

**Non-Modernization: Power - Culture Trajectories
and the Dynamics of Political Institutions**
非现代化：权力文化轨迹与政治制度动态*

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摘 要

Modernization theory is a cornerstone of much of **political** science, despite the mounting evidence against its predictions. We outline a theory in which the distribution of **political power** critically combines with **political culture**. We call the basic components of **culture** “attributes” and argue that these can be combined into larger cultural configurations. These configurations interact with the distribution of **power** and lead to three distinct self-reinforcing paths of **political** development, with very different state - society relations, institutions, and economic structures. These are paths to Despotic, Absent, and Shackled Leviathans. The role of cultural configurations is critical in legitimizing the social arrangements in each path. None of the three different paths we highlight support modernization theory. We discuss how **political** equilibria can change in ways critically dependent on cultural and **political** entrepreneurship in order to formulate and popularize new cultural configurations and institutionalize **political** changes.

现代化理论是许多政治科学的基石，尽管越来越多的证据，反对其预测。我们概述了一个理论，其中政治权力的分配与政治文化，批判性地结合在一起。我们称文化的基本组成部分为“属性”，并认为这些属性，可以整合成更大的文化结构。随着权力的分配，这些配置相互作用，导致三种截然不同的自我强化政治发展道路，截然不同的国家与社会关系，制度和经济结构。这些是通往专制、心不在焉、还有束缚的 Leviathans 的途径。文化结构，在每条道路上的社会安排合法化中，起着至关重要的作用。我们强调，三条不同的路径都没有支持现代化理论。我们讨论，政治平衡，如何能以批判性地依赖文化和政治的创业方式发生变化，旨在制定和推广新的文化形态，并将政治变革制度化。

关键词 (Key words): modernization, **power**, **culture**, regime, state / 现代化、权力、文化、政权、国家

常见词 (Frequently appeared words): **culture**, **power**, **political** / 文化，权力，政治的

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政治科学年鉴 杂志的 影响因子

§1 INTRODUCTION † 引言

“The rule of Virtue,” President Xi Jinping told Chinese Communist Party members (Van Norden 2017), “may be compared to the Pole Star, which stays in its place while the myriad stars pay it homage.” President Xi was quoting Confucius as a justification for his continued rule at the helm of the Communist Party. Xi’s notion of Virtue leaves no room for civil society or democratic participation, which was already limited in China in 2017 and has become much more constricted during his rule.

习近平主席对中国共产党党员说 (Van Norden 2017): “以德治国”, “可以比作北极星, 当无数恒星付钱时, 北极星仍留在原地致敬”。习主席引用孔子的话, 作为他继续领导共产党的理由。习的概念, 没有给民间社会或民主参与留下任何空间。在他的统治期间的2017年, 民间社会或民主参与, 在中国已经受到限制, 而且变得更加严格。

To many political scientists, this is a challenge. Modernization theory, most influentially articulated by Lipset (1959), is one of the cornerstones of modern political science and predicts that as societies become richer, more educated, and economically more modernized, their political institutions should also experience a particular path—become more democratic, respect civil and human rights more, and develop several other societal features we commonly associate with Western democracies (see also Apter 1967, Huntington 1968, Rostow 1971).

对于许多政治科学家来说, 这是一个挑战。最具影响力的现代化理论, Lipset (1959) 阐述了这一观点, 作为现代政治学的基石之一, 该理论预测, 随着社会变得更加富裕、受过更多教育、经济更加现代化, 他们的政治制度, 也应该经历一条特定的道路——变得更加民主, 尊重更多地关注公民权利和人权, 并发展我们通常联系的其他几个社会特征, 与西方民主国家合作 (另见 Apter 1967, Huntington 1968, Rostow 1971)。

China’s economy has been modernizing rapidly. It has the largest middle class anywhere in the world, estimated at 730 million people in 2016 (Kharas & Dooley 2020), and its citizens attain 8.1 years of schooling on average (UN Dev. Prog. 2020). Many aspects of its economy are more modern than in the United States; for example, the majority of its citizens already use electronic payments and the most advanced communication technologies. Its income per capita has exceeded \$13,000 in 2011 US dollars, which makes it 20% richer than the United Kingdom was in 1945 (data from Bolt & van Zanden 2020)—a critical period in that country’s political history, when it was implementing the Beveridge Report’s recommendations in building a modern welfare state backed by a highly democratic political structure.

中国经济它正在迅速现代化。据估计, 2016年, 它拥有世界上最大的中产阶级, 人口为 7.3 亿 (Kharas & Dooley 2020), 其公民平均接受了 8.1 年的学校教育 (联合国开发计划署, 2020年)。其经济的许多方面比美国现代化; 例如, 其大多数公民, 已经使用电子支付最先进的通信技术。2011 年, 其人均收入已超过 13000 美元, 使其比 1945 年的英国富裕 20% (数据来自 Bolt & van Zanden 2020) ——该国政治历史上的关键时期, 当时该国正在实施贝弗里奇报告建议, 建立一个有高度民主政治结构的现代福利国家。

Is China’s stubborn authoritarian rule the nail in the coffin of modernization theory? Not necessarily, say its defenders. First, they may claim that China is the exception that proves the rule (Treisman 2020, p. 246). Second, they may claim that true modernization in China is delayed because of various

historical factors (the Cultural Revolution, Confucian culture, or some remnants of Communist beliefs). For example, Treisman (2020, p. 247) proposes a “conditional modernization” theory where culture, among other factors, can delay the onset of modernization. Indeed, to Lipset himself, modernization was partly a cultural process. As a country becomes richer, more educated, and more modern, Lipset (1959) argued, its values change, and this is the leitmotif of its democratization.

中国顽固的威权统治，是现代化理论棺材上的钉子吗？不一定，它的捍卫者说。首先，他们可能会声称，中国是证明这一规则的例外(Treisman 2020, p. 246)。其次，他们可能会声称，中国真正的现代化之所以被推迟，是因为各种历史因素（文化大革命、儒家文化或一些残余共产主义信仰）。例如，Treisman (2020, p247) 提出了“有条件的现代化”理论，一种文化等因素，可以延缓现代化进程的理论。的确，对 Lipset 本人来说，现代化在一定程度上是一个文化过程。随着一个国家变得更加富裕 Lipset (1959) 认为，受过教育、更现代的人，其价值观会发生变化，这是其民主化的主题。

The problem with modernization theory is in fact deeper: It is inadequate for thinking about these issues because it posits a link between economics and politics that is not conditional on institutions and culture and that presumes a definite endpoint—for example, an “end of history” (Fukuyama 1989). In practice, the relationship between economics and politics and how economic and political development impact each other cannot be separated from these institutional and cultural factors, and this dependence means that there is no unique endpoint toward which all societies inexorably head.

现代化理论的问题，实际上更深层次：它不足以思考这些问题，是因为它在经济和政治之间建立了一种联系，而这种联系并不取决于制度和文化，这假设了一个明确的终点，例如“历史的终结”(Fukuyama 1989)。在实践中，经济与政治的关系，以及经济如何和政治发展相互影响，不能与这些制度和文化因素分离，这种依赖性，意味着所有人都没有唯一的终点，社会无情地前进。

This perspective is related to the framework we developed in two recent works (Acemoglu & Robinson 2017, 2019), where we argued that historical and structural forces shape how state – society relations develop. We pointed out that three broad clusters of long-run economic and political institutions are possible. In the first (Absent Leviathan), the state is weak, while societal collective action and various norms are strong and constrain political hierarchy. In the second (Despotic Leviathan), the state is strong; it crushes and further impairs an already weak society. In the third (Shackled Leviathan), there is a balance between the state’s and society’s capacities, which enables their coevolution toward greater strength and also undergirds a very different type of state—simultaneously powerful and still accountable and responsive to society. Economic modernization is almost impossible under the Absent Leviathan.

这一观点，与我们在最近开发的两部作品 (Acemoglu & Robinson 2017, 2019) 中的框架有关，在这两部作品中，我们认为历史和结构性力量，塑造了国家与社会关系的发展方式。我们指出，可能存在三大类长期经济和政治制度。在第一种（心不在焉的 Leviathan）中，国家软弱，而社会集体行动和各种规范是强大的，并约束政治层次结构。在第二种（专制的 Leviathan），国家强大；它摧毁并进一步损害了一个已经脆弱的社会。在第三种（束缚的 Leviathan）中，国家和社会的能力之间存在平衡，这使得它们能够共同进化，以获得更大的力量，并支撑着一种截然不同的类型状态—国家同时有力，也对社会负责并作出回应。经济现代化，在（心不在焉的 Leviathan）中，几乎是不可能的。

It is possible under the Despotic Leviathan, and under some circumstances it can proceed rather rapidly. But it will not bring democracy or accountable behavior by rulers and bureaucrats. The

positive feedback between **political** institutions and economic development is only a feature of the Shackled Leviathan. As a result, economic changes in, say, South Korea will have fundamentally different implications than when the same changes happen in China.¹

在(专制 Leviathan)的统治下,这是可能的,在某些情况下,它可以相当迅速地进行。但它不会带来民主或统治者和官僚的负责任行为。政治制度和经济发展之间的正反馈,只是(被束缚的 Leviathan)的一个特征。因此,韩国等国的经济变化将产生的影响,与中国发生同样变化时的影响,根本不同。

These insights, though formulated in a different way and yielding different implications than in the previous literature, are nevertheless related to some classic arguments in **political** theory. Machiavelli [1961 (1532), p. 67] proposed similar ideas more than 500 years ago, identifying a related trichotomy: “The people are everywhere anxious not to be dominated or oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles are out to dominate and to oppress the people. These opposed ambitions bring about one of three results: a principality, a free city, or **anarchy**.”

