

**Weak, Despotic, or Inclusive? How State Type  
Emerges from State versus Civil Society  
Competition**

软弱的，专制的，或包容性的？从国家与民间社会的竞争中出现  
的状态，类型如何\*

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## 摘 要

We develop a theory of the accumulation of state capacity as the outcome of a political competition between elites and (civil) society. State capacity is accumulated by elites, and it is productive as well as useful in controlling society. However, society can fight back and accumulate its own capacity, facilitating collective action. The theory leads to three distinct equilibria depending on initial conditions. One type, a weak state, emerges when society is strong relative to the elite. Another, a despotic state, originates where the elite is initially relatively powerful. A third type, an inclusive state, emerges when the elite and society are more evenly matched. The theory has several important implications; first, variation in state capacity does not require large structural differences; second, inclusive states have the highest levels of state capacity in the long run; third, the effects of shocks or external threats like wars are conditional on the balance of power between elites and society.

我们发展了一种理论，认为国家能力的积累，是精英和（公民）社会之间政治竞争的结果。国家能力，是由精英积累起来的，它在控制社会方面是富有成效的，也是有用的。然而，社会可以反击，并积累自己的能力，促进集体行动。该理论根据初始条件得出三个不同的平衡。软弱的国家，当社会相对于精英阶层强大时，就会出现一种的类型。另一种，是专制的国家，起源于精英阶层，最初相对强大的地方。第三种类型，是包容性的国家，当精英和社会更均匀地匹配时，才出现的状态。该理论有几个重要含义；首先，国家能力的变化，不需要很大的结构差异；第二，从长远来看，包容性国家的能力，水平最高；第三，冲击或战争等外部威胁的影响，取决于精英和社会之间的权力平衡。

关键词 (Key words): society, elites, capacity / 社会、精英、能力

常见词 (Frequently appeared words): matched, accumulate, inclusive / 匹配, 积累, 包容的

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美国政治科学评论 杂志的 影响因子

## §1 INTRODUCTION † 引言

There is a great deal of variation in state capacity around the world. Simple statistical measures, such as the ratio of government tax revenues to national income, vary from close to 50% in western and northern Europe to less than 10% in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa. These differences in resources are reflected in large differences in the provisions of public goods, infrastructure, and the ability to deliver justice or hold clean elections.

世界各地的国家能力存在很大差异。简单的统计指标，如政府税收收入与国民收入的比率，从西欧和北欧的近50%到撒哈拉以南非洲许多国家的不到10%不等。这些资源的差异反映在公共产品、基础设施以及伸张正义或举行廉洁选举的能力方面的巨大差异。

Such dispersion has enormous consequences for politics. The absence of state capacity has been argued to be the main reason that societies fall into civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003), the primary explanation for the absence of accountability and institutions of participation (Herbst 2000; Levi 1989; Tilly 2007), and an important cause of the inability of communities to collectively govern resources in desirable ways (Ostrom 1990). The presence of state capacity is argued to be the main driving force behind experiences of rapid economic growth (Amsden 1989; Evans 1995; Wade 1990) and more broadly to guarantee that the state works in the collective interest (Geddes 1994).

这种分散，对政治产生了巨大的影响。国家能力的缺失，被认为是社会陷入内战的主要原因 (Fearon & Laitin 2003)，是缺乏问责制和参与制度的主要解释 (Herbst 2000; Levi 1989; Tilly 2007)，也是社区无法以理想方式集体管理资源的重要原因 (Ostrom 1990)。国家能力的存在，被认为是经济快速增长背后的主要驱动力 (Amsden 1989; Evans 1995; Wade 1990)，更广泛地说，是保证国家为集体利益而运作 (Geddes 1994)。

In this paper we propose a new theory to explain this variation. Existing explanations account for it either by structural factors such as population density, topography, or culture or via more contingent influences such as histories of warfare, colonialism, or trade. Yet, as we illustrate below, polities with very similar structural features and histories of warfare have experienced dramatic divergences in state capacity.

本文提出了一种新的理论，来解释这种变化。现有的解释，要么是通过人口密度、地形或文化等结构性因素，要么是通过战争、殖民主义或贸易史等更偶然的影响来解释它。然而，正如我们在下面所说明的，那样，具有非常相似的结构特征和战争历史的政治，在国家能力方面经历了巨大的分歧。

Our theory conceptualizes the construction of state capacity as a game between those in control of the state, who we call the elite, and civil society—or henceforth “society” for short. State capacity, accumulated by the elite, potentially has benefits for all in the sense that it allows for the provision of public goods, but at the same time it can be used to oppress citizens and thus slant all the benefits toward the elite. This trade-off is recognized in the Western world at least since the time of Locke. As Scott (2010) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2019) discuss, it is well understood in non-Western societies too. But citizens also have capacity in this game with the elite—we conceptualize this as the ability to organize and engage in collective action. Like state capacity accumulated by elites, greater societal capacity adds to productivity because it allows greater coordination and public good provision (Ostrom 1990). But it simultaneously gives society greater ability to contest with the elite (emphasized by Wood

2003).

我们的理论，将国家能力的构建概念，化为控制国家的人（我们称之为精英）和公民社会（或简称“社会”）之间的游戏。国家能力，即精英阶层累积的，可能对所有人都有好处，因为它允许提供公共产品，但与此同时，它也可能被用来压迫公民，从而使所有利益偏向精英阶层。至少从洛克时代开始，这种权衡，在西方世界就得到了认可。正如 Scott (2010)、Acemoglu & Robinson (2019) 所讨论的那样，它在非西方社会，也得到了很好的理解。但公民在与精英的游戏中，也有能力— 我们将其概念化为组织和参与集体行动的能力。类似国家能力积累，对于精英阶层来说，更大的社会能力，可以提高生产力，因为它允许更大的协调和公共产品的提供 (Ostrom 1990)。但它同时赋予了社会更大的与精英竞争的能力 (Wood 2003 强调)。

Specifically, we assume that state and society’s capacities are used as inputs into a contest for power. Elites accumulate state capacity, which enables them to impose their wishes on and dominate society, whereas society’s capacity empowers it to resist elite schemes (which may take the form of democratic political participation, protests, collective action, strikes, and even violence). Our notion of a contest for power and the model we use is common in the literature on interest group politics, civil wars, and international relations (see Powell 1999; Skaperdas 1992; Tullock 1980). As in these literatures, we model the outcome as uncertain; for given capacities, which side wins depends on a variety of contingent factors that cannot be anticipated in advance. Whoever wins is then able to set policy and allocate resources in their own interests.

具体来说，我们假设国家和社会的能力，被用作权力竞争的投入。精英积累国家能力，这使他们能够将自己的意愿，强加给社会并主导社会，而社会的能力使其能够抵制精英计划（可能采取民主政治参与、抗议、集体行动、罢工甚至暴力的形式）。我们对权力争夺的概念，和我们使用的模式在利益集团政治、内战和国际关系的文献中很常见（见 Powell 1999; Skaperdas 1992; Tullock 1980）。与这些文献一样，我们将结果建模为不确定的；对于给定的能力，哪一方获胜，取决于各种无法提前预测的偶然因素。无论谁获胜，都可以制定政策并为自己的利益分配资源。

We show that there are three long-run equilibrium outcomes in this contest.<sup>1</sup> Elites manage to accumulate far more capacity than society and dominate it. This leads to a despotic state. Or, in the opposite case, society dominates elites and very little state capacity develops, and a weak state emerges. In the middle, where the capacity of the state and society is balanced a third equilibria emerges where both the state and society end up with large amounts of capacity. We call this an inclusive state.

我们证明，在这场竞赛中有三个长期均衡结果。精英们设法积累比社会多得多的能力，并统治社会。这导致了专制的国家。或者，在相反的情况下，社会主导着精英，国家能力发展甚微，出现了一个弱国。在中间，在国家和社会的能力平衡的情况下，出现了第三种平衡，即国家和社会最终都有大量的能力。我们称之为包容性的国家。

These long-run equilibrium outcomes and the dynamics leading up to them are summarized in Figure 1. We depict society’s capacity on the horizontal axis and state capacity on the vertical one. Region I illustrates the political dynamics leading to a despotic state, similar to those of early modern Prussia, a case we discuss in detail in our historical perspective section. Region III is the case of a

<sup>1</sup> Technically, these are steady-state Nash equilibria of the dynamical system, but to avoid proliferating the use of the word “state” we simply refer to these as equilibria. † 从技术上讲，这些是动力系统的稳态纳什均衡，但为了避免“状态”一词的使用激增，我们简单地将其称为均衡。

weak state, which we illustrate with the history of Montenegro contrasted to Prussia's. Finally, Region II depicts the middle ground where the elite and society are initially in balance, and this triggers an ongoing competition between the two, leading to an *inclusive* state, which we illustrate with Switzerland. 图 1 总结了这些长期均衡结果及其背后的动态。我们在横轴上描绘社会能力，在纵轴上描绘国家能力。区域 I 说明了导致专制国家的政治动态，类似于近代早期的普鲁士，我们在历史视角部分详细讨论了这个案例。区域 III 是一个弱国，我们用黑山与普鲁士的历史对比，来说明这一点。最后，区域 II 描绘了精英和社会最初处于平衡状态的中间地带，这引发了两者之间的持续竞争，导致了包容性状态，我们用瑞士来说明这一点。

This comparison is not intended to indicate the scope conditions of the model but is simply a use of Mill's (1872) most similar research design. More broadly, our claim is that the mechanisms underlying the dynamics and equilibria of the model help to account for the patterns we see in the world with the simultaneous persistent existence of despotic states (like China), weak states (as in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa), and *inclusive* states (in western and northern Europe or north America). Existing theories can explain this pattern only by appealing to significant regional or continental differences in underlying conditions. Without denying the role of such differences, our *ambition* is to develop a global theory that can account for these rich patterns without huge *structural differences* across countries and regions.

这种比较不是为了表明模型的范围条件，而只是使用了 Mill (1872) 最相似的研究设计。更广泛地说，我们的主张是，该模型的动态和均衡背后的机制，有助于解释我们在世界上看到的模式，即专制国家（如中国）、弱国（如撒哈拉以南非洲的许多地区）和包容性国家（西欧、北欧或北美）同时持续存在。现有的理论，只能通过呼吁潜在条件的显著区域或大陆差异来解释这种模式。在不否认这些差异的作用的情况下，我们的目标是发展一种全球理论，可以解释这些丰富的模式，而不会在国家 and 地区之间，产生巨大的结构性差异。

Our theory and Figure 1 clarify that small differences in initial conditions can put a polity into the basin of attraction of one equilibrium rather than another. We believe this feature of the model is consistent with historical evidence, as we discussed later. An important implication of our theory is visible in Figure 1: state capacity is greater under *inclusive* states than under despotic states. This is because when the state dominates society, it has less incentive to *accumulate* further capacity. It is competition between state and society that triggers greater investments by the elites controlling it. Our model thus highlights that weak, despotic, and *inclusive* states have not only different amounts of state capacity but also divergent societal capacities.

我们的理论和图 1 表明，初始条件的微小差异，可能会使政体陷入一种平衡而非另一种平衡的吸引力盆地。我们认为该模型的这一特征，与历史证据一致，正如我们稍后讨论的那样。我们的理论的一个重要含义，在图 1 中可见：包容性的状态下的国家能力比专制状态下的更大。这是因为当国家主导社会时，它就没有动力进一步积累容量。正是国家和社会之间的竞争，引发了控制它的精英的更大投资。因此，我们的模型强调，软弱的、专制的和包容性的国家，不仅具有不同的国家能力，而且具有不同的社会能力。

Another feature of our theory is clear from Figure 1: the effects of a rich array of structural factors are conditional. For example, factors that (exogenously) increase the power of the state could move a polity from Region III to Region II, initiating a powerful process of state capacity building. But

as Figure 2 illustrates, the same factors may also push a polity previously in Region II into Region I, reducing its long-run potential to achieve high state capacity. Similarly, structural factors shift the boundaries of the basins of attraction of the three different types of states as well, but the effects of such changes are also conditional on the prevailing balance between state and society. These conditional comparative statics highlight that there is no simple version of Tilly’s “War made the state, and the state made war” (1975, 42) in our theory. Though warfare may create incentives to strengthen state capacity, its ultimate implications depend on the balance of power between state and society. This provides one explanation for why for each structural factor argued to underlie the development of state capacity, there are always counterexamples going in the opposite direction.<sup>2</sup>

我们理论的另一个特征，从图 1 中可以清楚地看出：丰富的结构因素的影响，是有条件的。例如，（外生）增加国家权力的因素，可能会将一个政体从 III 区转移到 II 区，从而启动一个强大的国家能力建设进程。但如图 2 所示，同样的因素也可能将之前位于 II 区的政体推向 I 区，从而降低其实现高国家能力的长期潜力。同样，结构性因素，也改变了三种不同类型国家的吸引力边界，但这种变化的影响，也取决于国家和社会之间的普遍平衡。这些有条件的比较静力学强调，Tilly 的理论没有简单的版本。在我们的理论中，“战争造就了国家，国家也制造了战争”（1975, 42）。尽管战争可能会产生加强国家能力的动机，但其最终影响取决于国家和社会之间的权力平衡。这就解释了，为什么对于每个被认为是国家能力发展基础的结构因素，总是有相反的反例。

Although our theory allows for diverse long-term outcomes, it also generates several falsifiable predictions. First, the greatest state capacity emerges not when the state is overwhelmingly dominant and strong relative to society but when there is some sort of balance between the two. This would imply that one should find a nonmonotonic relationship between initial state capacity (given society’s organization) and ultimate state capacity. Second, the longer a society remains in the basin of attraction of the despotic state (or weak state), the more difficult it is for it to transition to an *inclusive* state. This perspective implies, for example, that in contrast to optimistic predictions about China’s political development and seamless transition to democracy based on its modernization, building *inclusive* state-society relationship in China will be very hard. Third, the model implies a type of weak monotonicity in initial conditions in response to shocks, which can be investigated empirically. For example, of two polities that are subject to exactly the same prostate shock and have the same societal capacity, the one with greater state capacity is more likely to transition to a despotic state than the other and less likely to remain in the weak state’s basin of attraction.

