.15)
Panel B: OLS						
Socialist vote share in 1919	0.54 (0.03)	0.54 (0.03)	0.50 (0.03)	0.50 (0.03)	0.49 (0.03)	0.50 (0.03)
Dep. variable: Agrarian strikes in 1920						
Panel C: 2SLS						
Socialist vote share in 1919	0.00 (0.11)	-0.01 (0.11)	-0.02 (0.13)	0.00 (0.14)	0.00 (0.13)	0.00 (0.13)
Panel D: OLS						
Socialist vote share in 1919	0.09 (0.03)	0.08 (0.03)	0.09 (0.03)	0.09 (0.03)	0.09 (0.03)	0.09 (0.03)
Regiment/province FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographic controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Socialist share in 1913			✓	✓	✓	✓
Military controls				✓	✓	✓
Agriculture controls					✓	✓
Urban controls						✓
Observations	5,775	5,775	5,775	5,775	5,775	5,775
Number of clusters	181	181	181	181	181	181

Notes. 2SLS (Panels A and C) and OLS (Panels B and D) regressions of a dummy for municipalities where the Socialist Party won the majority of votes in the 1920 local elections (Panels A and B) and agrarian strikes in 1920 (Panels C and D) on socialist vote share in 1919. Standardized coefficients are reported. Column (1) includes regiment and province fixed effects and demographic controls (quartic in log population and share of population below the age of six in 1911). Column (2) includes geographic controls (log area, elevation of the main center, and maximum elevation). Column (3) adds socialist vote share in 1913. Column (4) adds military controls (veterans from classes 1874 - 95 and from classes 1896 - 1900 as well as casualties among special assault troops and volunteers as a share of the male population above the age of six in 1911, a dummy for the presence of army-supplying production plants, and a dummy for any casualties in the highest-mortality battles). Column (5) includes agricultural controls (share of day laborers, share of sharecroppers, and a dummy for the presence of local agrarian associations). Finally column (6) adds urban controls (industry workers and industrial firms over the male population in 1911, literacy rate in 1911, the share of entrepreneurs and rentiers, and the share of the bourgeoisie). Standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses.

表 5 ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF SOCIALIST VOTE SHARE IN 1919 AND FOOT SOLDIER CASUALTIES ON THE VOTE SHARE OF SOCIALIST, CATHOLIC, AND TRADITIONAL PARTIES IN 1921 AND 1924 † 1919年社会主义选票份额和步兵伤亡, 对社会主义、基督教、1921年和1924年的传统政党选票份额的影响估计

TABLE V
ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF SOCIALIST VOTE SHARE IN 1919 AND FOOT SOLDIER CASUALTIES ON THE VOTE SHARE OF SOCIALIST, CATHOLIC,
AND TRADITIONAL PARTIES IN 1921 AND 1924

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Dep. variable:		Popular (Catholic) vote share in 1921			Traditional parties' vote share in 1921			Socialist vote share in 1921	
Panel A: 2SLS									
Socialist vote share in 1919	-0.73 (0.19)	-0.76 (0.22)	-0.70 (0.19)	-0.30 (0.15)	-0.25 (0.17)	-0.31 (0.16)	0.86 (0.09)	0.81 (0.11)	0.82 (0.11)
Panel B: Reduced form									
Share of foot soldier casualties	-0.09 (0.02)	-0.08 (0.02)	-0.07 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.11 (0.02)	0.08 (0.02)	0.08 (0.02)
Implied votes lost due to foot soldier casualties	-279k	-242k	-216k	-130k	-92k	-107k	-33k	-54k	-46k
Observations	5,172	5,172	5,172	5,172	5,172	5,172	5,172	5,172	5,172
Number of clusters	173	173	173	173	173	173	173	173	173
Dep. variable:		Popular (Catholic) vote share in 1924			Traditional parties' vote share in 1924			Socialist vote share in 1924	
Panel C: 2SLS									
Socialist vote share in 1919	-0.47 (0.19)	-0.55 (0.20)	-0.49 (0.19)	-0.39 (0.16)	-0.47 (0.18)	-0.50 (0.19)	0.23 (0.14)	0.16 (0.15)	0.22 (0.15)
Panel D: Reduced form									
Share of foot soldier casualties	-0.06 (0.02)	-0.06 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Implied votes lost due to foot soldier casualties	-122k	-123k	-106k	-98k	-101k	-104k	-309k	-281k	-258k