这些见解,虽然以不同的方式表述,并产生了与先前文献不同的含义,但与政治理论中的一些经典论点有关。Machiavelli [1961 (1532), p. 67] 在 500 多年前提出了类似的观点,确认一个相关的三分法:“各地的人民都渴望不被贵族统治或压迫,贵族也出来统治和压迫人民。这些对立的野心,带来的三种结果之一是:公国、自由城市或**无政府状态**。”

Missing from our previous framework, as well as from Machiavelli’s thought, is the role of **culture**. Different state – society relations are not only bolstered by economic and **political** contests (as modeled in Acemoglu & Robinson 2017) but also interwoven with particular worldviews that legitimize prevailing institutions and distributions of **political power**. This is the focus of the current article. We build a framework where the exact interplay between institutions, **culture**, and politics is shaped by historical and structural factors, and this interplay can go in diametrically opposed directions depending on these factors.

我们之前的框架以及 Machiavelli 的思想中,都缺少**文化**的作用。不同的国家-社会关系,不仅受到经济和政治竞争的支持(如 Acemoglu & Robinson 2017 所示),还与特定的世界观交织在一起,这些世界观,使主流制度和政治权力分配合法化。这是本文的重点。我们构建了一个框架,在这个框架中,制度、**文化**和政治之间的确切相互作用,是由历史和结构因素塑造的,而这种相互作用,可能会根据这些因素,朝着截然相反的方向发展。

The key new element in this article turns on the concept of a cultural configuration. We argue, building on Acemoglu & Robinson (2021), that many societies have a fairly stable **culture** set. Its attributes determine such things as the importance of hierarchy, the influence of family and gender roles, and the higher ideals (such as virtue and honor) that are valued, with specific types of rituals and relevant customs and traditions.

本文的关键新元素在于**文化结构**的概念。我们认为,在 Acemoglu & Robinson (2021) 的基础上,许多社会都有一个相当稳定的**文化集合**。它的属性,决定了等级制度的重要性、家庭和性别角色的影响,以及被重视的更高理想(如美德和荣誉),具体类型如下仪式、相关习俗和传统。

These attributes can be combined into different cultural configurations, each with different meanings for individuals and societies and each providing justifications for distinct **political** arrangements and

¹This highly context-specific nature of economic modernization is confirmed by the cross-national econometric results of Acemoglu et al. (2008, 2009); see also Acemoglu & Robinson (2018).

social hierarchies. Hence, the Despotism Leviathan—and why, under its auspices, economic growth will not automatically bring democratic institutions—cannot be fully understood without appreciating the cultural configuration that convinces people that rule by virtuous leaders is legitimate and ordinary people should not challenge them and should not strive to have their voices heard.

这些属性，可以组合成不同的文化结构，每种配置，对个人和社会都有不同的含义，每种属性，都为不同的政治安排和社会等级制度，提供了理由。因此，如果不了解文化结构，就无法充分理解专制 Leviathan，以及为什么在它的主持下，经济增长不会自动带来民主制度，这种文化结构，使人们相信，由有道德的领导人统治是合法的，普通人不应挑战他们，也不应努力让他们的声音被听到。

The Despotism Leviathan also provides interpretations that push people toward accepting the virtue of such leaders. Vitality, however, our framework does not claim (nor is it true) that such attitudes are ingrained and unchangeable. A given culture set can generate many different cultural configurations, and as the political balance of power and other structural conditions change, a new cultural configuration can emerge, with very different justifications for politics, sometimes rather swiftly.

专制 Leviathan 也提供了一些解释，促使人们接受这些领导人的美德。然而，至关重要的是，我们的框架并没有声称（也不是真的），这种态度是根深蒂固和不可改变的。给定的文化集，可以生成许多不同的文化结构，随着权利的政治平衡和其他结构条件的变化，一种新的文化结构，可能会出现，其政治理由非常不同，有时甚至相当迅速。

The Chinese case powerfully illustrates these ideas and elucidates why modernization theory is not a useful framework. Indeed, cultural factors are central in the Chinese equilibrium, which still heavily depends on Confucian philosophy. In Confucius' s view, the best organization of society had powerful leaders and a government that did not need to have any accountability, let alone democracy. “When the Way prevails in the world, commoners do not debate matters of Government” (Confucius 2003, 16.2, p. 193). Rather, government operates best when leaders cultivate virtue and find the Way.

中国的案例，有力地阐述了这些思想，并阐明了为什么现代化理论不是一个有用的框架。事实上，文化因素，是中国均衡的核心，仍然严重依赖儒家哲学。在孔子看来，社会的最佳组织，具有有力领导人，而政府不需要任何问责，更不用说问责民主了。“当道在世界上盛行时，平民不会辩论政府事务”（孔子，2003年，第16.2页，第193页）。相反，当领导者培养美德时，政府运作最佳，找到道路。

This Confucian philosophy has deeply influenced Chinese politics for 2,500 years throughout the vicissitudes of dynastic politics, invasions, European colonialism, economic decline, state collapse and, last but not least, communism. The famous examination system tested its aspirants on their knowledge of the Confucian classics, and now the Chinese government sponsors Confucius Institutes all over the world.

这种儒家哲学，对中国政治产生了深远的影响，2500年来历经王朝政治、侵略、欧洲殖民主义、经济衰落、国家崩溃，最后但同样重要的是，共产主义。著名的考试制度，考验了有志者对儒家经典的了解，现在又考验了，赞助世界各地的孔子学院的中国政府。

This is the basis of the view of scholars such as Huntington (1991, p. 24) that China was bound to be nondemocratic given its Confucian culture, as “no scholarly disagreement exists regarding the proposition that traditional Confucianism was either undemocratic or antidemocratic.” Yet, the specific way in which Confucian philosophy was applied cannot be understood without considering who exercised political power in China and how.

这是 Huntington (1991, p. 24) 等学者的观点的基础, 即鉴于中国的儒家文化, 中国必然是不民主的, 因为“对于传统儒家思想是不民主还是反民主的命题, 学术界并不存在分歧。”然而, 如果不考虑谁在中国行使权力、以及如何行使权力, 就无法理解, 儒家哲学的具体应用方式。

The Qin dynasty created the first version of the imperial state, relying not only on Confucian ideas but also on Legalism, as articulated by Lord Shang, who claimed, “When the people are weak the state is strong; when the people are strong the state is weak. Hence, the state that possesses the Way devotes itself to weakening the people” (Shang 2017, 20.1, p. 79).

秦朝, 创造了第一个版本的帝国, 不仅依靠儒家思想, 还依靠法家思想, 正如 商大人 所言, 他声称: “当人民软弱时, 国家强大; 当人民强大时, 国家软弱。因此, 拥有道的国家致力于削弱人民” (Shang 2017, 20.1, p. 79)。

Here, virtuous rule apparently involved weakening the people, just in case. Although the Qin triumphed by military might, the reason why this relative power balance between state and society, and the institutions that have accompanied it, have been so enduring in China is because basic elements of Confucian philosophy have been fused with the top-down model of government articulated by Legalism. Indeed, neither imperial rule nor the reign of the Communist Party in China can be understood without appreciating how Confucian philosophy was critical in people’s lives (generating meaning, order in family relations, stable expectations, and specific rituals) and at the same time how it legitimized top-down rule.²

在这里, 德治, 显然涉及削弱人民, 以防万一。尽管秦凭借军事力量, 取得了胜利, 但国家和社会之间的这种相对的权力平衡, 以及随之而来的制度, 之所以在中国如此持久, 是因为儒家哲学的基本要素, 与法家所阐述的自上而下的政府模式, 相融合。事实上, 如果不了解儒家哲学在人们生活中的重要性, (在家庭关系中产生意义、秩序、稳定的期望和特定的仪式), 以及它如何使自上而下的统治合法化, 就无法理解帝国统治, 无法理解共产党在中国的统治。

Crucially, however, it would also be a mistake to follow Huntington (1991) and presume that this particular legitimization of despotic rule by Confucian thought is a hardwired feature of Chinese society and politics. Rather, it has emerged and endured because the distribution of political power and political institutions have reinforced it. Put differently, China’s political trajectory has created a specific type of feedback between its institutions and cultural configuration. The more empowered are the ruler and the elites, the more ingrained the cultural configuration legitimizing their rule and discouraging societal participation becomes.