尽管我们的理论，允许不同的长期结果，但它也产生了几可证伪的预测。首先，最大的国家能力，不是当国家相对于社会，具有压倒性的主导地位 and 强有力时出现，而是当两者之间存在某种平衡时出现。这意味着，人们应该在初始国家能力（给定的社会组织）和最终国家能力之间，找到一种非

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<sup>2</sup> Most studies of Tilly’s hypothesis, even in Europe find it does not apply without some mediating variables or the addition of various complementary channels (e.g., Abramson 2017; Hoffman 2015). Thies (2005) adds to Tilly the notion of “inter-state rivalry.” In the Asian context, Taylor and Botea (2008) provide a discussion of how mediating factors like ethnicity may interact with warfare. For Latin America, see Centeno’s (1997) discussion of mediating factors, for China, see Hui (2005) and Dincecco and Wang (2018), and for Africa, see Dincecco, Fenske, and Onorato (2019). † 对 Tilly 假说的大多数研究，即使在欧洲，也发现如果没有一些中介变量或添加各种互补渠道，它就不适用（例如，Abramson 2017; Hoffman 2015）。Thies (2005) 为 Tilly 增加了“国家间竞争”的概念。在亚洲背景下，Taylor & Botea (2008) 讨论了种族等中介因素如何与战争相互作用。对于拉丁美洲，请参见 Centeno (1997) 关于中介因素的讨论，对于中国，请参见 Hui (2005)、Dincecco & Wang (2018)，对于非洲，请参见 Dincecco、Fenske & Onorato (2019)。

单调的关系。其次，一个社会在专制国家（或弱国）的吸引力范围内，停留的时间越长，就越难过渡到包容性状态。例如，这种观点意味着，与对中国政治发展和基于现代化的民主无缝过渡的乐观预测相反，在中国建立包容性国家与社会关系，将非常困难。第三，该模型暗示了初始条件下对冲击的一种弱单调性，这可以通过经验进行研究。例如，在两个遭受完全相同前列腺冲击，并具有相同社会能力的政治体中，国家能力更强的一个，比另一个更有可能过渡到专制国家，也不太可能留在弱国的吸引力范围内。

Our theory builds on a few main ideas. First, that state capacity can be used productively, but also to control society, and that it can be accumulated. By state capacity, most scholars build on Mann's (1993) notion of "infrastructural power," which he defines as the capacity of a central state to "penetrate its territories and logistically implement decisions" (59). Such capacity is multidimensional and includes bureaucratic, legal, and fiscal capacities, and even the latter is itself complex, as Fauvelle-Aymar (1999) points out, as it involves not just the construction of state institutions but also people's willingness to pay taxes, which may depend on the extent to which they see the state as legitimate or efficient. Though our model is reduced form and consistent with different interpretations of state capacity, fiscal capacity does satisfy our three conditions; it can be used to provide public goods and to equip and pay state agents of control, and more of it can be acquired via institution building, conducting surveys of assets and wealth, etc. (even if people may resist, à la Fauvelle-Aymar 1999). It is also the dominant measure in the literature (e.g., Herbst 2000; Slater 2010) and lends itself to measurement.

我们的理论，建立在几个主要观点之上。首先，这种国家能力，可以得到有效利用，但也可以用于控制社会，它可以是累积的。根据国家能力，大多数学者基于 Mann (1993) 的“基础设施权力”概念，将其定义为中央国家“渗透其领土并在后勤上执行决策”的能力 (59)。这种能力是多维的，包括官僚、法律和财政能力，正如 Fauvelle Aymar (1999) 所指出的那样，即使是后者本身也是复杂的，因为它不仅涉及国家机构的建设，还涉及人们纳税的意愿，这可能取决于他们认为国家合法或高效的程度。尽管我们的模型是简化的，并且与对国家能力的不同解释相一致，但财政能力，确实满足我们的三个条件；它可以用来提供公共产品，装备和支付国家控制代理人，更多的可以通过制度建设、资产和财富调查等方式获得。（即使人们可能会反抗，正如 Fauvelle Aymar 1999 年所说）。它也是文献中的主导指标（例如，Herbst 2000；Slater 2010），适合测量。

We pit this against society's capacity. Our notion of societal capacity emphasizes society's ability to solve collective action problems and define and achieve collective goals. Like our definition of state capacity, this is productive, can be used in contestation, and it can be built. Tilly (1995) studied the emergence of this capacity in eighteenth-century Britain, showing how initially "contention" was about "local people and local issues, rather than nationally organized programs and parties" (5). However, "between 1758 and 1833 a new variety of claim making had taken shape— Mass popular politics had taken hold on a national scale" (13). Critically, this new politics was not just about new and collective issues (instead of parochial ones); it was also organized in very different ways, frequently in the form of "a special purpose association, society or club" (10). Our model captures what Tilly thought was the force driving this reorganization of society: "the contemporary reorganization— of the state, that re-shaped the state's repressive apparatus" (23), along with expansions of "revenue, expenditure and personnel" (49), which induced on the part of society "a shift towards collective action that was large in scale and national in scope" (49).

我们将其与社会的能力相抗衡。我们的社会能力概念，强调解决集体行动问题、确定和实现集体目标的社会能力。就像我们对国家能力的定义一样，这是富有成效的，可以建立用于竞争。Tilly（1995）研究了18世纪英国这种能力的出现，表明最初的“争论”是关于“当地人民和当地问题，而不是国家组织的计划和政党”（5）。然而，“在1758年至1833年间，一种新的索赔形式已经形成—大众政治在全国范围内占据了主导地位”（13）。至关重要地，这种新政治不仅仅是关于新的集体问题（而不是狭隘的问题）；它也以非常不同的方式组织，通常是以“特殊目的协会、社团或俱乐部”的形式（10）。我们的模型，捕捉到了 Tilly 认为推动社会重组的力量：“国家的当代重组—重塑了国家的镇压机器”（23），以及“收入、支出和人员”的扩张（49），这促使社会“转向大规模、全国性的集体行动”（49）。

Ostrom’s work identified aspects of social institutions that are critical for solving collective action problems and building capacity (1990). These include: autonomous organization, monitoring capability, availability of sanctions, and effective conflict resolution mechanisms. Society lacks capacity when there is “no capacity to communicate with one another, no way to develop trust, and no sense that they share a common future” (90). Ostrom also stressed that “Such groups may need some form of external assistance to break out of the perverse logic of their situation” (21), which often comes from interactions with the state, or as she puts it “are affected by the surrounding political regime” (141). States often influence the creation of institutions to solve collective action problems “by creating and limiting the powers that can be exercised with collective-choice arrangements (creating legislative and judicial bodies, protecting rights of free speech and property etc.)” (192). Her case studies confirmed that “the orientation of the ruling political regime can make a substantial difference” (212). Recent work on collective action in civil war echoes many of these themes. Steele shows that communities in Colombia have managed to organize collectively to resist armed groups when they developed “a combination of a strict internal hierarchy and external support” (2017, 173). Arjona’s study of local order during the Colombian civil war similarly illustrates how “the quality of dispute institutions plays a central role in fostering the community’s capacity for collective action” (2016, 71). Institutions further facilitate cohesion if they can target goods and services as emphasized by Cammett (2014) and Cammett and McLean (2014). Ostrom 的工作，确定了能力建设、和对解决集体行动问题至关重要的社会制度方面（1990年）。这些包括：自主组织、监控能力、可用性制裁和有效的冲突解决机制。当“没有相互沟通的能力，没有建立信任的方法，也没有共同未来的感觉”时，社会就会缺乏能力（90）。Ostrom 还强调，“这些团体，可能需要某种形式的外部援助，来打破其处境的反常逻辑”（21），这通常来自与国家的互动，或者正如她所说，“受到周围政治制度的影响”（141）。国家经常通过“建立和限制集体选择安排可以行使的权力（建立立法和司法机构，保护言论自由和财产权等）”来影响解决集体行动问题的机构的建立（192）。她的案例研究证实，“统治政权的方向，可以产生实质性的影响”（212）。最近，关于内战中集体行动的工作，与许多这些主题相呼应。Steele 表明，哥伦比亚的社区，在发展“严格的内部等级制度和外部支持的结合”时，已经设法组织起来抵抗武装团体（2017, 173）。Arjona 对哥伦比亚内战期间地方秩序的研究，同样说明了：“争端机构的质量，在培养社区集体行动能力方面，发挥着核心作用”（2016, 71）。正如 Cammett（2014）和 Cammett & McLean（2014）所强调的那样，如果机构能够针对商品和服务，它们将进一步促进凝聚力。

Societal capacity also depends on cultural and behavioral factors identified by Wood (2003). In her study of the Salvadorean Civil War, collective action depends on people’s “moral commitments and

emotional engagements”(18). People acted collectively “as an act of defiance of long-resented authorities and a repudiation of perceived injustices”(18). As in our theory, this type of capacity building is dynamic, as “political culture—the values, norms, practices, beliefs, and collective identity of insurgents—was not fixed but evolved in response to the experiences of the conflict itself”(41), and defiance “motivated further collective action through a recursive process”(238). Wood’s notion of society’s capacity is complemented by Viterna’s (2013) theory of how people can assume a “participation identity,” selecting from the available repertoire of identities (Swidler 1986) one that is highly congruent with collective action. As in Wood’s analysis, this can be precipitated by the influence of political institutions. “In El Salvador, the military’s attacks on rural civilians gave new meanings to existing identities”(54), which tipped people toward participation in the conflict.

社会能力，还取决于 Wood (2003) 确定的文化和行为因素。在她的研究在萨尔瓦多内战中，集体行动取决于人们的“道德承诺和情感约定”(18)。人们集体行动“是对长期憎恨的当局的蔑视和对所感知的不公正的否定”(18)。正如我们的理论所述，这种能力建设是动态的，因为“政治文化——叛乱分子的价值观、规范、实践、信仰和集体认同——不是固定的，而是随着冲突本身的经历而演变的”(41)，而反抗“通过递归过程激励了进一步的集体行动”(238)。Wood 关于社会能力的概念，得到了 Viterna (2013) 关于人们如何承担“参与身份”的理论的补充，该理论从现有的身份库中，选择了一个与集体行动高度一致的身份 (Swidler 1986)。正如 Wood 的分析所示，这可能是由于政治制度的影响。“在萨尔瓦多，军方对农村平民的袭击，为现有的身份赋予了新的含义”(54)，这使人们倾向于参与冲突。

A central assumption in our model is that the accumulation of both state and societal capacity is subject to (dynamic) increasing returns to scale. In particular we assume that the marginal cost of building capacity is higher below a certain threshold than afterwards. Intuitively, once one has sufficient capacity, it becomes easier to acquire more. For example, building a nascent fiscal system involves large fixed costs. Detailed studies of this, such as Brewer (1988), show that to build an effective excise tax system in Britain many elements had to be in the place so that personnel can be trained, paid, monitored, and stationed throughout Britain.

我们模型中的一个核心假设是，国家和社会能力的积累，是随着(动态)规模回报增加的。特别是，我们假设建筑能力的边际成本更高，但低于某个阈值。直觉上，一旦一个人有了足够的能力，就更容易获得更多。例如，建立一个新兴的财政体系需要大量的固定成本。对此的详细研究，如 Brewer (1988) 表明，要在英国建立一个有效的消费税体系，必须具备许多要素，以便人员可以在英国各地接受培训、支付工资、监督和驻扎。

Our assumption is that if one has these elements in place, then it becomes easier and cheaper to build further fiscal capacity (see also Dharmapala, Slemrod, and Wilson 2011). Our argument for society is similar: as Tilly’s (1995) study shows, more effective contention required organization and the creation of new institutions. Once these had been put in place, it subsequently became easier to accumulate greater capacity. Both Wood’s and Viterna’s theories imply increasing returns to the accumulation of what we are calling society’s capital. This is evident in Wood’s formal model (2003, 267 - 74) and from the peer effects connected to the formation of a collective participation identity in Viterna (2013). Increasing returns to collective action are also emphasized in Marwell and Oliver (1993) and Pearson (2000).

我们的假设是，如果有了这些要素，那么建立进一步的财政能力就会变得更容易、更便宜（另见 Dharmapala、Slemrod & Wilson 2011）。我们对社会的观点是相似的：正如 Tilly（1995）的研究所表明的那样，更有效的争论，需要组织和创建新的制度。一旦这些设置到位，随后就更容易积累更大的容量。Wood 和 Viterna 的理论，都意味着我们所说的社会资本积累的回报，越来越高。这在 Wood 的正式模型（2003, 267-74）和 Viterna（2013）中，与集体参与身份形成相关的同伴效应中，都很明显。Marwell & Oliver（1993）和 Pearson（2000）也强调了，集体行动回报率的提高。

Our paper is closely related to several important lines of research within comparative politics. Though our findings do not support the idea that divergence in state capacity necessitates large structural differences or is a consequence of the incidence of warfare, they are consistent with other key ideas. Many scholars have studied the idea that elites and society compete and that state capacity can emerge from what Wood calls this “recursive process.” This is evident from our discussion of Tilly（1995） and central to Skocpol’s（1979） theory of social revolutions and their consequences.