TABLE V
CONTINUED

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Observations	5,775	5,775	5,775	5,775	5,775	5,775	5,775	5,775	5,775
Number of clusters	181	181	181	181	181	181	181	181	181
Vote share in 1919		0.205			0.370			0.323	
Vote share in 1921		0.206			0.321			0.297	
Vote share in 1924		0.090			0.065			0.147	
Regiment/province FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographic controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Socialist share in 1913		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Military controls		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Agriculture controls			✓			✓			✓
Urban controls			✓			✓			✓

Table 5 continued † 表 5 的续

Notes. 2SLS (Panels A and C) and reduced-form (Panels B and D) regressions of the Popular Party (columns (1) - (3)), of the traditional parties (columns (4) - (6)), and of the socialist vote share (columns (7) - (9)) in 1921 (Panels A and B) and in 1924 (Panels C and D). The excluded instrument in Panels A and C is the count of World War I foot soldier casualties from a municipality divided by the total male population over the age of six in 1911. Standardized coefficients are reported. The three specifications correspond to those from Table 1, columns (1), (4), and (6). Column (1) includes regiment and province fixed effects and demographic controls (quartic in log population and share of the population below the age of six in 1911). Column (4) includes geographic controls (log area, elevation of the main center, and maximum elevation), the socialist vote share in 1913, and military controls (veterans from classes 1874 - 95 and from classes 1896 - 1900 as well as casualties among special assault troops and volunteers as a share of the male population above the age of six in 1911, a dummy for the presence of army-supplying production plants, and a dummy for any casualties in the highest-mortality battles). Column (6) includes agricultural controls (share of day laborers, share of sharecroppers, and a dummy for the presence of local agrarian associations) and urban controls (industry workers and industrial firms over male population in 1911, literacy rate in 1911, the share of entrepreneurs and rentiers, and the share of the bourgeoisie). Standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses.

表 6 HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS OF SOCIALIST VOTE SHARE IN 1919 ON LOCAL FASCIST SUPPORT † 1919年社会主义选票份额对地方法西斯支持的异质性影响

TABLE VI
HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS OF SOCIALIST VOTE SHARE IN 1919 ON LOCAL FASCIST SUPPORT

Dep. variable:	Fascist violence in 1920-22			Fascist local branch in 1921			Fascist vote share in 1921			Fascist vote share in 1924		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Panel A: Heterogeneous effects in the presence of landowner associations, 2SLS												
Socialist vote share in 1919	0.35	0.51	0.51	0.37	0.48	0.50	0.29	0.36	0.35	0.40	0.54	0.51
	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.16)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Socialists × landowner association dummy	0.85	0.74	0.75	0.53	0.41	0.41	0.76	0.73	0.75	-0.20	-0.28	-0.24
	(0.46)	(0.44)	(0.43)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.41)	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.19)
Kleibergen-Paap F -stat.	19.71	26.01	24.61	19.71	26.01	24.61	20.02	24.91	24.20	19.71	26.01	24.61
Panel B: Reduced form												
Share of foot soldier casualties	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.05	0.05
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Casualties × landowner association dummy	0.21	0.22	0.23	0.14	0.14	0.15	0.18	0.19	0.20	-0.02	-0.00	0.00
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Panel C: Heterogeneous effects in the presence of elites (entrepreneurs and rentiers), 2SLS												
Socialist vote share in 1919	0.34	0.49	0.47	0.38	0.50	0.50	0.30	0.37	0.34	0.37	0.52	0.49
	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.18)
Socialists × elites	0.44	0.44	0.49	0.04	0.05	0.05	-0.03	-0.07	-0.07	0.27	0.25	0.34
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.16)
Kleibergen-Paap F -stat.	16.16	16.61	13.50	16.16	16.61	13.50	16.62	16.22	12.87	16.16	16.61	13.50