然而, 至关重要的是, 遵循 Huntington (1991) 的观点, 认为儒家思想对专制统治的这种特殊合法化, 是中国社会和政治的固有特征, 这也是一个错误。相反, 它之所以出现并持续存在, 是因为政治权利和政治制度的分布, 加强了它。换句话说, 中国的政治 轨迹, 在其制度和结构之间, 创造了一种特定类型的反馈。统治者、精英的权力越大, 使他们的统治合法化、并阻碍社会参与的文化结构, 就越根深蒂固。

And in typical circular fashion, the greater is the legitimacy conferred on it, the stronger authoritarian rule becomes. Another balance of political power could have produced a very different cultural

²Perry (2008, 2018) discusses the continuities and similarities between imperial and communist ideologies of state legitimacy. Pan & Xu (2017) document a strong correlation between Chinese citizens’ beliefs in the importance of Confucianism and the extent to which they view Western political institutions and rights as inappropriate in China.

configuration. We see this in Taiwan, which has the same Confucian **culture** set as China. Over the last 30 years, Taiwan has combined the same attributes in a way that generated a very different cultural configuration, supporting vibrant democratic rule. Our point is not only that different cultural configurations, with widely differing **political** implications, are possible. It is also that, as we discuss below, the shift from one cultural configuration to another can be rather abrupt, which is again illustrated by Taiwan's history.

以典型的循环方式，赋予它的合法性越大，威权统治就越强大。另一种政治**权力**的平衡，可能会产生一种非常不同的文化结构。我们在台湾看到了这一点，它拥有与中国相同的儒家文化。在过去的 30 年里，台湾将同样的属性结合在一起，形成了一种截然不同的文化结构，支持充满活力的民主统治。我们的观点不仅是，不同的文化结构，具有广泛不同的政治含义，是可能的。正如我们在下面讨论的那样，从一种文化形态到另一种文化格局的转变，可能相当突然，台湾的历史再次说明了这一点。

There is nothing unique about China or Confucian **culture**. We encounter similar dynamics in English history, where different **political** philosophies were constructed from the same foundations and justified very different state - society relations and **political** systems. Moreover, the English case illustrates even more clearly than the Chinese one how a volte-face in cultural configuration can **take place in response to changing political and economic conditions**.

中国或儒家文化，没有什么独特之处。我们在以下方面遇到了类似的英国历史的动态，其中不同的政治哲学是基于相同的基础构建的，并为非常不同的国家-社会关系和政治制度辩护。此外，英国的案例，比中国的案例更清楚地说明了，文化结构的转变，如何根据不断变化的政治和经济条件而发生。

What does all this mean for modernization theory? As we have already hinted, the coexistence of different **political** trajectories, leading to very different limiting equilibria of state - society relations, invalidates the core precept of modernization theory. However, in our assessment, the failings of modernization theory are deeper. The exact way in which cultural configurations emerge, which we argue to be critical for understanding the nature of **political power** in society, shapes what economic modernization and economic growth involve and what types of social and **political** arrangements are viewed as legitimate.

这一切对现代化理论意味着什么？正如我们已经暗示的那样，共存不同的政治轨迹，导致国家-社会的极限均衡关系，非常不同，使现代化理论的核心原则失效。然而，根据我们的评估，现代化理论的缺陷更为深刻。出现文化结构的确切方式，我们认为，这对于理解社会中政治**权利**的性质至关重要，塑造了经济现代化和经济增长所涉及的内容，以及社会和经济发展的类型、政治安排被视为合法。Modernization theory, by ignoring the critical role of cultural configurations and how they can endogenously remake what is and what is not feasible, may be inducing us to focus on the wrong variables as determinants of the dynamics of **political** institutions.

现代化理论，忽视批判文化结构的作用、以及它们如何内生地重塑是什么和不是什么可行的，可能会诱使我们关注错误的变量，将其作为政治制度动态的主导因素。

We are, of course, not the first ones to think about the role of **culture** in politics. Although cultural factors are not part of many of the seminal frameworks of **political** science—for example, Tilly's (1990) theory of the emergence of states; Moore's (1966) theory of capitalism, fascism, and communism; or more orthodox Marxist frameworks for understanding **political** and economic change—they have featured in important contributions. Huntington (1996) places a heavy emphasis on **culture** in his work on

civilizations.

当然，我们并不是第一个考虑文化在政治中的作用的人。尽管文化因素，不是政治科学的许多开创性框架的一部分，例如，Tilly（1990）的国家出现理论；Moore（1966）的资本主义、法西斯主义和共产主义；或更正统的马克思主义框架，用于理解政治和经济变化——他们做出了重要贡献。Huntington（1996）在他关于文明的著作中，非常强调文化。

Culture has also played a critical role in the modern literature on nationalism and identity (Anderson 1983, Laitin 1998, Horowitz 2000, Gellner 2009) and in the literature about the impact of religion on politics (Laitin 1986; Kalyvas 1996; Grzymała-Busse 2012, 2015). Putnam's (1993) theory of good democratic governance, building on Banfield's (1958) insights, also includes a central role for cultural factors. Finally, Almond & Verba's (1963) seminal work merges culture and political behavior in understanding the support for democracy.

文化，在关于民族主义和身份的现代文学（Anderson 1983, Laitin 1998, Horowitz 2000, Gellner 2009）和关于宗教对政治影响的文学（Laitin 1986; Kalyvas 1996; Grzymała-Busse 2012, 2015）中，也发挥了关键作用。Putnam（1993）的良好民主治理理论，以 Banfield（1958）的见解为基础，也包括文化因素的核心作用。最后，Almond 和 Verba（1963）的开创性工作，将文化和政治行为融合在一起，以理解对民主的支持。

Nevertheless, none of these approaches have recognized the two pillars that are at the center of our framework. The first is the malleable role of cultural configurations (and how they can be constructed from a stable culture set). Although this notion is central to much of modern sociology (e.g., Geertz 1973, Swidler 1986, DiMaggio 1997, Sewell 2005), it has had less of an impact in political science. An exception is the constructivist research on ethnic identity (Posner 2005, Chandra 2012), which studies the endogeneity of ethnic identity, but it does not extend the analysis to the malleability of culture more broadly.

然而，这些方法，都没有认识到处于中心的两个支柱，首先是文化结构的可塑性作用（以及它们如何从稳定的文化集构建）。尽管这一概念，在现代社会的许多方面，都处于核心地位（例如，Geertz 1973, Swidler 1986, DiMaggio 1997, Sewell 2005），对政治科学，它没有那么多影响。一个例外，是关于民族认同的建构主义研究（Posner 2005, Chandra 2012），研究了种族认同的内生性，但没有扩展、更广泛地分析文化的延展性。

The second pillar is the presence of multiple long-run trajectories, with no natural tendency for all societies to move in the same direction, develop the same type of relationship between economics and politics, or even respond in the same way to structural changes.³

第二个支柱，是多元文化的存在长期轨迹，所有社会都没有朝着同一方向发展的自然趋势，在经济和政治之间发展相同类型的关系，甚至在结构变化也是如此。

The rest of the article is organized as follows. The next section introduces our conceptual framework and highlights the interplay between politics and culture. It is followed by three sections that apply this framework to illustrative cases of Despotism, Absent, and Shackled Leviathans, starting with the Chinese case. We then distill some of the lessons from these case studies and reevaluate modernization theory. The concluding section suggests directions for future work.

³Sociologists have examined the role of cultural factors in state formation (Gorski 2003, Adams 2005, Steinmetz 1999), but their works have not attempted the type of broad comparative analysis that we propose here.

文章的其余部分组织如下。下一节，将介绍我们的概念框架，并强调了政治和文化之间的相互作用。接下来是三个部分，将这一框架应用于专制、心不在焉和被束缚的Leviathans的说明性案例，从中国的案例开始。然后，我们从这些案例研究中，提炼出一些经验教训重新评价现代化理论。结论部分，提出了未来工作的方向。

§2 REINTERPRETING THE VARIETIES OF LEVIATHAN † 重新解读 LEVIATHAN 的多样性

Different **political** systems can emerge as stable long-run equilibria, bolstered by different types of state - society relations (Acemoglu & Robinson 2019). Figure 1 illustrates the configurations we have in mind. The three long-run **political** equilibria depicted—which we call Despotism Leviathan, Absent Leviathan, and Shackled Leviathan—involve different types of state institutions and different patterns of **political** participation by regular citizens. They are also associated with their own “basins of attraction” within which, as the illustrative trajectories indicate, dynamics gradually evolve toward those long-run institutional equilibria.