我们的论文，与比较政治学中的几个重要研究方向密切相关。虽然我们这些发现，并不支持国家能力差异，必然导致巨大的结构性差异，或是战争发生的结果的观点，它们与其他关键观点是一致的。许多学者，研究了精英和社会竞争以及国家能力，可以从 Wood 所说的“递归过程”中产生的观点。从我们对 Tilly（1995）的讨论中，可以明显看出，这也是 Skocpol（1979）社会革命及其后果理论的核心。

She defines social revolutions as “rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state and class structures, accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below”（33） and emphasizes not just “the changes that social revolutions make in the structure and function of states”（164） but also the mutual feedback such that “the changes in state structures that occur during social revolutions typically both consolidate, and themselves entail, socioeconomic changes”（164）.<sup>3</sup>

她将社会革命定义为“一个社会的国家和阶级结构的快速、基本的转变，伴随着并部分地通过自下而上的阶级起义”（33），并强调不仅是“社会革命对国家结构和功能的改变”（164），还强调了相互反馈，即“社会革命期间发生的国家结构的变化，通常既巩固了社会经济变化，也带来了社会经济变革”（164）。

Our model formalizes and extends these ideas and mutual feedback loops and shows that mechanisms typically studied in different contexts have common roots and major implications for the distribution of state capacity. For example, our weak state configuration captures Migdal’s（1988） and Scott’s（2010） ideas that weak states emerge from society’s strength. Yet, in contrast to their emphasis, our theory also reveals that, in the inclusive state configuration, society is even “stronger”（using Migdal’s terminology） when the state is stronger. Our theory’s implications also contrast with Huntington’s（1968） and Fukuyama’s（2011） claims that state capacity emerges under the auspices of powerful leaders and groups and that there is a specific sequence toward a democratic strong state—state strength first, democracy later.

我们的模型，形式化并扩展了这些想法和相互反馈回路，并表明，在不同背景下，通常研究的机制对国家能力的分布，有共同的根源和主要影响。例如，我们的弱状态配置，捕捉到了 Migdal（1988）和

<sup>3</sup> Anderson（1974），Hechter and Brustein（1980），Slater（2010），and Saylor（2014） have also emphasized the idea that the state accumulates capacity in a contest with society. † Anderson（1974）、Hechter & Brustein（1980）、Slater（2010）和 Saylor（2014）也强调了国家积累与社会竞争的能力。

Scott (2010) 的观点, 即弱状态, 源于社会的力量。然而, 与他们的强调相反, 我们的理论还表明, 在包容性状态配置中, 当国家更强大时, 社会甚至“更强”(使用 Migdal 的术语)。我们的理论的含义, 也与 Huntington (1968年) 和 Fukuyama (2011年) 的主张, 形成鲜明对比, 他们认为: 国家能力, 是在强大的领导人和团体的主持下出现的, 并且朝着民主强国的方向有一个特定的顺序—先是国家实力, 后是民主。

This is not a prediction of our model; when the state and elites become too strong, the development of state capacity and democracy (see below) is arrested. Our theory also nests Grzymala-Busse's (2007) theory that state capacity emerged in the post-Soviet world when there was competition between political parties (as in Hungary and Poland) but did not when one party dominated (as in the Czech Republic or Slovakia).<sup>4</sup>

这不是对我们模型的预测; 当国家和精英变得过于强大时, 国家能力和民主的发展(见下文), 就会受到阻碍。我们的理论还支持 Grzymala-Busse (2007) 的理论, 即国家能力出现在后苏联世界, 当时政党之间存在竞争(如匈牙利和波兰), 但当一个政党占主导地位时,(如捷克共和国或斯洛伐克)则没有。

Much scholarship in comparative politics has attempted to explain not just patterns of state building but also their consequences for regimes. Herbst (2000), building on ideas initially developed by Levi (1989), argues that state weakness in Africa leads to nondemocracy because states that do not raise taxes are not forced to negotiate with their citizens. Ertman (1997) develops a dichotomy of state capacity (bureaucratic or patrimonial), combining it with regime types (constitutional or autocratic rule). Though we do not formally model the process of democratization, our theory implies that democracy cannot easily arise under despotic or weak states. In the former, powerful elites can block the participation of society (as in many standard theories of democracy (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992). In the latter, the weakness of the central state does not allow for the emergence of effective democratic institutions. It is therefore in the middle, where there is state capacity, but it is forced to be responsive to a capacitated society that one would expect democracy to emerge. In the historical perspective section, we also develop an Early Modern European case study in the spirit of Mill's (1872) “most similar” research design (Skocpol 1979, discusses the strengths and weaknesses of this approach). Our case selection focuses on the large differences within Europe in terms of our main dependent variable. Why did Switzerland develop an inclusive state that had capacity but was very accountable to its people, whereas Prussia created a despotic state with less capacity? Why did Montenegro never really create a state, except a powerless theocracy, until the twentieth century?

比较政治学的许多学术研究, 不仅试图解释国家建设的模式, 还试图解释它们对政权的影响。Herbst (2000) 以 Levi (1989) 最初提出的观点为基础, 认为非洲的国家软弱会导致非民主, 因为不增税的国家不会被迫与公民谈判。Ertman (1997) 发展了国家能力(官僚或世袭)的二分法, 将其与政权类型(宪法或专制统治)相结合。虽然我们没有正式模拟民主化的过程, 但我们的理论意味着, 民主不能在专制或弱国下轻易产生。在前者中, 强大的精英, 可以阻止社会的参与(如许多标准的民主理论(如Acemoglu & Robinson 2006; Rueschemeyer, Stephens & Stephens 1992)。在后者中, 中央政府的软弱, 不允许有

<sup>4</sup> See Berwick and Christia (2011), Blaydes (2017), and Grzymala-Busse (2020) for three recent surveys of important aspects of this literature and the essays in Centeno et al. (2017). † 请参阅 Berwick & Christia (2011)、Blaydes (2017) 和 Grzymala-Busse (2020), 了解最近对该文献重要方面的三项调查, 以及 Centeno 等人 (2017) 的文章。

效的民主制度的出现。因此，它处于中间，有国家能力，但它被迫对一个有能力的社会做出反应，人们会期待民主的出现。在历史视角部分，我们还本着 Mill (1872年) “最相似” 的研究设计的精神，开发了一个早期现代欧洲案例研究 (Skocpol 1979, 讨论了这种方法的优势和劣势)。我们的案例选择，侧重于欧洲内部在主要因变量的巨大差异。为什么瑞士发展了一个有能力但对人民非常负责的包容性国家，而普鲁士却建立了一个能力较弱的专制国家？为什么黑山直到二十世纪才真正建立了一个国家，除了一个无能为力的神权政治？

We develop this case study as two linked pairs, Prussia - Switzerland and Switzerland - Montenegro. This design is “most similar” in the sense that we emphasize both common institutional histories (Prussia - Switzerland) and social structures and ecologies (Switzerland - Montenegro). Prussia and Switzerland in 1600 (before Brandenburg had merged with Prussia) were both part of the Holy Roman Empire and had inherited several political and economic institutions in common from the Germanic tribes, the Carolingians, and feudalism. Switzerland and Montenegro had deep institutional roots in common (Roman Empire), but our focus is on social structures (clans) and also mountainous ecology. The role of clans is well established in Montenegro, of course, but it is also a common theme in Swiss studies. For example, Steinberg (2016, 17) notes, “[Swiss] medieval clan structures had little to do with our images of democratic forms but these peasants were ‘free,’ ” and he notes the extent of communal activities and organization. It is also interesting the extent to which the early development of the Old Swiss Confederacy was focused on conflict resolution and the management of feuds, which were an incessant problem in Montenegro as well. The main difference between the cases is the initial strength of the state: no state in Montenegro, a nascent, noncentralized state in Swiss cantons, and a stronger and more centralized state in Brandenburg (Prussia). In our theory it is these relatively small differences in the initial strength of the state that led to the very different dynamics and outcomes.

我们将此案例研究，分为相连的两对，普鲁士-瑞士和瑞士-黑山。这种设计是“最相似的”，因为我们强调共同的制度历史（普鲁士-瑞士）和社会结构和生态（瑞士-黑山）。1600年的普鲁士和瑞士（Brandenburg 与 Prussia(普鲁士)合并之前）都是 Holy Roman Empire(神圣罗马帝国)的一部分，从日耳曼部落、加洛林王朝和封建主义那里，继承了几个共同的政治和经济制度。瑞士和黑山有着深厚的共同制度根源（罗马帝国），但我们的重点是社会结构（氏族）和山地生态。当然，氏族的作用在黑山已经确立，但这也是瑞士研究的一个共同主题。例如，Steinberg (2016, 17) 指出，“[瑞士]中世纪的氏族结构，与我们对民主形式的印象关系不大，但这些农民是‘自由的’，”他还指出了社区活动和组织的程度。同样有趣的是，旧瑞士联盟的早期发展，在多大程度上侧重于解决冲突和管理世仇，这在黑山也是一个持续存在的问题。这两种情况之间的主要区别，在于国家的初始实力：黑山没有国家，瑞士各州是一个上升的非中央集权国家，Brandenburg (Prussia)[勃兰登堡（普鲁士）]是一个更强大、更中央集权的国家。在我们的理论中，正是这些相对较小的国家初始实力差异，导致了截然不同的动态和结果。

Finally, our theory is built on the theory of dynamic contests (e.g., Hirshleifer 1989). Our results on stronger incentives to build capacity when elites and citizens are evenly matched are related to the discouragement effect in contests emphasized in Harris and Vickers (1985).

最后，我们的理论建立在动态竞争理论的基础上（例如，Hirshleifer 1989）。当精英和公民势均力敌时，我们的结果，是基于以建设能力为目的与沮丧有关的更强的激励措施，曾被 Harris & Vickers (1985) 强调。

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce our main model. Next, we characterize the dynamic equilibrium and steady states of this model. To maximize transparency, this section uses a number of simplifying assumptions, many of which are relaxed in the Appendix. We then outline how the same model with forward-looking players leads to similar results. The historical perspective section discusses our case study of early modern European state divergence. The last section concludes, and the online Appendix presents the proofs of the results stated in the text, details of several generalizations mentioned in the text, some additional technical material, and also a generalization of our model in which the **inclusive** state becomes feasible only after the capacities of both the state and society are above certain thresholds.

本文的其余部分组织如下。在下一节中，我们将介绍我们的主要模型。接下来，我们描述该模型的动态平衡和稳态。为了最大限度地提高透明度，这一节使用了一些简化假设，其中许多在附录中都有所放宽。然后，我们概述了前瞻性参与者的相同模型，如何导致类似的结果。历史视角这一节，讨论了我们对近代早期欧洲国家分歧的案例研究。最后一节总结，在线附录给出了文中所述结果的证明、文中提到的几个概括的细节、一些额外的技术材料，以及我们模型的概括，其中包容性的状态，只有在国家和社会的能力都高于一定阈值后才可行。

## §2 BASIC MODEL † 基础模型

### §2.1 Preferences and Conflict † 偏好和冲突

We start with a discrete time setup, where period length is  $\Delta > 0$  and will later be taken to be small so that we work with differential rather than difference equations in characterizing the dynamics. At time  $t$ , the stock variables inherited from the previous period are  $(x_{t-\Delta}, s_{t-\Delta}) \in [0, 1]^2$ , where the first element corresponds to the capacity of society and the second to state capacity controlled by the elite.<sup>5</sup>

我们从离散时间设置开始，其中周期长度  $\Delta > 0$ ，稍后将被视为较小，因为我们在描述动力学特性时，使用微分方程而不是差分方程。在时间  $t$ ，股票从上一时期继承的变量是  $(x_{t-\Delta}, s_{t-\Delta}) \in [0, 1]^2$ ，其中第一个元素对应社会的能力，而第二个元素则对应精英控制的国家的能力。

At each point, the elite is represented by a single player and society is also represented by a single player. In the next two sections, we study both the case in which these players are short-lived and are immediately replaced by another player (so that we have a nonoverlapping generations model with myopic players) and the case in which players are long-lived and maximize their discounted sum of utilities.

在每一点上，精英都由一个参与者代表，社会也由一个玩家代表。在接下来的两节中，我们将研究这两种情况，即这些参与者是短暂的，并且立即被另一个玩家取代（这样我们就有了一个近视玩家的非重叠世代模型），在案例中，玩家是寿命长，并最大化折扣效用总和的。

At time, players simultaneously choose their investments,  $i_t^x \geq 0$  and  $i_t^s \geq 0$ , which determine their current capacity according to the equations:

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<sup>5</sup> Normally in dynamical systems these variables would be referred to as the state variables. We use the terminology stock instead to avoid confusion. † 通常在动力系统中，这些变量会被引用作为状态变量。我们使用术语 股票 来避免混乱。

当时，玩家同时选择他们的投资， $i_t^x \geq 0$  和  $i_t^s \geq 0$ ，根据以下方程式决定产能的当前值：

$$x_t = x_{t-\Delta} + i_t^x \Delta - \delta \Delta, \quad (1)$$

and † 和

$$s_t = s_{t-\Delta} + i_t^s \Delta - \delta \Delta, \quad (2)$$

where  $\delta > 0$  is the depreciation of the capacities of both parties between periods. Both investment and depreciation are multiplied by the period length,  $\Delta$ , as they represent “flow” variables, and when period length is taken to be small, they will be suitably downscaled.<sup>6</sup>

其中  $\delta > 0$  是双方在不同时期之间的产能折旧。投资和折旧乘以周期长度  $\Delta$ ，因为它们代表变量“流量”，当周期长度较小时，将适当缩减。

The cost of investment for society during a period of length  $\Delta$  is given as  $\Delta \tilde{C}_x(i_t^x, x_{t-\Delta})$ , where 在一段时间  $\Delta$  内，社会的投资成本为  $\Delta \tilde{C}_x(i_t^x, x_{t-\Delta})$ ，其中

$$\tilde{C}_x(i_t^x, x_{t-\Delta}) = \begin{cases} c_x(i_t^x), & \text{if } x_{t-\Delta} > \gamma_x, \\ c_x(i_t^x) + (\gamma_x - x_{t-\Delta})i_t^x, & \text{if } x_{t-\Delta} \leq \gamma_x. \end{cases}$$

This cost function is multiplied by  $\Delta$ , as it is the cost of investing an amount  $i_t^x$  during the period of length  $\Delta$ , as captured by Equation (1). The presence of the term  $\gamma_x > 0$ , on the other hand, captures the “increasing returns” nature of capacity accumulation mentioned in the Introduction: starting from a low level of capacity, it is more costly to build up this capacity. We specify this in a very simple form here, with the cost of investments increasing linearly as last period’s capacity falls below the threshold  $\gamma_x$ . This increasing returns aspect plays an important role in our analysis as we emphasize below.