TABLE VI
CONTINUED

Dep. variable:	Fascist violence in 1920-22			Fascist local branch in 1921			Fascist vote share in 1921			Fascist vote share in 1924		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Panel D: Reduced form												
Share of foot soldier casualties	0.04 (0.02)	0.05 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.05 (0.02)	0.05 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.05 (0.01)	0.05 (0.01)
Casualties × elites	0.10 (0.05)	0.10 (0.05)	0.09 (0.05)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.07 (0.04)	0.06 (0.03)	0.07 (0.03)
Regiment/province FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographic controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Socialist share in 1913	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Military controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Agriculture controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Urban controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	5,775	5,775	5,775	5,775	5,775	5,775	5,358	5,358	5,358	5,775	5,775	5,775
Number of clusters	181	181	181	181	181	181	175	175	175	181	181	181

Table 6 continued † 表 6 的续

Notes. 2SLS (Panels A and C) and reduced-form regressions (Panels B and D) of the heterogeneous effect of the socialist vote share in 1919 on fascism in the presence of landowners' associations (Panels A and B) and the share of elites (Panels C and D). The endogenous variables are socialist vote share in 1919 and its interaction with the measure of elite organization. Excluded instruments are the count of World War I foot soldier casualties from a municipality divided by the total male population over the age of six in 1911 and its interaction with the elite variables. The left-hand-side variables are the fascist violence (episodes per 1,000 inhabitants) in 1920 - 22 (columns (1) - (3)), the presence of local fascist branches in the fall of 1921 (columns (4) - (6)), the fascist vote share in 1921 (columns (7) - (9)) and in 1924 (columns (10) - (12)). Standardized coefficients are reported. The three specifications correspond to those from Table 1, columns (1), (4), and (6). Column (1) includes regiment and province fixed effects and demographic controls (quartic in log population and share of population below the age of six in 1911). Column (4) includes geographic controls (log area, elevation of the main center, and maximum elevation), the socialist vote share in 1913, and military controls (veterans from classes 1874 - 95 and from classes 1896 - 1900 as well as casualties among special assault troops and volunteers as a share of the male population above the age of six in 1911, a dummy for the presence of army-supplying production plants, and a dummy for any casualties in the highest-mortality battles). Column (6) includes agricultural controls (share of day laborers, share of sharecroppers, and a dummy for the presence of local agrarian associations) and urban controls (industry workers and industrial firms over male population in 1911, literacy rate in 1911, the share of entrepreneurs and rentiers, and the share of the bourgeoisie). Standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses.

表 7 2SLS ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF THE FASCIST VOTE SHARE IN 1924 ON JEWISH DEPORTATIONS 1943 - 45 † 1924年法西斯投票份额, 对1943年至1945年犹太人被驱逐出境的影响的 2SLS 估计

TABLE VII
2SLS ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF THE FASCIST VOTE SHARE IN 1924 ON JEWISH DEPORTATIONS 1943-45

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Jews deportation dummy (1943-45)						
Fascist vote share in 1924	0.89 (0.46)	0.81 (0.42)	0.82 (0.42)	0.77 (0.38)	0.83 (0.42)	0.82 (0.43)
Panel B: Deportations over Jewish population (capped at 1)						
Fascist vote share in 1924	1.08 (0.50)	0.99 (0.44)	0.99 (0.43)	0.92 (0.38)	0.99 (0.43)	0.97 (0.44)
Panel C: Deportations over Jewish population (capped at 1, no camps)						
Fascist vote share in 1924	0.95 (0.46)	0.88 (0.41)	0.88 (0.41)	0.81 (0.36)	0.87 (0.40)	0.86 (0.41)
Regiment/province FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographic controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Share of Jewish pop. in 1911	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Days of German occupation	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Socialist share in 1913			✓	✓	✓	✓
Military controls				✓	✓	✓
Agriculture controls					✓	✓
Urban controls						✓
Observations	5,775	5,775	5,775	5,775	5,775	5,775
Number of clusters	181	181	181	181	181	181
First-stage <i>F</i> -stat	6.52	9.22	9.82	11.56	9.88	10.04