不同的政治系统，可以作为稳定的长期均衡出现，并得到不同类型的国家-社会关系的支持 (Acemoglu & Robinson 2019)。图 1 说明了我们想到的配置。所描绘的三个长期政治均衡，我们称之为专制 Leviathan，心不在焉的 Leviathan 和束缚的 Leviathan — 涉及不同类型的国家机构和不同的普通公民参与政治的模式。它们也与自己的“吸引盆地”有关，正如说明性的轨迹所示，在这些盆地内，动态逐渐朝着这些长期制度均衡发展。

How different these trajectories are deserves some emphasis. Let us first focus on the trajectory heading toward the Despotism Leviathan, which captures a general feature of this basin of attraction. With the rising dominance of the state over society, society becomes increasingly impaired and unable to organize and contest **power**. Interestingly, however, this trajectory also underscores that the capacity of the state will ultimately stop growing somewhere below the maximum **power** it can achieve. Put simply, the long-run state - society configuration that emerges from these trajectories is one of great imbalance between the capacities of state and society, but it also involves a limit on how **powerful** and capable the state becomes. In the basin of attraction of the Absent Leviathan, we see the converse dynamics. Society is relatively strong, and this prevents **political** hierarchy and strong state institutions from emerging. Ultimately, any institutional arrangements that create this type of hierarchy tend to atrophy—a typical pattern we see in the history of **politically** decentralized societies (often called small-scale or may be stateless societies).

这些轨迹有多不同值得强调。让我们首先关注轨迹走向专制 Leviathan，它捕捉到了这个吸引人的盆地的一般特征。随着国家对社会的主导地位日益上升，社会越来越受损，无法组织和**权力**竞争。然而，有趣的是，这一轨迹也突显出，国家的能力，最终将在低于其可以实现的最大**权力**的某个地方，停止增长。简单地说，从这些轨迹中出现的长期国家-社会配置，是国家和社会能力严重失衡的问题之一，但也涉及国家变得如何有能力和如何有权力的极限问题。在“心不在焉的 Leviathan”的吸引力盆地中，我们看到了相反的动态。社会是相对强大，这阻止了政治等级制度和强大的国家机构的出现。最终，任何创造这种等级制度的制度安排都会萎缩—这是我们在历史上看到的典型模式政治地分散的社会（通常称为小规模或无国籍社会）。

In the middle corridor, something very different transpires. In contrast to the two other basins of attraction, the capacities of both state and society increase simultaneously. We interpret this as resulting from both competition and cooperation between state and society (Acemoglu & Robinson 2019). Competition is rooted in the fact that as the state gets more capable, it becomes harder to monitor, and society needs to increase its **powers** in order to maintain its relative situation. Cooperation is equally important: When society is capable of reining in the state, it becomes more willing to share information and allow the state to penetrate and regulate various productive and social relations. This type of state - society balance is in fact critical for the emergence of democratic institutions, a general notion of liberty (providing protection and social opportunities for agency for individuals), and economic dynamism. That trajectories in this middle region are tending toward values of state capacity greater than those achieved by the Despotic Leviathan is related to these features. A degree of self-reinforcing dynamics is apparent in all of these trajectories. For example, for the Despotic Leviathan, the stronger the state and elites become, the weaker is society. What is the source of these self-reinforcing dynamics? Although these dynamics have some element of **power** begetting **power** due to the standard economic and **political** reasons (see, e.g., Acemoglu & Robinson 2012), detailed analysis of historical dynamics suggests that there is more to it. States become stronger when they are viewed as more legitimate, and when they are stronger, they tend to increase their legitimacy. Similarly, along this trajectory, it becomes accepted that citizens have less business in interfering in government affairs and there is less need for civil society organizations monitoring and pressuring elites. But some of the major tools for understanding issues of legitimacy and what is socially acceptable—social meanings, expectations, values, and beliefs—are missing from this framework. Where did they come from?

在中间的走廊里，发生了一些非常不同的事情。与另外两个吸引盆地相比，国家和社会的能力同时增加。我们解释这是国家与社会之间竞争与合作的结果 (Acemoglu & Robinson 2019)。竞争的根源在于，随着国家能力的提高，变得更难监控，社会需要增加其**能力**，以保持其相对地位。合作同样重要：当社会能够控制国家时，它就更愿意分享信息，并允许国家渗透和规范各种生产和社会关系。这种国家与社会的平衡实际上对民主制度、自由的一般概念（为个人提供保护和社会机会）以及经济活力的出现至关重要。这个中间区域的轨迹，倾向于比专制 Leviathan 所达到的国家能力值更大的国家能力，这与这些特征有关。在所有这些轨迹中，都明显存在一定程度的自我强化动态。例如，对于专制 Leviathan，国家和精英越强大，社会就越脆弱。这些自我强化动力的来源是什么？尽管由于标准的经济和政治原因（例如，参见 Acemoglu & Robinson 2012），这些动态有一些**能力**引发**能力**的因素，但对历史动态的详细分析表明，还有更多因素。当国家被视为更合法时，它们会变得更强大，当它们变得更强大时，它们往往会增加其合法性。同样，沿着这一轨迹，人们逐渐接受公民干预政府事务的业务减少，民间社会组织监督和向精英施压的必要性降低。但是，了解**合法性**和社会可接受的东西（社会意义、期望、价值观和信仰）这些问题的主要工具，在这个框架中缺失了。它们从哪里来？

By exploring this question, we develop and add to the Acemoglu & Robinson (2019) framework. We start from the modern sociology literature in thinking about **culture**. Geertz (1973, p. 89) defines **culture** as a “historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes towards life.” Several aspects of this definition are worth emphasizing. Most importantly, Geertz refuses the simplistic notion that **culture** is about stable values. Rather, **culture**

is about interpreting the world, defining social meaning, communicating, and justifying social actions. This notion of **culture** also clarifies that in any given society there are many different ways of creating meaning and justifying actions. This perspective is the basis of Swidler's (1986, p. 277) influential work, which defines **culture** as "a 'toolkit' or repertoire from which actors select differing pieces for constructing lines of action. Both individuals and groups know how to do different kinds of things in different circumstances." Put differently, many different values, interpretations and justifications are consistent with a given **culture**. This is the basis of our notion of a cultural configuration, which emphasizes that different configurations, with different social implications, can be produced from the same **culture**. 通过探索这个问题，我们开发并添加了 Acemoglu & Robinson (2019) 框架。我们从现代社会学文献出发，思考文化。Geertz (1973, 第89页) 将文化定义为“历史上传播的符号所体现的意义模式，一种以符号形式表达的继承概念系统，人们通过这种方式交流、延续和发展他们对生活的知识和态度。”这一定义的几个方面值得强调。最重要的是，Geertz拒绝了文化是关于稳定值的简单概念。相反，文化是关于解释世界，定义社会意义、沟通和证明的社会行为。文化的概念，也阐明了在任何特定的社会中，都有许多不同的方式，来创造意义和证明行为的正当性。这一观点是 Swidler (1986年, 第277页) 有影响力的作品的基础，该作品将**culture**定义为“一个‘工具包’或曲目，演员从中选择不同的片段，来构建行动线。个人和团体都知道，如何在不同的情况下做不同的事情。”换句话说，许多不同的价值观、解释和理由与给定的文化是一致的。这是我们文化结构概念的基础，强调同一文化，可以产生具有不同社会含义的不同配置。

We have developed this perspective further by conceptualizing the constituent elements of **culture** as “attributes” that are contained in a **culture** set and can be combined in various different ways to produce different cultural configurations (Acemoglu & Robinson 2021). For instance, as we see in the next section, there are several important elements in Confucian philosophy related to the importance of virtue, tradition, rituals, and hierarchy, but these can be combined in different ways, and their combinations provide different social meanings and legitimizations for different types of **political** arrangements. 我们进一步发展了这一观点，将文化的组成元素，概念化为文化集中包含的“属性”，可以以各种不同的方式组合，以产生不同的文化配置 (Acemoglu & Robinson 2021)。例如，正如我们在下一节中看到的，儒家哲学中有几个重要元素与美德、传统、仪式和等级制度的重要性有关，但这些元素，可以以不同的方式组合在一起，它们的组合为不同类型的政治安排，提供了不同的社会意义和合法性。

The fluidity of a **culture** is pivotal here. Although an important part of the emphasis is on how fluid (malleable) different **cultures** may be (Acemoglu & Robinson 2021), here we simplify matters and presume that we are dealing with sufficiently fluid **cultures** that allow a multitude of cultural configurations with distinct **political** and social implications. This opens the way specifically to DiMaggio's (1997, p. 265) observation that “once we acknowledge that people behave as if they use **culture** strategically, it follows that the **cultures** into which people are socialized leave much opportunity for choice and variation.” Building on his terminology, we interpret the world as having plenty of scope for the strategic use of **culture**.