此成本函数乘以  $\Delta$ ，因为它是投资金额  $i_t^x$  的成本，如方程 (1) 所示。另一方面， $\gamma_x > 0$  这一术语的存在，体现了引言中提到的产能积累的“收益递增”特性：从较低的产能水平开始，建立这种产能的成本更高。这里我们用一个非常简单的形式，指定了这一点，随着上一时期产能降至阈值  $\gamma_x$  以下，投资成本呈线性增长。正如我们在下文中强调的那样，这种收益递增方面，在我们的分析中起着重要作用。

The cost of investment for the elite during a period of length  $\Delta$  is similarly given as  $\Delta \tilde{C}_s(i_t^s, s_{t-\Delta})$ , where

精英阶层在一段时间  $\Delta$  内的投资成本，同样为  $\Delta \tilde{C}_s(i_t^s, s_{t-\Delta})$ ，其中

$$\tilde{C}_s(i_t^s, s_{t-\Delta}) = \begin{cases} c_s(i_t^s), & \text{if } s_{t-\Delta} > \gamma_s, \\ c_s(i_t^s) + (\gamma_s - s_{t-\Delta})i_t^s, & \text{if } s_{t-\Delta} \leq \gamma_s. \end{cases}$$

In these expressions, it will often be more convenient to eliminate investment levels and directly work with the two stock variables,  $x_t$  and  $s_t$ , especially when we take  $\delta$  to be small and transition to continuous time. In preparation for this transition, let us substitute out the investment levels and observe that the

<sup>6</sup> Assuming that depreciation is independent of the current level of the capacity of the state or society is for convenience only. In addition, we can easily allow the two stock variables to have different depreciation rates but do not do so in order to prevent the notation from becoming more cumbersome. † 假设折旧与国家或社会目前的产能水平无关，只是为了方便。此外，我们可以很容易地允许，这两个股票变量具有不同的折旧率，但不这样做，以防止符号变得更加繁琐。

cost function for society and state can be written as

在这些表达中，消除投资水平，并直接采用两个股票变量， $x_t$  和  $s_t$ ，特别是当我们把  $\delta$  取小并过渡到连续时间时。为了准备这一过渡，让我们替换投资水平，并观察可以写出的社会和国家成本函数，

$$C_x(x_t, x_{t-\Delta}) = c_x \left( \frac{x_t - x_{t-\Delta}}{\Delta} + \delta \right) + \max\{\gamma_x - x_{t-\Delta}, 0\} \left( \frac{x_t - x_{t-\Delta}}{\Delta} + \delta \right)$$

and † 和

$$C_s(s_t, s_{t-\Delta}) = c_s \left( \frac{s_t - s_{t-\Delta}}{\Delta} + \delta \right) + \max\{\gamma_s - s_{t-\Delta}, 0\} \left( \frac{s_t - s_{t-\Delta}}{\Delta} + \delta \right)$$

where the increasing returns to scale nature of the cost function is now captured by the max term.<sup>7</sup> 其中成本函数的递增规模回报性质，现在是由 max 项捕获的。

During the lifetime of each generation, a polity with state capacity  $s_t$  and societal capacity  $x_t$  produces income/output given by

在每一代人的一生中，一个具有国家能力  $s_t$  和社会能力  $x_t$  的政体，都会由下式给出 收入/产出

$$f(x_t, s_t) \tag{3}$$

where  $f$ , the production function, is assumed to be nondecreasing and differentiable.<sup>8</sup> We adopt a reduced-form approach in modeling the contribution of state and society capacities and assume that they contribute to aggregate income as well as affecting the conflict between them. In reality, the ability of society to coordinate and the infrastructural power of the state increase the productivity of producers, which then affects the income to be divided between different parties.<sup>9</sup> The dependence of the total output of the economy on state capacity captures the various efficiency-enhancing roles of the state. In addition, we allow for output to depend on the capacity of civil society as well because its greater cooperation and coordination also improve economic efficiency (Ostrom 1990).

其中， $f$  是生产函数，假设是不递减的、且可微分的。我们采用简化形式的方法，来模拟国家和社会能力的贡献，并假设它们对总收入有贡献，也会影响它们之间的冲突。事实上，社会的协调能力和国家的基础设施力量，提高了生产者的生产力，从而影响了不同政党之间的收入分配。经济总产出对国家能力的依赖，反映了各种效率-强化国家作用。此外，我们允许产能，也取决于公民社会的能力，因为更大的合作与协调，也提高了经济效率 (Ostrom 1990)。

We next discuss how the aggregate income is distributed between the elite (controlling the state) and society. At date  $t$ , if the elite and society fight and one side wins and captures all of the income of

<sup>7</sup> Note that when we consider the limit  $\Delta \rightarrow 0$ , we obtain † 注意，当我们考虑极限  $\Delta \rightarrow 0$  时，得到

$$\begin{aligned} C_x(\dot{x}_t) &= c_x(\dot{x}_t + \delta) + \max\{\gamma_x - x_t, 0\}(\dot{x}_t + \delta), \\ C_s(\dot{s}_t) &= c_s(\dot{s}_t + \delta) + \max\{\gamma_s - s_t, 0\}(\dot{s}_t + \delta). \end{aligned}$$

<sup>8</sup> The fact that Equation 3 refers to output during the lifetime of each generation means that each generation will produce this quantity regardless of  $\Delta > 0$ .

<sup>9</sup> See the Appendix for a microfoundation. As we show more explicitly in footnote 13, this feature is important to ensure that the incentives for investment do not vanish when we consider short-lived players, as in the next section and  $\delta \rightarrow 0$ . (When we return to long lived, forward-looking players, incentives for investment will not vanish and similar results apply as  $\delta \rightarrow 0$  even if Equation 3 is multiplied with the period of length  $\Delta$ ). † 微观基础，见附录。正如我们在脚注 13 中更明确地显示的那样，当我们考虑短期-参与者时，这一特征，对于确保投资激励不会消失非常重要，如下一节和  $\delta \rightarrow 0$  所述。(当我们回到长期参与者、前瞻性的参与者身上时，投资激励不会消失，类似的结果也适用于  $\delta \rightarrow 0$ ，即使方程式 (3) 乘以长度  $\Delta$ )。

the economy, the other side receives zero. Winning probabilities are functions of relative capacities. In particular, the elite will win if

接下来，我们将讨论，总收入如何在精英（控制国家）和社会之间分配。在日期  $t$ ，如果精英和社会斗争，一方获胜，并获得经济的所有收入，另一方将获得零。获胜概率，是相对能力的函数。特别是，精英们获胜，如果

$$s_t \geq x_t + \delta_t \quad (4)$$

where  $\delta_t$  is drawn from the distribution  $H$  independently of all past events. We denote the density of the distribution function  $H$  by  $h$ . The existence of the random term  $\delta_t$  captures the fact that various stochastic factors affect the outcome of any conflict.<sup>10</sup>

其中  $\delta_t$  从分布  $H$  中提取， $H$  独立于所有过去的事件。我们用  $h$  表示分布函数  $H$  的密度。随机项  $\delta_t$  的存在，反映了各种随机因素，影响任何冲突结果的事实。

This specification of a stochastic contest function, and a symmetry assumption that we will impose shortly, implies that when the capacities of society and state are given, respectively, by  $x$  and  $s$ , the probability that the elite will win the conflict is  $H(s - x)$  and the probability that the society will do so is  $1 - H(s - x) = H(x - s)$ , a property we will use frequently below.<sup>11</sup>

随机竞争函数的这种规范，以及我们稍后将强加的对称假设，意味着，当社会和国家的能力分别由  $x$  和  $s$  给出时，精英赢得冲突的概率为  $H(s - x)$ ，社会获胜的概率为  $1 - H(s - x) = H(x - s)$ ，这是我们在下面经常使用的属性。

## §2.2 Simplifying Assumptions † 简化假设

We next introduce three assumptions. The first one is a simplifying assumption, which we impose initially and then relax subsequently:

接下来，我们介绍三个假设。第一个是一个简化的假设，我们最初强加，然后放宽：

**Assumption 1 † 假设 1**  $f(x, s) = 1$  for all for all  $x \in [0, 1]$  and  $s \in [0, 1]$ . † 对于所有  $x \in [0, 1]$  和  $s \in [0, 1]$ ， $f(x, s) = 1$ 。

This assumption makes it transparent that the multiple equilibria and their dynamics—our main focus—are driven by the dynamic contest between the elite and society, not because of changes in the value of the prize in this contest. It will be relaxed in the Appendix.

这一假设表明了多重均衡及其动态—我们的主要关注点—是在精英与社会之间的动态竞争的驱动，不是因为这场比赛中奖品价值的变化。它将在附录中放宽。

The next two assumptions are imposed throughout. † 接下来的两个假设贯穿始终。

**Assumption 2 † 假设 2**

- (1)  $c_x$  and  $c_s$  are continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and weakly convex over  $\mathbb{R}_+$ , and satisfy  $\lim_{x \rightarrow \infty} c'_x(x) = \infty$ , and  $\lim_{s \rightarrow \infty} c'_s(s) = \infty$ . †  $c_x$  和  $c_s$  在  $\mathbb{R}_+$  上是连续可微的，严格递增的，弱

<sup>10</sup> Scholars in international relations have provided a great deal of evidence on the applicability of these contest functions, for example Reiter (1996) and Buhaug (2010). † 国际关系学者，提供了大量关于这些竞争函数适用性的证据，例如 Reiter (1996) 和 Buhaug (2010)。

<sup>11</sup> In the Appendix, we also show that the most important qualitative features implied by this formulation of conflict between the elite and society are shared by other formulations of the contest between these parties. † 在附录中，我们还表明，精英与社会之间冲突的这种表述，所隐含的最重要的定性特征，与这些政党之间竞争的其他表述，是相同的。

凸的，并且满足  $\lim_{x \rightarrow \infty} c'_x(x) = \infty$ ，以及  $\lim_{s \rightarrow \infty} c'_s(s) = \infty$ 。

(2)  $c'_s(\delta) \neq c'_x(\delta)$ .

(3)

$$\frac{|c''_s(\delta) - c''_x(\delta)|}{\min\{c''_x(\delta), c''_s(\delta)\}} < \frac{1}{\sup_z |h'(z)|}.$$

(4)

$$c'_s(0) + \gamma_s > c'_x, \quad \text{and} \quad c'_x(0) + \gamma_x > c'_s(\delta).$$

Part 1 of Assumption 2 is standard. Part 2 is imposed for simplicity and rules out the nongeneric case where the marginal cost of investment at  $\delta$  is exactly equal for the two parties. Part 3 is also imposed for technical convenience and is quite weak. For example, if the gap between  $c''_x(\delta)$  and  $c''_s(\delta)$  is small, this condition is automatically satisfied.

假设 2 的第 1 部分是标准的。第 2 部分是为了简单起见而强加的，并排除了非一般情况，即双方的边际投资成本  $\delta$  完全相等。第 3 部分也是为了技术便利而强加的，而且相当薄弱。例如，如果  $c''_x(\delta)$  和  $c''_s(\delta)$  之间的差距小，则该条件自动满足。

We will flag its role when we come to our analysis, but anticipating that discussion, it makes it much easier for us to establish the instability of some substantively uninteresting equilibria. Part 4 ensures that the marginal cost of each player in the increasing returns region (when  $x < \gamma_x$  or  $s < \gamma_s$ ) when making zero investment is greater than the marginal cost of the other player outside this region when evaluated at  $\delta$ —the marginal cost on the right-hand side is evaluated at  $\delta$  because, as our above transformation showed, the level of investment necessary for maintaining any positive equilibrium level of capacity is  $\delta$ . We will flag the role of this assumption when we come to our formal analysis.