Notes. 2SLS regressions of a dummy for the occurrence of the deportation of Jews in 1943 - 45 (Panel A); the number of deported Jews in 1943 - 45 over the 1911 Jewish population, capped at 1 (Panel B); the number of deported Jews in 1943 - 45 over the 1911 Jewish population, capped at 1 and excluding 39 municipalities with concentration camps (Panel C) on the fascist vote share in 1924. The excluded instrument is the count of World War I foot soldier casualties from a municipality divided by the total male population over the age of six in 1911. Standardized coefficients are reported. Column (1) includes regiment and province fixed effects, demographic controls (quartic in log population and share of the population below the age of six in 1911), the share of the Jewish population in 1911, and days of German occupation in the period 1943 - 45. Column (2) includes geographic controls (log area, elevation of the main center, and maximum elevation). Column (3) adds socialist vote share in 1913. Column (4) adds military controls (veterans from classes 1874 - 95 and from classes 1896 - 1900 as well as casualties among special assault troops and volunteers as a share of the male population above the age of six in 1911, a dummy for the presence of army-supplying production plants, and a dummy for any casualties in the highest-mortality battles). Column (5) includes agricultural controls (share of day laborers, share of sharecroppers, and a dummy for the presence of local agrarian associations). Finally column (6) adds urban controls (industry workers and industrial firms over male population in 1911, literacy rate in 1911, the share of entrepreneurs and rentiers, and the share of the bourgeoisie). Standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses.

表 8 2SLS ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF THE FASCIST VOTE SHARE IN 1924 ON POST-WORLD WAR II PARTY VOTE SHARES † 1924年法西斯选票份额对二战后政党选票份额的影响的 2SLS 估计

TABLE VIII

2SLS ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF THE FASCIST VOTE SHARE IN 1924 ON POST-WORLD WAR II PARTY VOTE SHARES

Dep. variable: Votes shares of	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel A: Elections 1946–1979										
Left	0.68 (0.30)	1.30 (0.50)	1.05 (0.45)	1.26 (0.59)	0.97 (0.49)	0.86 (0.44)	0.67 (0.40)	0.82 (0.45)	1.14 (0.55)	0.97 (0.49)
Center right	-0.60 (0.24)	-1.14 (0.47)	-0.95 (0.49)	-1.29 (0.52)	-1.18 (0.47)	-0.84 (0.40)	-1.04 (0.43)	-1.01 (0.45)	-1.11 (0.50)	-0.87 (0.42)
Extreme left	0.30 (0.15)	0.25 (0.22)	0.29 (0.36)				1.12 (0.58)	1.04 (0.62)	-0.07 (0.39)	1.11 (0.44)
Extreme right	0.20 (0.18)		0.17 (0.34)	0.32 (0.36)	0.33 (0.27)	0.19 (0.30)	0.46 (0.33)	0.50 (0.29)	0.11 (0.31)	0.34 (0.34)
Election(s)	1946–2018	1946	1948	1953	1958	1963	1968	1972	1976	1979
Observations	109,725	5,775	5,775	5,775	5,775	5,775	5,775	5,775	5,775	5,775
Number of clusters	5,775	181	181	181	181	181	181	181	181	181
First-stage F -stat.	10.10	9.94	9.94	9.94	9.94	9.94	9.94	9.94	9.94	9.94

TABLE VIII
CONTINUED

Dep. variable: Votes shares of	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel B: Elections 1983–2018										
Left	0.81 (0.43)	0.90 (0.46)	0.47 (0.37)	0.45 (0.26)	0.23 (0.25)	0.41 (0.32)	0.67 (0.38)	0.47 (0.30)	0.57 (0.38)	0.77 (0.46)
Center right	-0.83 (0.44)	-0.73 (0.40)	-0.89 (0.45)	-0.64 (0.29)	-0.13 (0.36)	-0.49 (0.35)	-0.66 (0.43)	-0.79 (0.41)	-1.04 (0.63)	-0.08 (0.44)
Extreme left	-0.59 (0.38)	-0.47 (0.55)	0.58 (0.41)	0.60 (0.37)	0.65 (0.40)	0.44 (0.48)	0.78 (0.43)	0.67 (0.41)	0.06 (0.23)	-0.08 (0.31)
Extreme right	0.41 (0.42)	0.09 (0.46)	0.14 (0.36)	0.14 (0.29)	0.14 (0.29)	-0.03 (0.30)	-0.37 (0.43)	0.67 (0.40)	0.14 (0.39)	0.23 (0.33)
Election:	1983	1987	1992	1994	1996	2001	2006	2008	2013	2018
Observations	5,775	5,775	5,775	5,775	5,775	5,775	5,775	5,775	5,775	5,775
Number of clusters	181	181	181	181	181	181	181	181	181	181
First-stage F -stat.	9.94	9.94	9.94	9.94	9.94	9.94	9.94	9.94	9.94	9.94
Full set of controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Table 8 continued 表 8 的续