文化的流动性，在这里至关重要。尽管重点的一个重要部分，是不同文化的流体（延展性）如何可能是不同的 (Acemoglu & Robinson 2021)，在这里我们简化了问题，并假设我们正在处理足够流畅的文化，它允许具有不同政治和社会含义的多种文化结构。这为 DiMaggio (1997, 第265页) 的观察开辟了道路，即“一旦我们承认人们的行为，就像他们战略性地使用文化一样，那么文化使人们被社

会化，留下了很多选择和变化的机会。”根据他的术语，我们将世界解释为，有足够的空间来战略性地使用文化。

What does this imply in the context of Figure 1? We start from the perspective that the true extent of self-reinforcing dynamics underlying these trajectories cannot be understood without studying how these trajectories themselves shape social meaning, values, and beliefs. Put simply, the trajectory going toward the Despot Leviathan cannot be separated from the cultural configuration that dictates that top-down rule is legitimate, rulers are virtuous or divinely empowered, and common people interfering in matters of state is inappropriate. This cultural configuration, used strategically both by leaders to further their positions and by citizens to adapt to life in a despotic polity, then makes it harder for civil society to become stronger and renders it more likely that the imbalance of **power** will continue. In typical self-reinforcing fashion, the longer we are in the basin of attraction of the Despot Leviathan, the more ingrained the current cultural configuration gets, and the easier it becomes to legitimize the rule of elites—be they emperors or bosses of the Communist Party.

这在图 1 的上下文中意味着什么？我们从真实的角度出发，如果不研究这些轨迹本身如何塑造社会意义、价值观和信仰，就无法理解这些轨迹背后的自我强化动力学的程度。简单地说，走向专制 Leviathan 的轨迹，与文化结构密不可分。这表明自上而下的规则，是合法的，统治者是善良的或神圣的，普通民众干涉国家事务是不恰当的。这种文化结构，被领导人战略性地用来巩固自己的地位，也被公民战略性地用来适应专制政体中的生活，这使得公民社会更难变得更强大，并使**权力**的不平衡，更有可能持续下去。以典型的自我强化的方式，我们在专制 Leviathan 的吸引力盆地中停留的时间越长，当前的文化结构，就越根深蒂固，精英统治的合法化，就越容易—无论是皇帝，还是共产党的老板。

Likewise, in the basin of attraction of the Absent Leviathan, state institutions atrophy because the population comes to believe that any **political** hierarchy is dangerous, a tool in the hands of upstart individuals, and/or likely to lead to much worse outcomes along a predictable slippery slope. Analogous to what we described in the context of the Despot Leviathan, it is difficult to escape from the orbit of the Absent Leviathan, because people increasingly view **political** hierarchy as illegitimate. As we describe below, this type of thinking becomes second nature to many individuals living in **politically** decentralized societies without **powerful** state institutions, and of course once it becomes widespread, and incorporated into their belief systems, it makes such societies likely to endure and **political** hierarchy and state institutions much less likely to emerge. A very different type of cultural configuration supports the trajectories in the middle corridor of Figure 1, where the Shackled Leviathan emerges. Here, it is neither unacceptable for regular people to participate in politics and keep rulers accountable, nor illegitimate to create **political** hierarchy and centralized institutions. Instead, a cultural configuration with three distinctive aspects develops.

同样，在心不在焉的 Leviathan 的吸引力盆地中，国家机构萎缩，是因为人们开始相信，任何政治等级制度都是危险的，是**暴发户**手中的工具，和/或可能导致更糟糕的结果，沿着可预测的滑坡发展。与我们在专制的 Leviathan 中描述的类似，很难从心不在焉的 Leviathan 的轨道逃脱，因为人们越来越认为政治等级制度，是非法的。正如我们下面所描述的，这种思维方式，成为许多人的第二天性，他们生活在无强大国家机构去中心化社会。当然，一旦它变得广泛，并被纳入它们的信仰体系，这就使得这些社会很可能持续下去，而等级制度和国家机构出现的可能性要小得多。一种完全不同类型

的文化结构，支持图 1 中间走廊的轨迹，在这里出现了被束缚的 Leviathan。在这里，普通人参与政治，并追究统治者的责任，既不是不可接受的，也不是创建政治等级制度和中央集权机构的非法行为。相反，一种具有三个独特方面的文化结构逐渐形成。

First, in contrast to the trajectory supporting the Despot Leviathan, suspicious attitudes toward those who are politically powerful endure. Although this attitude has some similarity to the politically egalitarian beliefs under an Absent Leviathan, it is very different from them, because it takes a more institutionalized form. People are willing to vote and participate in civil society organizations and other institutionalized forms of political engagement.

首先，与支持专制 Leviathan 轨迹的相反，忍耐政治强力的那些人，持怀疑态度。这种态度，与心不在焉的 Leviathan 中的平等主义信仰，有一些类似，与他们截然不同，因为它采取了一种更加制度化的形式。人们愿意投票和参与公民社会组织，和其他制度化的政治参与形式。

Second, in partial contrast to the first, it becomes natural for people to trust impersonal institutions and accept the political hierarchy that is associated with them (think of the natural way in which many people in democratic and even semidemocratic societies accept the authority of courts, bureaucracies, and political officeholders). In fact, people become willing to demand more from, and also willing to delegate more to, the state.

其次，与第一种情况形成部分对比的是，人们自然会信任非个人的机构，并接受与它们相关的政治层次结构（想想自然的方式在民主甚至半民主社会中，许多人接受法院、官僚机构和政治官员）。事实上，人们变得愿意要求更多来自国家的，也愿意向国家下放更多权力。

Third, a different model of political philosophy emerges: Political power emanates from the people, who can then delegate it to state institutions or rulers. These rulers and institutions can become further empowered and take on greater responsibilities, but they are supposed to remain accountable to and act on behalf of the people. This model of popular sovereignty builds on and further promotes a synergy between suspicions toward political hierarchy and the willingness of people to trust and empower state institutions and the people in charge of them.

第三，出现了一种不同的政治哲学模型：政治权力来自人民，然后他们可以将其委托给国家机构或统治者。这些统治者和机构可以进一步增强，并承担更大的责任，但他们应该留下来对人民负责并代表人民行事。这种人民主权模式，建立在进一步促进对政治等级制度的怀疑，与对国家机构及其负责人的信任和授权之间的协同之上。

As with the trajectories in the orbits of Absent and Despot Leviathans, in this case, too, the longer we stay along the trajectory toward the Shackled Leviathan, the stronger these approaches to social meaning and political legitimacy become. For example, the stronger is society's ability to organize and have its voice heard, the more ingrained the notion of popular sovereignty becomes. Likewise, the stronger and more autonomous state institutions are, the easier it is to trust their effectiveness and the more justifiable it is for people to actively participate in politics to control them and have their voices heard in the functioning of these increasingly powerful state institutions.

就像心不在焉的 Leviathans 和绝望的 Leviathans 轨道上的轨迹一样，在这种情况下，我们在通往被束缚的 Leviathans 的轨道上停留的时间越长，这些社会意义和政治合法性的方法，就变得越有效。例如，社会组织和发出声音的能力越强，人民主权的概念就越根深蒂固。同样，国家机构越强大、越自治，就越容易信任他们有效性，人们积极参与政治以控制他们，并在这些力量增加的国家机构的

功能中，听到他们的声音就越合理。

Finally, while we have emphasized the self-reinforcing relationship between the distribution of **political power** and the cultural configurations that legitimize those arrangements, our framework does not claim that these are immutable. **Political**, economic, or demographic shocks can both reshape the basins of attraction of the different types of Leviathans and shift a polity from one basin to another (Acemoglu & Robinson 2019). Hence, historical conditions create **powerful** tendencies for persistence but do not cause permanent lock-in. Cultural feedbacks enrich but do not change this picture, because the same types of shocks can induce changes in cultural configurations. As a result, our framework implies that Huntington's (1991) portrayal of Chinese **culture** as unchanging and unchangeable was simplistic. In contrast, we will see that it is possible for attributes to be rewired so as to generate alternative cultural configurations, support different **power - culture** trajectories, and legitimize very different types of state - society relations and distinct types of **political** institutions. In fact, major shocks that shift a society into a new basin of attraction can induce very rapid cultural change.

最后，虽然我们强调了分配之间的自我强化关系政治**权利**以及使这些安排合法化的文化结构，我们的框架并不声称这些是**不可变的**。政治、经济或人口冲击都可以重塑不同类型 Leviathans 的**吸引力盆地**，并将政体从一个盆地转移到另一个盆地 (Acemoglu & Robinson 2019)。因此，历史条件创造了**强化倾向的坚持**，但不会造成**永久的锁定**。文化反馈丰富，但不会改变这张照片，因为相同类型的冲击，会引起文化结构的变化。作为一个结果，我们的框架表明，Huntington (1991) 将汉语**文化**，描述为不变和不可改变，是过于简单的。相比之下，我们将看到，属性有可能被重新连接，以生成替代的文化结构，支持不同的**权力—文化**轨迹，并使非常不同类型的国家—社会关系和不同类型的政治制度合法化。事实上，将一个社会转变为新的吸引力盆地的重大冲击，可能会引发非常迅速的文化变革。

In the remaining sections, we go through three applications, one corresponding to each of the three types of Leviathans, in order to provide more details about the interplay between politics and cultural configurations and also highlight how cultural configurations can change in response to structural shocks. Once these additional insights are obtained, it will become much more apparent why modernization theory fails to provide an empirically accurate or useful account of the dynamics of political institutions and how we need to move beyond it.