当我们进行分析时，我们将标记它的作用，但预计会有这样的讨论，这使我们更容易确定，一些实质上无趣的均衡的不稳定性。第 4 部分确保了在零投资时，每个参与者在收益递增区域（当  $x < \gamma_x$  或  $s < \gamma_s$  时）的边际成本，大于该区域外其他参与者的边际成本  $\delta$ —右侧的边际成本被评估为  $\delta$ ，因为正如我们上面的转换所示，维持任何正均衡容量水平所需的投资水平为  $\delta$ 。当我们进行正式分析时，我们将标记这一假设的作用。

**Assumption 3 † 假设 3**

(1)  $h$  exists everywhere and is differentiable, single-peaked, and symmetric around zero. †  $h$  存在于任何地方，并且是可微的、单峰的、围绕零对称的。

(2) For each  $z \in \{x, s\}$ ,

$$c'_z(0) > h(1)$$

(3) For each  $z \in \{x, s\}$ ,

$$\min\{h(0) - \gamma_z, h(\gamma_z)\} > c'_z(\delta)$$

Part 1 contains the second main assumption for our analysis—single peakedness and symmetry of  $h$  around 0 (differentiability is standard). This assumption not only simplifies our analysis as it ensures that  $h(x - s) = h(s - x)$  and  $h'(x - s) = -h'(s - x)$  but also implies that incentives for investment are

strongest when  $x$  and  $s$  are close to each other. We highlight the role of this feature below as well.<sup>12</sup>

第 1 部分包含我们分析的第二个主要假设— $h$  在 0 附近的单峰性和对称性（可微性是标准）。这一假设不仅简化了我们的分析，而且确保了那个  $h(x-s) = h(s-x)$  和  $h'(x-s) = -h'(s-x)$ ，但也意味着，当  $x$  和  $s$  彼此靠近时，投资动机最强。我们在下面，也强调了这一功能的作用。

Part 2 imposes that when a player has the maximum gap between itself and the other player, it has no further incentives to invest.

第 2 部分规定，当一个参与者与另一个参与者之间的差距最大时，它就没有进一步的投资动机。

Part 3, on the other hand, ensures that at or near the point where capacities are equal, there are sufficient incentives to increase capacity. Both of these assumptions restrict attention to the part of the parameter space of greater interest to us.

另一方面，第 3 部分确保在能力相等或接近能力相等时，有足够的激励措施，来增加能力。这两个假设，都将注意力限制在我们更感兴趣的参数空间部分。

### §3 EQUILIBRIUM WITH SHORT-LIVED PLAYERS † 与短暂玩家的平衡

We now present our main results about the dynamics of the capacity of state and society, focusing on the nonoverlapping generations setup, where at each point, each side of the conflict is represented by a single short-lived agent who will be replaced by a new agent from the same side next period.

我们现在展示，关于国家和社会能力动态的主要结果，重点关注不重叠的几代人设置，在每个点上，冲突的每一方都由一个单一的短命代理人作代表，在下一时段将由同一方的新代理人更换。

#### §3.1 Preliminaries † 准备工作

Suppose that the above-described polity is populated by nonoverlapping generations of agents—on the one side representing the elite and on the other, society.

假设上述政体，由不重叠的几代代理人组成—一方面代表精英，另一方面代表社会。

With these assumptions, at each time  $t$ , society maximizes

$$H(x_t - s_t) - \Delta \cdot C_x(x_t, x_{t-\Delta})$$

by choosing  $x_t$ , taking  $x_{t-\Delta}$  as given. Simultaneously, the elites maximize

<sup>12</sup> The result that incentives for investment are strongest when the two sides are evenly matched is more general than the specification used here. For example, suppose that we have a contest function where the probability that the elite wins is  $\frac{k(s)}{k(s)+k(x)+\eta}$  and the probability that society wins is  $\frac{k(x)}{k(s)+k(x)+\eta}$ , where  $k(\cdot)$  is an increasing, differentiable function, and  $\eta \geq 0$  is a constant. In this case, the marginal return to increasing investment for the elite is  $\frac{k'(s)(k(x_t)+\eta)}{(k(s)+k(x)+\eta)^2}$ , and the expression for society is also similar. It can be verified that, when  $\eta = 0$ , the cross-partial derivative of this expression is positive when  $s_t > x_t$  and negative when  $s_t < x_t$ . When  $\eta > 0$ , the same result holds provided that  $s_t$  is sufficiently larger than  $x_t$ . † 当两侧均匀匹配比规格更通用在这里使用。例如，假设我们有一个竞赛函数其中精英获胜的概率为  $\frac{k(s)}{k(s)+k(x)+\eta}$  社会获胜的概率是  $\frac{k(x)}{k(s)+k(x)+\eta}$ ，其中  $k(\cdot)$  是递增的， $\eta \geq 0$  是一个常数。在这种情况下精英阶层增加投资的边际回报是  $\frac{k'(s)(k(x_t)+\eta)}{(k(s)+k(x)+\eta)^2}$ ，对社会的表达也是相似的。可以证实，当  $\eta = 0$  时，此表达式的交叉偏导数为正当  $s_t > x_t$  时为负，当  $s_t < x_t$  时为负值。当  $\eta > 0$  时，结果相同只要  $s_t$  足够大于  $x_t$ ，则保持不变。

$$H(s_t - x_t) - \Delta \cdot C_s(s_t, s_{t-\Delta})$$

by choosing  $s_t$ , taking  $s_{t-\Delta}$  as given. A dynamic (Nash) equilibrium with short-lived players is given by a sequence  $\{x_{k\Delta}^*, s_{k\Delta}^*\}_{k=0}^\infty$  such that  $x_{k\Delta}^*$  is a best response to  $s_{k\Delta}^*$ , and likewise  $s_{k\Delta}^*$  is a best response to  $x_{k\Delta}^*$  given  $s_{(k-1)\Delta}$ .

根据这些假设，在每个时间  $t$ ，社会最大化

$$H(x_t - s_t) - \Delta \cdot C_x(x_t, x_{t-\Delta})$$

通过选择  $x_t$ ，取  $x_{t-\Delta}$  为给定值。同时，精英最大化

$$H(s_t - x_t) - \Delta \cdot C_s(s_t, s_{t-\Delta})$$

通过选择  $s_t$ ，取  $s_{t-\Delta}$  为给定值。具有短命玩家的动态 (Nash) 均衡由序列  $\{x_{k\Delta}^*, s_{k\Delta}^*\}_{k=0}^\infty$  给出，使得  $x_{k\Delta}^*$  是对  $s_{k\Delta}^*$  的最佳响应，同样地， $s_{k\Delta}^*$  是对给定  $s_{(k-1)\Delta}$  的  $x_{k\Delta}^*$  的最好响应。

The investment decisions of both elites and society are then determined by their respective first-order conditions (with complementary slackness). In particular, at time  $t$ , we have<sup>13</sup>  
精英和社会的投资决策，都是由他们各自的一阶条件决定的（有互补的宽松）。特别是，在时间  $t$ ，我们有

$$\begin{aligned} h(x_t - s_t) &\leq c'_s \left( \frac{x_t - x_{t-\Delta}}{\Delta} + \delta \right) + \max\{0; \gamma_x - x_{t-\Delta}\}, \text{ if } \frac{x_t - x_{t-\Delta}}{\Delta} = -\delta, \text{ or } x_t = 0, \\ h(x_t - s_t) &\geq c'_s \left( \frac{x_t - x_{t-\Delta}}{\Delta} + \delta \right) + \max\{0; \gamma_x - x_{t-\Delta}\}, \text{ if } x_t = 1, \\ h(x_t - s_t) &= c'_s \left( \frac{x_t - x_{t-\Delta}}{\Delta} + \delta \right) + \max\{0; \gamma_x - x_{t-\Delta}\}, \text{ otherwise,} \end{aligned}$$

and † 和

$$\begin{aligned} h(s_t - x_t) &\leq c'_s \left( \frac{s_t - s_{t-\Delta}}{\Delta} + \delta \right) + \max\{0; \gamma_s - s_{t-\Delta}\}, \text{ if } \frac{s_t - s_{t-\Delta}}{\Delta} = -\delta, \text{ or } s_t = 0, \\ h(s_t - x_t) &\geq c'_s \left( \frac{s_t - s_{t-\Delta}}{\Delta} + \delta \right) + \max\{0; \gamma_s - s_{t-\Delta}\}, \text{ if } s_t = 1, \\ h(s_t - x_t) &= c'_s \left( \frac{s_t - s_{t-\Delta}}{\Delta} + \delta \right) + \max\{0; \gamma_s - s_{t-\Delta}\}, \text{ otherwise.} \end{aligned}$$

<sup>13</sup> Following up on footnote 8, we can more clearly see the role that  $\Delta$  in front of the cost function plays here: without this term (or equivalently if the return was also multiplied by  $\Delta$ ), the marginal cost of investment would be multiplied by  $1/\Delta$ , and thus as  $\Delta \rightarrow 0$ , investments would converge to zero. This is because short-lived players that are not forward looking do not take the effects of their instantaneous investments on future stocks (and have infinitesimal influence on the current stock). † 根据脚注 8，我们可以更清楚地看到成本函数前面的  $\Delta$  在这里所起的作用：如果没有这个项（或者等效地，如果回报也乘以  $\Delta$ ），投资的边际成本将乘以  $1/\Delta$ ，因此当  $\Delta \rightarrow 0$  时，投资将收敛到零。这是因为没有前瞻性的短期参与者，将不会瞬时投资对未来股票的影响（对当前股票的影响微乎其微）

The first line of either expression applies when the relevant player has chosen zero investment so that its stock variable shrinks as fast as it can (at the rate  $\delta$ ) or is already at its lower bound  $x_t = 0$  or  $s_t = 0$ . In this case, we have the additional cost of investment on the right-hand side, and also the optimality condition is given by a weak inequality, as at this lower boundary, the marginal benefit could be strictly less than the marginal cost of investment. The second line, on the other hand, applies when the stock variable takes its maximum value, 1, and in this case the marginal benefit could be strictly greater than the marginal cost of investment. Away from these boundaries, the third line applies and requires that the marginal benefit equal the marginal cost. Note also that the marginal benefit for society is the same as the marginal benefit for the elite—as  $h(s_t - x_t) = h(x_t - s_t)$ . On the other hand, we also have from Assumption 3 that changes in the marginal benefits of the two players are the converses of each other—that is,  $h'(s_t - x_t) = -h'(x_t - s_t)$ .

当相关参与者选择零投资, 使其股票变量尽可能快地收缩(以  $\delta$  的速度), 或者已经处于其下限  $x_t = 0$  或  $s_t = 0$  时, 任一表达式的第一行都适用。在这种情况下, 我们在右边有额外的投资成本, 最优性条件也由弱不等式给出, 因为在这个下限, 边际收益可能严格小于边际投资成本。另一方面, 当股票变量达到最大值 1 时, 第二行适用, 在这种情况下, 边际收益可能严格大于投资的边际成本。在这些界限之外, 第三条线适用, 并要求边际收益等于边际成本。另请注意, 社会的边际效益与精英的边际效益相同, 即  $h(s_t - x_t) = h(x_t - s_t)$ 。另一方面, 我们还从假设 3 中得到, 两个参与者的边际收益的变化, 是彼此的转换, 即  $h'(s_t - x_t) = -h'(x_t - s_t)$ 。

Now letting  $\Delta \rightarrow 0$ , we obtain the following continuous- time first-order optimality (and thus equilibrium) conditions

现在让  $\Delta \rightarrow 0$ , 我们得到以下连续时间一阶最优性(而因此均衡)的条件

$$\begin{aligned} h(x_t - s_t) &\leq c'_s(\dot{x}_t + \delta) + \max\{0; \gamma_x - x_t\}, \text{ if } \dot{x}_t = -\delta, \text{ or } x_t = 0, \\ h(x_t - s_t) &\geq c'_s(\dot{x}_t + \delta) + \max\{0; \gamma_x - x_t\}, \text{ if } x_t = 1, \\ h(x_t - s_t) &= c'_s(\dot{x}_t + \delta) + \max\{0; \gamma_x - x_t\}, \text{ otherwise,} \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

and † 和

$$\begin{aligned} h(s_t - x_t) &\leq c'_s(\dot{s}_t + \delta) + \max\{0; \gamma_s - s_t\}, \text{ if } \dot{s}_t = -\delta, \text{ or } s_t = 0, \\ h(s_t - x_t) &\geq c'_s(\dot{s}_t + \delta) + \max\{0; \gamma_s - s_t\}, \text{ if } s_t = 1, \\ h(s_t - x_t) &= c'_s(\dot{s}_t + \delta) + \max\{0; \gamma_s - s_t\}, \text{ otherwise.} \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

In what follows, we work directly with these continuous- time first-order optimality conditions. Moreover, it is straightforward to see that in continuous time, away from the boundaries of  $[0, 1]^2$ , these first-order optimality conditions will hold as equality, and thus the dynamics of state and society capacity can be represented by the following two differential equations:

在下文中, 我们直接使用这些连续时间一阶最优性条件。此外, 它很容易看出, 在连续时间内, 远离  $[0, 1]^2$  的边界, 这些一阶最优性条件将保持相等, 因此国家和社会产能的动态表达, 可以用以下两个微分方程

$$\begin{aligned} \dot{x} &= \max\left\{(c'_x)^{-1}(h(x - s) - \max\{\gamma_x - x, 0\}); 0\right\} - \delta \\ \dot{s} &= \max\left\{(c'_s)^{-1}(h(s - x) - \max\{\gamma_s - s, 0\}); 0\right\} - \delta \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

The roles of the two main assumptions highlighted above—the single-peakedness of  $h$  and the increasing returns aspect of the cost function—are evident from Equation 7. First, when  $x$  and  $s$  are close to each other,  $h(x-s)$  large, and thus both of these variables will tend to grow further. Conversely, when  $x$  and  $s$  are far apart,  $h(x-s)$  is small, and investment by both parties is discouraged. This observation captures the primary force that will lead to the emergence of different dynamics of elite—society relations and different types of states in our setup.<sup>14</sup> Second, the presence of the max term implies that once the capacity of a party falls below a critical threshold ( $\gamma_x$  or  $\gamma_s$ ), there is an additional force pushing toward further reduction in this capacity.