Notes. 2SLS regressions of the vote shares of post-World War II parties for the period 1946 – 2018 on fascist vote share in 1924. The left column identifies the party whose vote share is used as the dependent variable in the regressions in each row. The heading Election identifies the election(s) included in the sample. The excluded instrument is the count of foot soldier casualties from a municipality divided by the total male population over the age of six in 1911. Standardized coefficients for fascist vote share in 1924 are reported. All specifications include our full set of controls. We include regiment and province fixed effects and demographic controls (quartic in log population and share of population below the age of six in 1911), geographic controls (log area, elevation of the main center, and maximum elevation), the socialist vote share in 1913, military controls (veterans from classes 1874 – 95 and from classes 1896 – 1900 as well as casualties among special assault troops and volunteers as a share of the male population above the age of six in 1911, a dummy for the presence of army-supplying production plants, and a dummy for any casualties in the highest-mortality battles), agricultural controls (share of day laborers, share of sharecroppers, and a dummy for the presence of local agrarian associations) and urban controls (industry workers and industrial firms over the male population in 1911, literacy rate in 1911, the share of entrepreneurs and rentiers, and the share of the bourgeoisie). Standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. Panel A, column (1) reports a pooled 2SLS regression for the period 1946 – 2018 where all controls are interacted with election dummies and standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.




图 1 Spatial Distribution of Foot soldier Casualties and Fascist and Socialist Support † 步兵伤亡、法西斯和社会主义的支持的空间分布




图 2 Bin Scatter plot of the First-Stage Relationship between Socialist Vote Share in 1919 and Foot Soldier Casualties † 1919年社会主义选票份额与步兵伤亡第一阶段关系的宾散点图

Note that: Residuals and coefficient estimates from the specification in Table 1, column (6). Please see notes in Table 1. The average bin size is 130 municipalities.




图3 Falsification Tests. The estimates correspond to the specifications from columns (1) (top-black; color version available online), (4) (middle-light blue), and (6) (bottom-green) in Table 1. Please see notes to Table 1. Standardized coefficients and 95% confidence intervals are reported. † 伪造试验。估算值对应于第(1)列(顶部黑色; 颜色设置是, 表1中的(4)列(中浅蓝色)和(6)列(底部绿色)。请参阅表1的注释。标准化的系数和报道的置信区间为95%。




图 4 Bin Scatter plot of the 2SLS Relationship between Fascist Support Measures and Socialist Vote Share in 1919. † 法西斯支持度与1919年社会主义选票份额之间的 2SLS 关系的散点图。

Residuals and coefficient estimates from the specification in column (6) of Tables 2 and 3. Socialist vote share in 1919 is instrumented with foot soldier casualties relative to the male population over the age of six in 1911. The average bin size is 130 municipalities.




图 5 Comparison of Reduced-Form Estimates of Fascist Activity on Foot Soldier Casualties in the Full Sample, Municipalities with Predicted Socialist Vote Share in 1919 in the Bottom Quartile, and Municipalities with No Socialist Candidate in 1913 † 全样本中法西斯活动对步行士兵伤亡的简化估计、在底部四分之一、有预测的1919年社会主义选票份额的城市，和1913年没有社会主义候选人的城市的比较

This figure reports standardized coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals for reduced-form regressions of fascist violence in 1920 – 22, fascist local branches in 1921, and fascist vote shares in 1921 and 1924 on foot soldier casualties divided by male population over the age of six in 1911. We consider three samples: the full sample, the subsample of municipalities where predicted socialist vote share in 1919 from the first-stage specification in column (1) of Table I is in the bottom quartile of the distribution of municipalities, and the subsample of municipalities with no socialist candidates in the 1913 national elections. For each outcome variable and each sample, we report three specifications, corresponding to columns (1) (top-black), (4) (middle-light blue), and (6) (bottom-green) from Table I. See text for additional details.




图 6 Correlation between Foot Soldier Casualties and Support for Fascism and Nationalism † 步兵伤亡与法西斯和民族主义支持之间的相关性

The estimates correspond to the specifications from columns (1) (top-black), (4) (middle-light blue), and (6) (bottom-green) of Table I. Please see notes to Table 1 and text for variable definitions. Standardized coefficients and 95% confidence intervals are reported.

Resume of the 1st author † 第一作者简历



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