在剩下的部分中，我们将介绍三个应用程序，每个应用程序对应三种类型 Leviathans 中的一个，以提供更多关于政治—文化结构之间**相互作用**的细节，并强调文化结构如何对结构性冲击作出相应地发生变化。一旦获得这些额外的见解，它将变得更加明显，对于**政治制度的动态**以及我们需要如何超越它，为什么现代化理论不能提供经验上准确或有用的解释。

§3 WHEN THE STATE DOMINATES SOCIETY: THE DESPOTIC LEVIATHAN † 当国家主宰社会：专制的 LEVIATHAN

The historical formation of the Chinese state began with the first Qin dynasty, which united the country by military conquest in 221 BC. This was based on a model of a top-down state micromanaging society, along the lines recommended by Lord Shang, but still drawing on Confucian philosophy. Confucius painted a picture of an ideal society held together by ritual virtue and filial piety. A famous

depiction appears in the text *The Great Learning*:

中国国家的历史，形成始于公元前221年第一个秦朝通过军事征服统一了国家。这是基于一种自上而下的国家微观管理社会模式，遵循商鞅的建议，但仍然借鉴了儒家哲学。孔子描绘了一个由礼德和孝道维系的理想社会。一个著名的描述，出现在《伟大的学问》一书中：

Their thoughts being sincere, their hearts were then rectified. Their hearts being rectified, their persons were cultivated. Their persons being cultivated, their families were regulated. Their families being regulated, their States were rightly governed. Their States being rightly governed, the whole kingdom was made tranquil and happy. (Legge 1893, pp. 358 - 59)

他们的思想是真诚的，他们的心就被纠正了。他们的心被纠正，他们的人被种植。他们的人受到培养，他们的家庭受到监管。他们的家庭受到监管，他们的国家得到了正确的治理。他们的国家得到了正确的治理，整个王国变得宁静而幸福。（Legge 1893，第358-59页）

Here, virtue begins in people's hearts and ripples up to the level of the state (Fei 1992, pp. 62 - 63). The government does not need mechanisms of accountability to behave in the collective interest; this will simply be the consequence of everyone cultivating virtue. If they do not, then accountability would not solve the problem. The role of the specific cultural configuration bolstering top-down rule is pivotal. It would have been most probably infeasible for successive Chinese dynasties to rely on intense repression in order to control their populations. But when people are convinced that such top-down rule is legitimate, it becomes much more likely to survive.

在这里，美德始于人们的心中，并波及到国家层面（Fei 1992，第62-63页）。政府不需要问责机制，来为集体利益行事；这只是每个人培养美德的结果。如果他们不这样做，那么问责制不会解决问题。支持自上而下规则的特定文化结构的作用，至关重要。对于连续的中国王朝来说，依靠强烈的镇压，来控制人口很可能是不可行的。但当人们确信，这种自上而下的规则是合法的时，它就更有可能幸存下来。

This cultural configuration was based on a powerful synthesis of despotism and Confucianism. A telling illustration is the imperial examination system, which was definitively institutionalized by the Song dynasty. In this system, the people staffing the government were chosen via three levels of examination. What was examined was knowledge of Confucian thought, and the state was able to impose its interpretation of Confucian ideas onto the people who then ran the state. The state thus reinforced a cultural configuration, legitimizing its authority.

这种文化结构基于权力的专制与儒家思想的融合。一个明显的例子是科举制度，它在宋代被明确地制度化了。在这个系统中，政府人员是通过三级考试选出的。考察的是儒家思想和国家的知识，能够将其对儒家思想的解释，强加给当时掌管国家的人。因此，国家加强了文化结构，使其权威合法化。

All the same, this cultural configuration cannot be understood without recognizing the political structure in which it was embedded. As Weber (1951, p. 249) noted long ago, “the basic characteristics of the [Confucian] ‘mentality’ —were deeply codetermined by political and economic destinies.” The trajectory underpinning and moving toward the Despotic Leviathan in Figure 1 is made possible by the synergy between despotic political power and a cultural configuration adapted to it.

尽管如此，如果不认识到它所嵌入的政治结构，就无法理解这种文化结构。正如 Weber（1951年，第249页）很久以前所指出的那样，“[儒家]‘心态’的基本特征—深受政治和经济命运的共同决定。”图1中支撑和走向专制 Leviathan 的轨迹，是由专制政治权力和适应它的文化结构之间的协同作用

所实现的。

§4 WHEN SOCIETY DOMINATES THE STATE: THE ABSENT LEVIATHAN † 社会主宰国家：心不在焉的 LEVIATHAN

The synergy between **political power** and specific cultural configurations is critical not only for the Despot Leviathan but also for its polar opposite, the Absent Leviathan. Because **power** is distributed differently, the cultural configurations that emerge and sustain economic and **political** relations in such societies are very different. Malinowski's ethnographic work in Melanesia elucidates some of the most salient features of politics and cultural configurations in such societies.

政治**权力**与特定文化结构之间的协同作用，不仅对专制 Leviathan 至关重要，对与其对立的心不在焉的 Leviathan 也至关重要。由于**权力**的分布不同，因此在这些社会中，出现并维持经济和政治关系的文化结构，非常不同。Malinowski 在美拉尼西亚的人种学工作，阐明了这些社会中政治和文化结构的一些最显著特征。

To illustrate the nature of these relations on the small coral island of Kitava, Malinowski (1922, pp. 311 - 16) relates the “myth of the flying canoe.” The Kitavans decided to build canoes for a great Kula expedition, a large system of interisland exchange. The main character in the myth, Mokatuboda, who possessed magic **powers**, built his canoe in the village and then flew it to the sea by magic (Malinowski 1922, pp. 312 - 13). Mokatuboda's control of magic not only transported his canoe but was making him a very **powerful** headman. According to the myth, he used magic to make it rain on his own fields and thus harvested far more crops than others. But rather than celebrating him, the Kitavans decided to stop his accumulation of **power** and wealth: “His brothers and maternal nephews sharpened the spear, they hit him, he died” (p. 315).

Malinowski (1922, 第311-16页)讲述了“飞行独木舟的神话”。基塔瓦人决定为伟大的库拉远征，一个庞大的跨洲交流体系。神话中的主角，Mokatuboda，拥有魔法**力量**，在村里造了他的独木舟，然后用魔法把它飞到了海里 (Malinowski 1922, 第312-13页)。Mokatuboda 对魔法的控制，不仅使他的独木舟得以运输，而且使他成为一个非常有**力量**的头领。根据神话，他用魔法让自己的田地下雨，因此收获的庄稼比其他人多得多。但基塔瓦人没有为他庆祝，而是决定阻止他积累权力和财富：“他的兄弟和侄子们磨尖了长矛，他们打了他，他死了” (第315页)。

The antihierarchical, intensely egalitarian attitudes illustrated by this myth are very common across **politically** decentralized societies that do not have state institutions. In such societies, most conflict is resolved via traditions and norms or some sort of enforced compromise, so there is less need for state institutions for dispute resolution. But how do you prevent people like Mokatuboda or chiefs or big men from becoming economically and then **politically** dominant? This is where egalitarianism comes in: People are not allowed to accumulate too much wealth or too much **political power**. This egalitarianism affects every aspect of society (see Acemoglu & Robinson 2019). For example, trade is regulated and constricted (lest it lead to too much accumulation). Some goods are not allowed to be bought (otherwise they confer too much status or could be used for patronage or **power** accumulation). In Kitava, economic institutions enmeshed “the whole community into a network of reciprocal obligations and dues, one constant flow of gift and counter-gift” (Malinowski 1921, p. 8). Institutions forced

output to be distributed in a very equal way, and the organization of the Kula ring similarly reinforced egalitarianism.