上述两个主要假设的作用— $h$ 的单峰性、成本函数的收益递增方面—从方程 7 中，可以明显看出。首先，当  $x$  和  $s$  彼此接近时， $h(x-s)$  大，因此这两个变量都会进一步增长。相反，当  $x$  和  $s$  相距很远时， $h(x-s)$  小，双方的投资气馁。这一观察捕捉到了，精英—社会关系的动态变化的主要力量，和我们设置中的不同国家类型。第二，含 max 的最大项的存在，意味着，一旦一方的能力下降到其临界阈值 ( $\gamma_x$  或  $\gamma_s$ ) 以下，有一股额外的力量，推动这一能力进一步减少。

### §3.2 Dynamics of the Capacity of Society and the State † 社会和国家能力的动态

Our main result in this section is summarized in the next proposition.

我们在下一个命题中，总结本节的主要结果。

**Proposition 1 † 命题 1** *Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold. Then there are three (locally) asymptotically stable (Nash) equilibria: † 假设假设 1、2 和 3 成立，则有三个（局部）渐近稳定 (Nash) 均衡：*

- (1)  $x^* = s^* = 1$ .
- (2)  $x^* = 0$ , and  $s^* \in (\gamma_s, 1)$ .
- (3)  $x^* \in (\gamma_x, 1)$ , and  $s^* = 0$ .

This proposition shows that there exist three relevant (asymptotically stable) equilibria: one corresponding to an **inclusive** state, one corresponding to a despotic state, and one corresponding to a weak state. The intuition, as already anticipated, is that when we are in the neighborhood of the steady state  $x^* = s^* = 1$ ,  $h(x-s)$  is large, encouraging both parties to move further toward  $x^* = s^* = 1$ . In contrast, in the neighborhood of  $x^* = 0$  or  $s^* = 0$ ,  $h(x-s)$  is small, and neither party has as strong incentives to invest, and in fact, one of them ends up with zero capacity.<sup>15</sup>

这一命题表明，存在三个相关的（渐近稳定的）均衡：一个对应于包容性的状态，一个对应于专制的状态，一种对应于弱的状态。如前所述，直觉是，当我们处于稳定状态  $x^* = s^* = 1$  附近时， $h(x-s)$

<sup>14</sup> In the Appendix we show that this same property holds with other formulations of the contest function. † 在附录中，我们证明了，这一性质适用于竞争函数的其他表述。

<sup>15</sup> Under Assumption 1, there is no social benefit in reaching the equilibrium  $x^* = s^* = 1$ , as the capacities of the state and society do not contribute to the size of aggregate income. This will be relaxed below when we consider the general environment in which  $x$  and  $s$  contribute to income. † 在假设 1 下，达到均衡  $x^* = s^* = 1$  没有社会效益，因为国家和社会的能力，对总收入的大小没有贡献。当我们考虑  $x$  和  $s$  对收入的贡献的一般环境时，这将在下面放宽。

很大，鼓励双方采取行动，进一步向  $x^* = s^* = 1$  靠拢。相比之下，在  $x^* = 0$  或  $s^* = 0$  附近， $h(x - s)$  很小，双方都没有强烈的投资动机，事实上，其中一方最终产能为零。

The equilibria presented in Proposition 1 and their local dynamics are exactly the same as those shown in Figure 1 in the Introduction. This can also be seen from the numerically constructed Figure 3 presented here.<sup>16</sup> 命题 1 中提出的平衡及其局部动力学，与引言中的图 1 所示的完全相同。这也可以从这里给出的数值构造的图 3 中看出。

### §3.3 Conditional Comparative Statics † 条件比较静力学

One of the most important results of our framework is that comparative statics — which show how the equilibrium changes when perturbed by exogenous factors — are conditional and in particular depend on the prevailing balance between elites and society (where we are in the diagram in Figure 1). The easiest way of seeing this is to consider an increase in  $s_0$  to  $s_0 + \bar{s}$  (this may be driven, for example, by changes in military technology or international factors, which necessitate greater building of state capacity for military reasons, as in Tilly’s [1990] discussion). 我们的框架最重要的结果之一是，比较静力学，它表明平衡在受到外生因素扰动时如何变化，是有条件的，特别是取决于精英与社会之间的普遍平衡（如图 1 所示）。最简单的方法是，考虑将  $s_0$  增加到  $s_0 + \bar{s}$ （例如，这可能是由军事技术的变化或国际因素驱动的，这些因素出于军事原因需要加强国家能力建设，如 Tilly [1990] 所讨论的）。

As Figure 2 in the Introduction illustrates, such a change can leave a polity in the same region as before, in which case the equilibrium trajectory will be shifted uniformly up, but the long-run outcome will remain unchanged (this will correspond to the Montenegrin case we discuss in the historical perspective section). Alternatively, this increase can shift us from, say, Region III to Region II, in which case not only the equilibrium trajectory but also the long-run outcome will change, and in fact it will involve greater state capacity (corresponding to the Swiss case below). However, depending on the exact value of  $(x_0, s_0)$ , the same increase of  $s$  in state capacity could also shift us from Region II to Region I, in which case the effect on the long-run state capacity will be negative instead of positive as in the Prussian case (also discussed below). This discussion thus establishes

正如引言中的图 2 所示，这种变化可能会留下同一地区的政体与以前一样，在这种情况下，均衡轨迹将均匀向上移动，但长期结果将保持不变（这将与我们在历史视角部分讨论的黑山案例相对应）。或者，这种增长可能会使我们从区域 III 转移到区域 II、在这种情况下，不仅均衡轨迹会改变，长期结果也会改变，事实上，这将涉及更大的国家能力（对应于下面的瑞士案例）。然而，根据  $(x_0, s_0)$  的确切值，国家能力中  $s$  的相同增加，也可能使我们从区域 II 转移到区域 I，在这种情况下，对长期国家能力的影响将是负面的，而不是像普鲁士的情况（也在下面讨论）那样积极。因此，本次讨论确立了

**Proposition 2 † 命题 2** *The effects of changes in the initial conditions  $(x_0, s_0)$  on equilibrium dynamics and the long run outcome for state capacity are conditional in the sense that these depend on which region*

<sup>16</sup> In particular, we take  $f(x, s) = 0.6$ , choose  $H$  to be a raised cosine distribution over  $[-1, 1]$  with mean  $\mu = 0$ , and set  $c_x(i) = 3.25 \times i^2$  (for  $i \in [0, 10]$ ) and  $c_s(i) = 3.25 \times i^2$  (for  $i \in [0, 15]$ ), with  $\gamma_x = 0.35$ ,  $\gamma_s = 0.35$ , and  $\delta = 0.1$ . All computations for this and subsequent figures are performed in Matlab. † 特别是，我们取  $f(x, s) = 0.6$ ，选择  $H$  为升余弦分布在  $[-1, 1]$  上，平均  $\mu = 0$ ，并设置  $c_x(i) = 3.25 \times i^2$ （用于  $i \in [0, 10]$ ）和  $c_s(i) = 3.25 \times i^2$ （对于  $i \in [0, 15]$ ），其中  $\gamma_x = 0.35$ ， $\gamma_s = 0.35$  和  $\delta = 0.1$ 。此图和后续图的所有计算都在 Matlab 中进行。

*we move out of and into.*

初始条件  $(x_0, s_0)$  的变化，对平衡动力学和国家能力长期结果的影响，是有条件的，因为这取决于我们离开哪个地区并进入哪个区域。

A more rigorous discussion of conditional comparative statics is provided in the Appendix, where we generalize the model so that the  $f$  function depends on state and societal capacity and we consider variations in the importance of these capacities for income. In that case, even for given initial conditions, dynamics can change fundamentally as the boundaries between regions shift, and once again exactly where we are in terms of initial conditions will determine how elites and society respond to the same change in structural factors.

附录中，对条件比较静力学进行了更严格的讨论，其中我们推广该模型，使  $f$  函数取决于国家和社会能力，我们考虑对于收入而言，这些能力的重要性变化。在这种情况下，即使对于给定的初始条件，随着地区之间的边界发生变化，动态可能会发生根本性的变化，而我们在初始条件方面的确切位置，将再次决定精英和社会，如何应对结构性因素的相同变化。

#### §4 EQUILIBRIUM WITH FORWARD LOOKING PLAYERS † 平衡与前瞻玩家

In this section, we briefly outline how the results generalize to a setting with long-lived, forward-looking players.

在本节中，我们简要概述了，结果如何推广到具有长期、前瞻性的环境中的玩家。

The technology of investment and conflict are the same as in the previous section. The only difference is that now both society and elite are long-lived and forward-looking. To maximize the parallel with the model with short-lived players, we assume that both players again correspond to sequences of nonoverlapping generations, but each generation has an exponentially distributed lifetime or equivalently, a Poisson end date with parameter,  $1 - \beta$ , where  $\beta = e^{-\rho\Delta}$ . We assume that this random end date is the only source of discounting. Clearly, this specification guarantees that as the period length  $\Delta$  shrinks, discounting between periods will also decline (and the discount factor will approach 1). Again to maximize the parallel with our myopic model, we assume that in expectation, there is one instance of conflict between the two players during the lifetime of each generation. Because with this Poisson specification, the expected lifetime of this generation is  $1/(1 - \beta)$ , this implies that a conflict arrives at the rate  $1 - \beta$ .<sup>17</sup>

投资和冲突的技术与上一节相同。唯一的区别是现在，社会和精英，都是长期的和有远见的。为了最

<sup>17</sup> An alternative specification of the model with long-lived players that leads to identical equations but eschews the parallel with the myopic model is to assume that both players are infinitely lived and discount the future at the rate  $\beta = e^{-\rho\Delta}$  and there is a conflict during each interval of length  $\Delta$ . Recall from footnote 13 that in this case there will be no investment when  $\Delta \rightarrow 0$  with short-lived players (because they do not take into account the benefit from increasing future conflict capabilities), but incentives for investment do not disappear with long-lived, forward-looking players even as  $\Delta \rightarrow 0$  (because they do take into account the benefit from increasing future capacities). † 对于长寿玩家的模型的另一种规范是，假设两个玩家都是无限生命的，并且以  $\beta = e^{-\rho\Delta}$  的比率贴现未来，在每个长度为  $\Delta$  的区间内都存在冲突。回想一下脚注 13，在这种情况下，当  $\Delta \rightarrow 0$  时，对于短期参与者（因为他们没有考虑到增加未来冲突能力的好处），将不会有投资；但对于长期、前瞻性参与者，投资激励不会消失，即使  $\Delta \rightarrow 0$ （因为它们确实考虑到了未来产能增加的好处）。

大化与在具有短期参与者的模型中，我们假设两个参与者，再次对应于不重叠的几代序列，但每一代都有指数分布的寿命，或者等效地，一个泊松结束日期，参数为  $1 - \beta$ ，其中  $\beta = e^{-\rho\Delta}$ 。我们假设，这个随机结束日期是折扣的唯一来源。显然，该规范保证了随着周期长度  $\Delta$  的缩短，周期之间的折扣也将下降（折扣系数将接近 1）。其次，为了最大化与我们的近视模型的平行度，我们假设，在预期中，在每一代人的一生中，两个参与者之间都有一次冲突。因为根据泊松规范，这一代的预期寿命为  $1/(1 - \beta)$ ，这意味着冲突的发生率为  $1 - \beta$ 。

The main result of this section is contained in the next proposition.

本节的主要结果，包含在下列命题中。

**Proposition 3 † 命题3** *Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold. Then there exist discount rates  $\bar{\rho} \geq \underline{\rho} > 0$  such that for all  $\rho > \bar{\rho}$ , there are three (locally) asymptotically stable equilibria:*

† 如果假设 1、2 和 3 成立，则存在贴现率  $\bar{\rho} \geq \underline{\rho} > 0$ ，对于所有  $\rho > \bar{\rho}$ ，都有三个（局部）渐近稳定的均衡：

- (1)  $x^* = s^* = 1$ .
- (2)  $x^* = 0$ , and  $s^* \in (\gamma_s, 1)$ .
- (3)  $x^* \in (\gamma_x, 1)$ , and  $s^* = 0$ .

Moreover, for all  $\rho < \underline{\rho}$  there exists a unique globally stable equilibrium  $x^* = s^* = 1$ . † 此外，对于所有  $\rho < \underline{\rho}$ ，存在一个唯一的全局稳定均衡  $x^* = s^* = 1$

Thus, this result shows that the main insights from our analysis apply provided that players, though forward- looking, are sufficiently impatient.<sup>18</sup> We note that this result is not a simple consequence of the fact that as we consider larger and larger values of  $\rho$ , players are becoming closer to myopic. It necessitates establishing properties of the the relevant value functions and their derivatives in the limit. Details as well as numerical illustrations are provided in the Appendix.<sup>19</sup>

因此，这一结果表明，只要参与者虽然具有前瞻性，但足够不耐烦，我们分析的主要见解就适用。我们注意到，这一结果并不是以下事实的简单结果：我们认为  $\rho$  值越大，玩家就越接近近视。它需要在极限中建立相关值函数及其导数的性质。附录中，提供了详细信息和数字插图。

## §5 EUROPEAN STATE DIVERGENCE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE † 历史视野中的欧洲国家分歧

In the Introduction, we discussed the divergent paths of political development in Switzerland, Prussia, and Montenegro. In this section, we elaborate on these historical experiences, illustrating how

<sup>18</sup> The dependence of the equilibrium set on the degree of impatience, or alternatively how forward-looking the players are, is standard in dynamic models. In our case positing a sufficient degree of impatience seems plausible. For example, elites lines may die out, or they may be killed in warfare or their state eliminated in geopolitical competition. These are all interpretations that lead to impatience. † 均衡集对不耐烦程度的依赖，或者对参与者的前瞻性的依赖，是动态模型中的标准。在我们的情况下，假设有足够程度的不耐烦似乎是合理的。例如，精英阶层可能会消亡，或者他们可能会在战争中丧生，或者他们的国家在地缘政治竞争中被消灭。这些都是导致不耐烦的解释。

<sup>19</sup> When  $\rho$  is between  $\underline{\rho}$  and  $\bar{\rho}$ , we may have a situation in which one of the two corner equilibria disappears while the other one still exists. † 当  $\rho$  介于  $\underline{\rho}$  和  $\bar{\rho}$  之间时，我们可能会出现以下情况，两个角平衡之一消失，而另一个角平衡仍然存在。

our theory is useful for interpreting these divergent trajectories. This section has two other related goals. 在引言中，我们讨论了瑞士、普鲁士和黑山政治发展的不同路径。在本节中，我们将详细阐述这些历史经验，说明我们的理论，是如何的有助于解释这些不同的轨迹。本节还有另外两个相关目标。First, we illustrate the notion of conditional comparative statics using the salient example of interstate warfare. Finally, we provide evidence that state capacity is greatest when there is more balanced contestation between state and society rather than under the auspices of a despotic state.

首先，我们用国家间战争的突出例子，来说明条件比较静力学的概念。最后，我们提供的证据表明，是当国家和社会之间的竞争更加平衡时，而不是在专制国家的主持下，国家能力是最大的。

### §5.1 Switzerland † 瑞士

Switzerland was historically on the periphery of the Holy Roman Empire. The Empire still had an emperor, but it had fragmented into many small and relatively independent polities. The component Swiss polities, the cantons, had their own systems of assemblies. 瑞士，在历史上处于 Holy Roman Empire [神圣罗马帝国]的边缘。帝国仍然有一个皇帝，但它已经分裂成许多相对独立的小政治体。瑞士政治的组成部分，各州有自己的议会制度。

These were legacies of two forces, first of the broader pattern of assembly politics inherited from German tribes, which had been institutionalized initially by the Merovingians, and second, from the political consequences of the communal economic organization of the medieval period (Wickham 2017). Swiss cantons did not just have assemblies; they also featured feudal, often monastic, elites.

这些这是两种力量的遗产，第一种是更广泛的模式继承自德国部落的集会政治，最初由梅洛温人制度化，第二，中世纪的公共经济组织期间的政治后果（威克姆2017）。瑞士各州，不仅有集会；它们还具有封建色彩，通常僧侣、精英。

The Swiss confederation started in 1291 with men from the cantons of Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden taking oaths in Rütli, a meadow above Lake Uri, and signing the Bundesbrief (Federal Charter). The charter was concerned with public order and lawlessness and committed the three cantons to come to each other's aid and provided a framework for resolving disputes.<sup>20</sup> The disputes were often with the feudal elites. In Schwyz, for example, cantonal authorities were in conflict with Einsiedeln Abbey over access to lands, which the Abbey claimed. In the conflict Schwyz was excommunicated by the Bishop of Constance, and in retaliation the Abbey was attacked and looted.

瑞士联邦始于1291年，由 Uri, Schwyz, 和 Unterwalden 州的男子，在 Uri 湖上方的 Rütli 草地上宣誓，并签署《联邦宪章》。宪章关注公共秩序和无法无天，并承诺三个州相互和解援助，并为解决争端提供了框架。这些争端往往与封建精英有关。例如，在施维茨州，州政府与 Einsiedeln 修道院，就修道院声称拥有的土地使用权发生冲突。在冲突中，施维茨被康斯坦茨主教逐出教会，作为报复，修道院遭到袭击和抢劫。

### §5.2 Prussia † 普鲁士

Prussia was never part of the Holy Roman Empire, but in 1618 it merged through marriage with Brandenburg, which was. The ruling family of Brandenburg, the Hohenzollerns, became the ruling family of Brandenburg-Prussia, with the ruler known as the Elector. During the Thirty Years War, the

<sup>20</sup> <https://www.admin.ch/gov/en/start/federal-council/history-of-the-federal-council/federal-charter-of-1291.html>.

newly united territories were devastated. Brandenburg might have lost as much as half of its population (Blanning 2016, 12).

普鲁士，从来不是神圣罗马帝国的一部分，但在1618年，它通过婚姻与罗马帝国合并Brandenburg，就是这样。勃兰登堡的统治家族 Hohenzollerns 家族成为了统治家族勃兰登堡-普鲁士，统治者被称为选帝侯。在三十年战争期间，新联合领土被摧毁。勃兰登堡可能已经失去了多达一半的人口 (Blanning 2016, 12)。

In 1640, Frederick William I came to the throne as the new Elector. Known as the Great Elector, he ruled for 48 years. He charted a new course for Brandenburg- Prussia based on the despotic path of state building. One of his main goals was to build a much more effective military. To achieve this, Frederick William needed tax revenues. Taxes had to be negotiated with various representative bodies, such as the Estates of Kurmark in Brandenburg. He started out by trying to get permanent grants of taxation, which would free him from the need to endlessly negotiate them. In 1653 he negotiated the so-called Recess that gave him 530,000 thalers over a period of six years. 1640年，Frederick 威廉一世作为新的选举人登上王位。他被称为伟大的选举人，统治着48年。他为Brandenburg—Prussia 制定了一条基于专制的国家建设道路的新路线。他的主要目标之一，是建立一支更有效的军队。为了实现这一目标，Frederick 威廉需要税收收入。税收必须与各种代表机构进行谈判，如 Brandenburg 州的 Kurmark 庄园。他一开始，试图获得永久性的税收拨款，这将使他无需无休止地进行谈判。1653年，他通过谈判，达成了所谓的“Recess”，在六年内给了他53万塔勒。

Crucially, he, rather than the Estates, got to collect the taxes, which allowed him to start building a bureaucracy. In exchange he gave the nobility, which made up a chamber in the Estates, tax-exempt status. He went on to extract similar concessions from the Prussian Estates. Frederick William then overrode the authority of the Estates and started to tax without their agreement. In 1655 he initiated the Kriegskommissariat (the “war commissary”), which covered both tax collection and military organization, and he also stripped Estates of their militias, which responded “with bitter protests” (Clark 2009, 56).

至关重要的是，他而不是庄园负责征税，这使他能够开始建立一个官僚政治。作为交换，他给予贵族免税地位，贵族在庄园中组成了一个房间。他继续向普鲁士三级政府争取类似的让步。弗雷德里克·威廉随后推翻了庄园的权威，在没有他们同意的情况下开始征税。1655年，他发起了 Kriegskommissariat (“战争委员会”)，该委员会涵盖了税收征收和军事组织，他还剥夺了Estates的民兵组织，这些民兵组织“以激烈的抗议”回应 (Clark 2009, 56)。

By 1659, the Estates retreated to local issues. They attempted to combine their forces, but their resistance was broken by “coercion and force” and “Leading Estates activists were intimidated or arrested” (Clark 2009, 57, and see Carsten 1954).

到1659年，庄园退到了地方问题上。他们试图联合起来，但他们的抵抗被“胁迫和武力”打破，“领导阶层的活动家受到恐吓或逮捕” (克拉克，2009，57，见 Carsten，1954)。

With the Estates sidelined, despotic state building commenced. In 1733, the basis of military recruitment was reorganized. The country divided into cantons of 5,000 households, with a regiment assigned to each for recruitment. At least a quarter of the male population was included in the rolls, dramatically increasing the potential size of the army. 随着庄园被边缘化，专制的国家建设开始了。1733年，征兵的基础被重组了。这个国家分为 5000 户的州，为了招聘，每个州都有一个团。。至

少有四分之一的男性人口被列入名单，而且这一比例急剧增加了军队的潜在规模。

Frederick the Great, assuming power in 1740, further expanded the tax base and strengthened the Prussian military machine. The French philosopher Voltaire (supposedly) summarized the Prussian situation as “other states possess an army; Prussia is an army which possesses a state.”

Frederick 大帝于1740年掌权，进一步扩大了税基，加强了普鲁士的军事机器。法国哲学家 Voltaire[伏尔泰](据说)将普鲁士的情况，概括为“其他国家拥有军队；普鲁士是拥有国家的军队。”

Our main point here is that this very stark difference from Switzerland evolved out of initial circumstances that were far more similar than different. Swiss local autonomy and democracy were not entirely unique; there were similar models all over Germany (Brady 1985), and the representative institutions of the Estates had considerable powers in many parts of the territories. 我们这里的主要观点是，与瑞士的这种明显差异，是由最初的情况演变而来的，它们之间的相似性远大于差异性。瑞士的地方自治和民主，并非完全独一无二；德国各地都有类似的模式 (Brady 1985)，以及庄园机构的代表在领土的许多地方拥有相当大的权力。

Yet in Prussia, such institutions weakened in the conflict with the Hohenzollerns. This did allow for the accumulation of state capacity, including an expanded fiscal system and army. Yet, as we will see, the Prussian despotic state eventually ended up with less capacity than the Swiss Republic.

然而，在普鲁士，这些机构在与 Hohenzollerns 人的冲突中被削弱了。这确实允许国家能力的积累，包括扩大财政体系和军队。然而，正如我们将看到的，普鲁士专制国家最终的能力，不如瑞士共和国。

### §5.3 Montenegro † 门的内哥罗(南斯拉夫一地区, 旧译黑山)

Montenegro was made up of kinship groups, referred to as clans, and lacked the elements of centralization that the Swiss (and Prussians) had inherited from the Carolingians and the Holy Roman Empire. Such kin groups had a great ability to coordinate, and they persistently opposed the creation of a state because “continued attempts to impose centralized government were in conflict with tribal loyalty” (Simić 1967, 87).

黑山由亲属团体组成，称为氏族，缺乏瑞士人（和普鲁士人）从加洛林王朝和神圣罗马帝国继承的集权元素。这些亲属群体具有很强的协调能力，他们一直反对建立国家，因为“继续试图强加中央集权政府，与部落忠诚相冲突” (Simić 1967, 87)。

Prior to 1852, Montenegro was a theocracy but where the ruling Bishop, the Vladika, could exercise no coercive authority over the clans that dominated the society, and “it was only when their central leader attempted to institutionalize forcible means of controlling feuds that the tribesmen stood firm in their right to follow their ancient traditions. This was because they perceived in such interference a threat to their basic political autonomy” (Boehm 1986, 186). Here Boehm is referring to the attempts of Vladika Njegoš to develop a state in Montenegro in the 1840s.

1852年之前，黑山是一个神权政治国家，但对统治社会的氏族，执政的主教，Vladika 不能行使强制权力，“只有当他们的中央领导人，试图将控制世仇的强制手段制度化时，部落成员才坚定地维护他们遵循古老传统的权利。这是因为他们认为这种干涉对他们的基本权利构成了威胁政治自治” (Boehm 1986, 186)。在这里，Boehm 指的是 Vladika Njegoš 试图于19世纪40年代在黑山建立国家。

Djilas describes the situation: “It was a clash between two principles—the state and the clan.

The former stood for order and a nation, and against chaos and treason; the latter stood for clan freedoms and against the arbitrary actions of an impersonal central authority—the Senate, the Guard, the captains” (Djilas 1966, 107). Djilas records that Njegoš’s reforms were immediately confronted by the revolt of the Piperi and Crmnica clans motivated by the fact that “the imposition of government and a state was putting an end to the independence and internal freedom of the clans” (Djilas 1966, 115). Djilas 描述了这种情况：“这是两个原则之间的冲突—国家和氏族。前者代表秩序和国家，反对混乱和叛国；后者代表氏族自由，反对非个人的中央权威——参议院、卫队、上尉的任意行为” (Djilas 1966:107)。Djilas 记录称，Njegoš 的改革，立即遭到了 Piperi 和 Crmnica 部族的反抗，其动机是“政府和国家的强加，正在结束部族的独立和内部自由” (Djilas 1966:115)。

Njegoš was succeeded by his nephew Danilo, who made himself the first secular Prince of Montenegro in 1851, but his efforts to centralize authority also ran into fierce opposition. An attempt to raise taxes in 1853 led the clans to revolt, with the Piperi, Kuči, and Bjelopavlići declaring themselves an independent state. Danilo’s attempt failed, and a member of the Bjelopavlići assassinated him in 1860. Njegoš 的侄子 Danilo 接替了他的职位，他于1851年成为黑山的第一位世俗王子，但他集中权力的努力，也遭到了强烈反对。1853年，一次提高税收的尝试，导致氏族起义，Piperi, Kuči, & Bjelopavlići 宣布自己是一个独立的国家。Danilo 的尝试失败了，Bjelopavlići 的一名成员，1860年暗杀了他。

#### §5.4 The Nature of the Comparison † 比较的性质

Methodologically, this section uses Mill’s (1872) most similar design for choosing case studies. Switzerland, Prussia, and Montenegro diverged in terms of the capacities of their states, and we relate this primarily to differences in initial conditions, in particular how much capacity their state had in the contest with society. Apart from these differences, there were many similarities.