这个神话所描绘的反等级、高度平等的态度非常普遍没有国家机构的分权社会。在这样的社会中，大多数冲突都是通过传统和规范或某种强制妥协来解决的，因此对国家机构解决争端的需求较小。但你如何防止像莫卡图博达这样的人或者酋长或大人物变得经济，然后政治地占主导地位？这就是平等主义发挥作用的地方：人们不允许积累太多的财富或太多的权力。这种平等主义，影响着社会的方方面面（见Acemoglu和Robinson 2019）。例如，贸易受到监管和限制（以免导致过多的积累）。一些不允许购买商品（否则它们会赋予太多的地位，或可能被用于赞助、或权力累积）。在Kitava，经济制度将“整个社区融入了一个互惠义务和会费的网络，一个不断的礼物和反礼物的流动”（Malinowski 1921，第8页）。机构强制以非常平等的方式分配产出，以及Kula环的组织，同样加强了平等主义。

Notably, none of this is institutionalized. It is a set of beliefs and practices that maintains this egalitarian equilibrium, and hence the cultural configuration is critical. For example, in most such societies, supernatural beliefs reinforce the nonhierarchical, egalitarian social system. Those who become rich or powerful are suspected of sorcery or witchcraft (Malinowski 1926). Although all of these practices and their implications for state - society relations are diametrically opposed to those we saw in the Chinese case, there is an important commonality: The cultural configuration is synergistic with the distribution of political power. A cultural configuration that refuses hierarchy and treats powerful men as nefarious, dangerous upstarts cannot coexist with the building of state institutions or incipient hierarchy, and the lack of such institutions further bolsters this cultural configuration. Tellingly, when the process of state-building starts in such societies, we often see powerful forces toward altering the cultural configuration (for example, as led by Shaka Zulu when he was building the early state institutions in Zululand; see Acemoglu & Robinson 2019).

值得注意的是，这些都没有制度化。这是一套维持这种平等主义平衡的信仰和实践，因此文化结构至关重要。例如，在大多数这样的社会中，超自然信仰，强化了非等级、平等的社会制度。那些变得富有或强有力的人，被怀疑是法道或巫术（Malinowski 1926）。虽然所有这些做法及其对国家与社会关系的影响，与我们在中国案例中看到的，有一个重要的共同点：文化结构是与政治权力的分布协同作用。一种文化结构，拒绝等级制度，把强有力的男人，当作邪恶、危险的暴发户，他们不能与国家机构或初期等级制度的建立共存，而这样的机构的缺乏，进一步强化了这种文化结构。很明显，当国家建设过程在这样的社会中开始时，我们经常看到改变文化结构的强大的力量（例如，正如Shaka Zulu在Zululand建立早期国家机构时所领导的那样；见Acemoglu & Robinson 2019）。

§5 WHEN SOCIETY BALANCES THE STATE: THE SHACKLED LEVIATHAN † 当社会平衡国家时：束缚的 LEVIATHAN

The nature of state - society relations is very different in the middle corridor in Figure 1. Here, in a process that we call the “Red Queen effect” (Acemoglu & Robinson 2019), the capacities of both state and society coevolve: The stronger the state becomes (for example, in terms of its capacity to regulate the economy or enforce laws and rules), the more active and assertive society needs to become in order to rein it in. This is a dynamic process, involving significant institutional changes along the way. It is, in equal part, about politics and culture. The powers that society and citizens need to acquire

in order to remain in the corridor are **political**, but they need to be bolstered by appropriate cultural configurations.

在图 1 的中间走廊中，国家与社会关系的性质非常不同。我们称之为“红皇后效应”的过程 (Acemoglu & Robinson 2019)，国家和社会两者的能力共同进化：国家变得越强大（例如，就其能力而言为了规范经济或执行法律法规），为了控制它，社会需要更积极、更自信。同时，这是一个动态的过程，涉及重大的制度变革。它同样涉及，政治和文化。为了留在走廊，社会和公民需要获得政治动力，但它们需要适当的文化结构来支撑。

This dynamic can be seen in the case of England, which witnessed fundamental institutional change in the seventeenth century. Though a monarchy, in the sixteenth century the country already housed a highly active citizenry. For example, local communities organized in various participatory ways, making demands on the central state and sometimes resisting policies the state was attempting to impose on them (Hindle 2000, Acemoglu & Robinson 2019). The tradition of Germanic assemblies that were central to the island's politics before the Norman invasion still had major effects at the time (Wickham 2016). Nevertheless, institutional means for popular participation in government were lacking.

这种动态可以从英国的情况中看出，英国见证了基本的制度十七世纪的变化。虽然是君主制，但在十六世纪，这个国家已经容纳了高度活跃的公民。例如，当地社区组织了各种参与式活动对中央政府提出要求，有时抵制试图强加给他们的国家政策，(Hindle 2000, Acemoglu & Robinson 2019)。在诺曼人入侵之前，日耳曼集会的传统，是该岛政治的核心，在当时仍然产生了重大影响 (Wickham 2016)。然而，政府缺乏民众参与的制度手段。

Three momentous changes started altering English society and economy from the middle of the sixteenth century. First, the capacity of the national state began to increase under Henry VII and picked up speed with Henry VIII's "Tudor revolution in government" (Elton 1953). Second, as Tawney (1941) emphasizes, a class of commercially minded new farmers, the gentry, emerged and started changing the economy after monastic lands were expropriated and then sold off by Henry VIII (Heldring et al. 2015). 从年中期开始，英国社会和经济发生了三次重大变化十六世纪。首先，在 Henry VII 统治下，国家的能力开始增强。并随着 Henry VIII 的“政府 Tudor 革命” (埃尔顿1953) 而加速。第二，正如 Tawney (1941) 所强调的那样，出现了一批有商业头脑的新农民，即士绅阶层。在亨利八世征用并出售寺院土地后，贵族阶层出现，并开始改变经济 (Heldring 等人, 2015)。

Third, Atlantic and interoceanic trade opportunities enriched a new class of merchants and industrialists, who had until then been excluded from the governing coalition of the country (Acemoglu et al. 2005, Pincus 2009, Jha 2015). These newly empowered groups vied for greater **political power**, destabilizing the **political** system and paving the way to the Civil War in 1642 and later to another, albeit less disruptive, civil war culminating in the Glorious Revolution of 1688.

第三，大西洋和跨洋贸易机会，丰富了一个新的商人和实业家阶层，在此之前，他们一直被排除在统治国家联盟之外 (Acemoglu 等人, 2005年; Pincus, 2009年; Jha, 2015年)。这些新的强有力的各团体竞相争取更大的政治权力，破坏政治体系的稳定，为1642年的内战铺平了道路，后来又爆发了另一场内战，尽管破坏性较小，内战最终导致1688年的光荣革命。

These epochal events that led to a constitutional monarchy and intensified **political** participation from a broader segment of society were not just **political**. They also involved the emergence of a radically new cultural configuration. At the center of this change was the notion of popular sovereignty that arose

at around the same time as the Civil War. The Levelers articulated and fought for popular participation in politics in the 1640s. Thomas Hobbes' s 1651 classic, *Leviathan*, articulated a materialistic portrayal of the “state of nature” and a contractarian model of the creation of the state based on a “covenant.” John Locke pushed this perspective further, proposing an almost modern version of popular sovereignty, whereby sovereignty rests with the people who then delegate it to a ruler on the condition that he acts in line with their interests and instructions. 这些划时代的事件，导致了君主立宪制和来自更广泛社会阶层的政治参与的加强，还不仅仅是政治参与。他们还参与了崛起一种全新的文化形态。这一变化的核心，是大众主权观念，它大约与内战同时出现。平级者在1640年代，为民众参政而斗争。Thomas Hobbes 1651年的经典之作，*Leviathan*，阐述了对“自然状态”的唯物主义描绘，和契约主义的创作模式。John Locke 进一步推动了这一观点，提出一种近乎现代的人民主权，主权属于人民然后将其委托给统治者，条件是他按照他们的利益和指示行事。

It is difficult to imagine how the significant increase in political participation could have taken place without this new philosophy of popular sovereignty. The emergence of these ideas of popular sovereignty and “resistance” (meaning resistance to the monarchy' s unchecked power) was itself rooted in the political changes brought about by the demands and revolt of newly enriched merchants, industrialists, and gentry, as Sommerville (1999, p. 75) emphasizes: “Talk of resistance became more common after 1640 not because of the sudden discovery of resistance theory, but because resistance had become a practical possibility.”

很难想象，在没有这种新的人民主权哲学的地方，政治参与度的显著增加会是什么样子。主权和“抵抗”，这些流行思想的出现(意思是抵抗君主制不受约束的动力)，其根源在于新富阶层(商人、实业家和绅士)的要求和反抗带来的政治变化。正如Sommerville (1999, 第75页)强调的那样：“谈论抵抗，1640年后变得更加普遍，不是因为阻力理论的突然发现，而是因为抵抗已经成为一种实际的可能性。”

Hence, we see that even though the trajectories in the basin of attraction of the Shackled are very different from those that emerge under the Despotic and Absent Leviathans, they too critically depend on the interplay and synergy of politics and cultural configurations. Moreover, the more dynamic nature of the interactions between state and society inside the corridor of the Shackled Leviathan crystallizes another key question: How do cultural configurations change? How did the notion of popular sovereignty come to be articulated and influential in seventeenth-century England, for example? This is the question we tackle in the next section in the context of reevaluating modernization theory.