在方法论上，本节使用 Mill (1872) 最相似的设计，来选择案例研究。瑞士，普鲁士和黑山，在国家能力方面存在分歧，我们主要由初始条件的差异，将其联系起来，特别是他们的国家在与社会的竞争中有多大的能力。除了这些差异，它们还有许多相似之处。

Consider Switzerland and Prussia. We have emphasized the similarities in terms of culture, ethnicity, and religion and of the institutions of the Holy Roman Empire. The main difference is that the Elector of Brandenburg-Prussia had more control over his territories than did the Habsburg Dukes over the Swiss cantons. The Elector was able to override the power of the Estates, whereas the local Swiss nobility could not stop the cantons signing an agreement that, for example, forbade Austrian judges. 以瑞士和普鲁士为例。我们强调了文化、种族和宗教和神圣罗马帝国的制度。主要区别在于，选举人 Brandenburg-Prussia 对其领土的控制，比哈布斯堡公爵控制的瑞士的州更大。选帝侯，能够推翻等级的权力，而当地的瑞士贵族则不能停止各州签署，例如，一项禁止奥地利法官的协议。

Turning to Switzerland and Montenegro, they both had been peripherally part of the Roman Empire and shared the same type of mountainous ecology and an economy based on herding. We also argued that there were similarities in social structures, in particular, clans. The important distinction is that the state was stronger in Switzerland where there was at least the legacy of Carolingian centralization, which never existed in Montenegro.

谈到瑞士和黑山，它们都曾是在罗马帝国的边缘地区，共享相同类型的山地生态和以畜牧业为基础的经济。我们还认为，社会结构，特别是宗族，也有相似之处。重要的区别在于，瑞士的国家更强大，

那里至少有加洛林中央集权的遗产，而黑山从未有过这种遗产。

These small differences around 1600 ended up creating very different dynamics of state-building and societal capacity during the early modern period because, in terms of our model, they put the different polities into three different basins of attraction.

1600年左右的这些微小差异，最终导致了国家建设和现代早期的社会能力的非常不同的动态，因为就我们的模式而言，他们把不同的政体，划分在三个不同的吸引力盆地。

### §5.5 Conditional Comparative Statics in Action † 作用中的条件比较静力学

Our case study illustrates our central notion of conditional comparative statics. We focus on the effects of warfare, as discussed in Proposition 2.

我们的案例研究，说明了条件比较静力学的核心概念。我们关注的是战争，如命题 2 所述。

For the Swiss, the threat of warfare, in particular the persistent threat from the Habsburgs to reinstate the overlordship of the feudal local elites, seems to have been an important incentive for the otherwise individualistic cantons and cities to unite into a larger confederation and to accede to more centralized authority and decision making. This seems to have overcome what might otherwise have been strong centrifugal tendencies. Thus the centralization that started in 1291 was likely encouraged by the pressure of warfare. As Figure 2 in the Introduction highlighted, it is plausible that this impulse toward greater state capacity pushed the Swiss cantons into the basin of attraction of the *inclusive* state. 对瑞士人来说，战争的威胁，特别是哈布斯堡王朝的持续威胁，要求恢复封建地方精英的统治，似乎是促使原本个人主义的州和城市联合成一个更大的邦联，并接受更集中的权力和决策的重要动力。这似乎克服了原本可能存在的强烈离心倾向。因此，1291年开始的中央集权，很可能是受到战争压力的鼓励。正如引言中的图 2 所强调的那样，这种对更大国家能力的冲动，似乎将瑞士各州推入了包容性的国家的吸引力范围。

The outcome in Prussia was very different. Though Brandenburg had many of the same structural features of Switzerland and Prussia was run by its ruling house, the territories to the east did not have the same history of communes and quasi-democratic politics like the Swiss cantons. Society was more easily dominated.

普鲁士的结果大不相同。尽管 Brandenburg 有许多相同的结构特征在瑞士和普鲁士的统治下，东部的领土，没有瑞士各州那样的公社和准民主政治的历史。社会更容易被支配。

Nevertheless, at the start of the early modern period it is plausible to believe that Prussia was in, or at the very least in the vicinity of, the basin of attraction of the *inclusive* state. In this light, the Thirty Year War can be thought of as forcing Prussia out of the basin of attraction of the *inclusive* state and into that of the *despotic path*. This is how Frederick the Great himself viewed the situation: “So long as God gives me breath, I shall assert my rule like a despot” (quoted in Blanning 2016, 127).

然而，在早期现代时期开始时，有理由相信 Prussia 处于或至少在包容性的国家的吸引力盆地附近。从这个角度来看，三十年战争，可以被认为是迫使普鲁士退出包容性国家的吸引力范围，走上专制道路。Frederick 大帝本人，就是这样看待这种情况的：“只要上帝给我喘息的机会，我就会像暴君一样维护我的统治”（引自 Blanning 2016, 127）。

Finally, war did not make the state in Montenegro and the incentives it created were not powerful enough to move the country out of the basin of attraction of the weak state. Continuous warfare with

the Ottomans did induce the clans to try to coordinate more and create more central structures (see Durham 1928). As we have seen, however, this impulse was not sufficiently powerful to create a state. 最后，战争并没有使黑山成为一个国家，它所创造的激励措施，也不够有力使国家摆脱弱国的吸引力盆地。与 Ottomans 帝国的持续战争，确实促使氏族试图进行更多的协调，并建立更多的中央结构（见 Durham 1928）。然而，正如我们所看到的，这种冲动不足以建立一个国家。

## §5.6 The Capacity of the State † 国家的能力

One of the most surprising implications of our analysis is that it is not the despotic state that has more capacity but the *inclusive* one. This implies an ordering of Switzerland then Prussia and then Montenegro in terms of their levels of state capacity, exactly as in Figure 2.

我们的分析最令人惊讶的影响之一是，拥有更多能力的，不是专制国家，而是包容性的国家。这意味着瑞士、普鲁士和黑山，在国家能力水平上的顺序，如图 2 所示。

This can be seen when we focus on the early modern period. We focus on a central metric of state capacity in the literature—the size of the fiscal state.

当我们关注近代早期时，就可以看到这一点。我们关注文献中国家能力的一个核心指标—财政国家的规模。<sup>21</sup>

The earliest available evidence suggests that despite the development of the absolutist Prussian state, the tax take relative to national income was higher in Switzerland. This is in line with the predictions of our model. Data in Aidt and Jensen (2009) suggest that central government tax revenues compared with national income were around 1.8% during the period 1860 - 1880 in Switzerland, rising to 2.1% during 1881 - 1914. But the central government was the smallest part of Swiss government tax revenues and expenditures. Cantons had raised income taxes since 1840, whereas the federal government did not do so until the 1930s. Though we have not been able to identify historical estimates of cantonal taxes, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development provides a comprehensive breakdown since 1965.<sup>22</sup> In 2018, cantonal and municipal tax revenues on individuals were five times the levels of federal income taxes, whereas the local corporate taxes were about the same. In 1965, these differences were far larger; local income and corporate taxes were over 11 and 4 times, respectively, as

<sup>21</sup> There is a clear ranking of other aspects of state capacity in these polities also. This is particularly so with respect to dispute resolution. Prussia retained large feudal and prebureaucratic elements in the state, as Rosenberg (1958) documented (see also Ziblatt 2009), and local courts were controlled by feudal elites (See Carsten 1954; Cerman 2012; Clark 2009, 160). This led to an endemic lack of cooperation with society and an inability to implement many policies (as documented by Raeff 1983, 45 - 6, 51). This is in severe contrast to Switzerland, which was founded on a demand for the objective resolution of disputes. At the commune level, magistrates were elected and Swiss society then fought a long and ultimately successful battle against precisely the type of local despotism that Prussian peasants had to put up with (see Schläppi 2009 for a detailed relevant study of Bern). In Montenegro disputes were mediated by the clans and the feud. This clearly corresponds to much less capacity than in the Swiss case, where an institutionalized system of law and justice developed. † 在这些政治体中，国家能力的其他方面也有明确的排名。在争议解决方面尤其如此。正如 Rosenberg (1958) 所记录的那样（另见 Ziblatt 2009），普鲁士在国家中保留了大量的封建和前封建元素，地方法院由封建精英控制（见 Carsten 1954; Cerman 2012; Clark 2009 160）。这导致了与社会普遍缺乏合作，无法实施许多政策（如 Raeff 1983, 45-6, 51 所述）。这与瑞士形成了鲜明对比，瑞士是建立在客观解决争端的要求之上的。在公社一级，地方法官由选举产生，瑞士社会，随后与普鲁士农民不得不忍受的地方专制主义进行了长期的，而最终成功的斗争（见 Schläppi 2009 对 Bern 进行的详细的相关研究）。在黑山，争端，由部族和世仇调解。这与瑞士的情况相比，显然其能力要低得多，因为瑞士已经建立了制度化的法律和司法体系。

<sup>22</sup> <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=REVCHE>.

large as federal taxes. Because in 1860, for example, there were local income taxes but no federal income tax, the number of 1.8% of GDP is clearly a large underestimate of the actual extent of taxation in Switzerland (Bullock 1924 provides an extensive discussion of the numerous taxes levied by Swiss cantons in the nineteenth century). Spoerer's (2010) estimates for Prussia are that tax revenues were 5% of national income in 1860. Therefore, we can conservatively estimate that in 1860 tax revenues relative to national income were twice as high in Switzerland, about 10%, as in Prussia, and thus Switzerland appears to have achieved greater fiscal capacity with an inclusive state.

最早的证据表明，尽管普鲁士国家实行了专制主义，但瑞士的税收相对于国民收入更高。这与我们模型的预测一致。Aidt 和 Jensen (2009) 的数据表明，1860年至1880年期间，瑞士中央政府税收收入，与国民收入之比约为1.8%，1881年至1914年期间上升至2.1%。但中央政府是瑞士政府税收收入和支出中最小的一部分。自1840年以来，各州提高了所得税，而联邦政府直到20世纪30年代才这样做。尽管我们无法确定各州税收的历史估计，但经济合作与发展组织提供了自1965年以来的全面细分。2018年，州和市的个人税收收入，是联邦所得税的五倍，而地方公司税大致相同。1965年，这些差异要大得多；地方所得税和公司税分别是联邦税的11倍和4倍多。例如，因为1860年有地方所得税，但没有联邦所得税，占国内生产总值1.8%的数字，显然大大低估了瑞士的实际税收范围（布洛克1924年对瑞士各州在十九世纪征收的众多税收进行了广泛的讨论）。斯波勒（2010）对普鲁士的估计是，年税收收入占国民收入的5% 1860.因此，我们可以保守估计，1860年税收收入相对于国民收入为瑞士的这一比例是普鲁士的两倍，约为10%，因此，瑞士，似乎已经实现了更大的财政能力，拥有一个包容性的国家。

## §6 CONCLUSION † 结论

There is a great deal of diversity in the nature of states and their capacity around the world today. But societies, not just states, differ enormously as well. Some are highly mobilized and organized collectively, with high levels of “social capital” and institutions that facilitate collective actions. In contrast, in others nonelites are weak and incapable of contesting for power against elites and the state. The capabilities of states and societies go together. † 当今世界各国的性质及其能力存在很大差异。但社会，而不仅仅是国家，也存在巨大差异。一些国家高度动员起来，集体组织起来，拥有高水平的“社会资本”和制度促进集体行动。相比之下，在其他国家，非精英力量薄弱，无法与精英和国家争夺权力。国家和社会的能力，是相辅相成的。

In this paper, we have developed a new theory for studying the variation in state capacity and state - society relations, arguing that states endogenously acquire capacity in a dynamic contest between elites and society. At the heart of our model is the notion that elites that control states must contest with society for control over political power and the distribution of resources. If the state accumulates capacity, then this helps elites win this contest. But in response society can also accumulate capacity, and this contestation from society in turn encourages the elite to build further capacity. † 本文提出了一种新的理论，来研究国家能力、国家与社会关系的变化，认为国家在精英与社会之间的动态竞争中，内生地获得了能力。我们模式的核心是这个概念，控制国家的精英，必须与社会争夺对政治权力和资源分配的控制权。如果国家积累了能力，那么这将有助于精英赢得这场比赛。但作为回应，社会也可以积累能力，而这种来自社会的竞争，反过来，又鼓励精英阶层进一步培养能力。

In our model, this logic leads to three distinct equilibria with very different constellations of state and societal capacity. In one equilibrium, which we called despotic, the state acquires far more capacity than society, in a sense dominating it. In the reverse situation, where society **accumulates** more capacity than the state, we have a weak state. Finally, a rough balance of power between state and society leads to the emergence of an **inclusive** state. Our model clarifies how the competition between elites and society in this case is the engine behind the emergence of the greatest state capacity. Elites in despotic states, because they can easily dominate society, have less reason to **accumulate** as much power and capacity. † 在我们的模型中, 这种逻辑, 导致了三种不同的均衡国家和社会能力的星座, 非常不同。在一种我们称之为专制的平衡中, 国家比社会获得了更多的能力, 从某种意义上说, 它占据了主导地位。在相反的情况下, 社会积累的能力比国家强, 则我们有一个软弱的国家。最后, 国家和社会之间的权力大致平衡, 社会导致包容性国家的出现。我们的该模型, 阐明了精英和社会之间的竞争, 是最大的国家能力出现的发动机。专制国家的精英, 因为统治社会很容易, 他们尽可能多地积累的权力和能力的理由, 更少。

#### **SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS**

To view supplementary material for this article, please visit <http://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055422000740>.

#### **DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT**

Research documentation and data that support the findings of this study are openly available at the American Political Science Review Dataverse: <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ALEVIE>.

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The authors declare no ethical issues or conflicts of interest in this research.

#### **ETHICAL STANDARDS**

The authors affirm this research did not involve human subjects.

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


图 1 The Emergence and Dynamics of Weak, Despotic, and Inclusive States. † 弱的、专制的和包容性的国家的出现和动态。




图 2 Conditional Comparative Statics: The Same Impulse Leads to Very Different Trajectories of Political Development. † 条件比较静力学：相同的动力导致截然不同的政治发展轨迹。




图 3 The Direction of Change of the Capacities of State and Society in a Simulated Example. † 一个模拟例子中的国家和社会能力的变化方向。

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