因此，我们看到，即使束缚的 *Leviathan* 在引力盆地中的轨迹与专制和心不在焉的 *Leviathan* 下出现的截然不同，它们也严重依赖于政治和文化结构的相互作用和协同作用。此外，走廊内束缚的 *Leviathans*，国家和社会之间互动的动态性更强。揭示了另一个关键问题：文化结构是如何改变的？人民主权的概念是如何在17世纪的英国被阐明和影响的？这是我们在下一节中要解决的问题，重新评估现代化理论的背景。

§6 WHITHER MODERNIZATION THEORY † 现代化理论怎样的前途

We have so far described three different types of political and social dynamics—under the auspices of, respectively, Despotic, Absent, and Shackled Leviathans. Do these dynamics support modernization

theory?

到目前为止，我们已经描述了三种不同类型的政治和社会动态，分别由专制、心不在焉和束缚的 Leviathans 主持。这些动态是否支持现代化理论？

In the case of the Absent Leviathan, economic modernization is rare, because the types of economic arrangements Malinowski described in Melanesia do not encourage technological change or productivity-enhancing large-scale trade. Even accumulation of wealth and assets is constricted by the cultural configuration that tries to maintain egalitarianism. This does not completely preclude all economic modernization, since some individuals or groups can sometimes accumulate enough power or form the right coalitions to take command and, in the process, reorganize economic relations (Flannery & Marcus 2014, Acemoglu & Robinson 2019). However, when that happens, the most likely transition is from the Absent Leviathan to the Despot Leviathan, which does not involve institutionalizing popular political participation.

就心不在焉的 Leviathan 而言，经济现代化是罕见的，因为 Malinowski 在美拉尼西亚描述的经济安排类型，不鼓励技术变革或提高生产力的大规模贸易。甚至财富和资产的积累，也受到试图维持平等主义的文化结构的限制。这并不完全排除所有的经济现代化，因为一些个人或团体，有时可以积累足够的权力或形成正确的联盟来掌握指挥权，并在此过程中，重组经济关系 (Flannery & Marcus 2014, Acemoglu & Robinson 2019)。然而，当这种情况发生时，最有可能的过渡是从心不在焉的利维坦到专制的利维坦，这并不涉及将民众的政治参与制度化。

What about economic growth and modernization under the Despot Leviathan? As the Chinese case illustrates, this is feasible. However, it very often takes the form of “despotic growth,” whereby the state and elites play a defining role, and their dominance over society, rather than weakening, becomes solidified. As growth under the Song dynasty and during the post-Mao era highlights, this type of economic growth does not typically bring any type of democracy or increase political participation or accountability. On the contrary, as again underscored by recent Chinese history, rapid growth can sometimes increase the grip of the despotic state, which gains greater legitimacy and comes to control more resources, which it can use to repress opposition or cultivate support.

专制的 Leviathan 统治下的经济增长和现代化呢？正如中国的案例所示，这是可行的。然而，它往往以“专制增长”的形式出现，国家和精英在其中发挥着决定性作用，他们对社会的统治地位，非但没有削弱，反而变得更加巩固。正如宋代和后毛时代的经济增长，所强调的那样，这种经济增长通常不会带来任何形式的民主或增加政治参与或问责制。相反，正如中国近代史再次强调的那样，快速增长有时会加强专制国家的控制，专制国家获得了更大的合法性，并控制了更多的资源，可以用来镇压反对派或培养支持。

While dynamics in the basins of attraction of the Absent and Despot Leviathans provide no support for modernization theory, economic modernization and a transition toward more democratic political institutions do go hand-in-hand in the Shackled Leviathan configuration. Yet, even this type of change does not take the almost automatic form that modernization theory predicts. Changes in cultural configuration necessitate (a) major efforts by cultural entrepreneurs in order to recombine existing attributes into a new cultural configuration and (b) intense struggles over these configurations within the population. The English case illustrates this dynamic, too. Monarchic rule, without constitutional or participatory constraints, was justified in early modern England by a cultural configuration emphasizing

the central role of obedience to authority. 虽然心不在焉的和专制的 Leviathan 吸引盆地的动态, 没有为现代化理论提供支持, 但经济现代化和向更民主的政治制度过渡, 确实在被束缚的 Leviathan 配置中齐头并进。然而, 即使是这种类型的变化, 也不会采取现代化理论预测的几乎自动的形式。文化结构的变化需要 (a) 文化企业家做出重大努力, 将现有的属性, 重新组合成新的文化结构, 以及 (b) 人口内部, 对这些结构的激烈斗争。英国的案例也说明了这种动态。君主统治, 没有宪法或参与约束, 在近代早期的英格兰, 一种强调服从权威的核心作用的文化结构, 为其辩护。

The roots of this can be traced to the writings of St. Paul (Col. 1:16): “For by him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers.” This model of Pauline obedience was reinforced by St. Augustine, whose views Ryan (2012, p. 199) sums up: “[One] would find true peace and justice only in God’s kingdom. Here we must simply obey the powers that be.” The Catholic Church promoted this view, emphasizing that God’s chosen rulers were confirmed by the Pope. According to this model, even if rulers misbehaved, one had to obey; rulers would be judged by God, not by their subjects. Ryan (2012, p. 199) argues, “The conventional view down to the sixteenth century was that if a ruler required his subjects to repudiate Christ, they did not have to comply; short of that, they had to obey.”

其根源可以追溯到 St. Paul 的著作 (Col. 1:16): “因为万物都是由他创造的, 无论是天上的, 地上的, 可见的还是不可见的, 无论它们是宝座、领地、公国, 还是动力。Augustine 强化了这种 Pauline 顺服的模式, 他的观点, Ryan (2012, 第199页) 总结道: “只有在上帝的国度里, 才能找到真正的和平与正义。在这里, 我们必须简单地服从动力 天主教会提倡这一观点, 强调上帝选择的统治者, 得到了教皇的确认。根据这个模型, 即使统治者行为不端, 也必须服从; 统治者, 将受到上帝的审判, 而不是他们的臣民。Ryan (2012, 第199页) 认为, “直到16世纪, 传统观点都认为, 如果统治者要求他的臣民, 否定基督, 他们就不必遵守他们必须服从。”

The social changes brought by Tudor monarchs, and especially Henry VIII, had started changing this picture, partly because of the break between the Church of England and the papacy, which meant that English kings could not appeal to the Pope’s authority. It was against this background that the ideas of popular sovereignty were elaborated and articulated by cultural entrepreneurs such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. Entrepreneurship, we think, is an apt word in this context, because these thinkers were creating and trying to popularize a different way of conceptualizing the world—and as a result legitimizing a different set of political institutions and state – society relations (see Mokyr 2016). Tudor 王朝君主, 尤其是 Henry VIII 带来的社会变革, 已经开始改变这一局面, 部分原因, 是英国国教和教皇之间的决裂, 这意味着英国国王无法诉诸教皇的权威。正是在这种背景下, Thomas Hobbes & John Locke 等文化企业家, 阐述了人民主权的思想。我们认为, 在这种情况下, 创业是一个恰当的词, 因为这些思想家, 正在创造并试图普及一种不同的世界概念化方式, 从而使一套不同的政治制度和国家—社会关系合法化 (见 Mokyr 2016)。

In doing this, Hobbes and Locke, as well as the Levelers and others, built not only on the Bible and Christian thought but also on ancient customs, especially ideas of participatory Germanic institutions, mentioned above. They drew on notions of popular sovereignty that had flourished in the medieval city-states of northern Italy (manifested in the writings of such scholars as Marcellius of Padua) and that were transformed by the Reformation spearheaded by Martin Luther and John Calvin. “A movement toward a more overtly constitutional view of politics took place” (Ryan 2012, pp. 342 – 43; see also

Skinner 1978, Wolin 2004).

在这样做的时候，Hobbes & Locke，以及平等主义者和其他人，不仅建立在圣经和基督教思想的基础上，还建立在古代习俗的基础上。他们借鉴了意大利北部中世纪城邦盛行的人民主权概念（体现在Padua的Marcelius等学者的著作中），并被Martin Luther & John Calvin领导的宗教改革所改变。“一场朝着更公开的宪法政治观的运动发生了”（Ryan 2012，第342-43页；另见Skinner 1978，Wolin 2004）。

These justifications were not accepted by all English people, however. There ensued an intense political and cultural struggle, and the English Civil War has to be viewed within this broader perspective. There was no certainty that this struggle would lead to the victory of popular sovereignty over more authoritarian ideas such as the Divine Right of Kings, propagated by the Stuart monarchs. 然而，并非所有英国人都接受这些理由。随后发生了激烈的政治和文化斗争，英国内战必须从更广泛的角度来看待。无法确定这场斗争，是否会导致人民主权战胜Stuart君主宣扬的更专制的思想，如国王的神圣权利。

A major part of the struggle was about convincing the broader public of the plausibility and desirability of alternative cultural configurations. Hobbes and Locke achieved this for popular sovereignty. Nevertheless, for changes to be enduring, they had to be institutionalized, meaning that the institutional foundations of political power had to change in tandem. This meant a need for not just cultural but political entrepreneurship, which we also see in this historical episode. After the Civil War, the English Commonwealth was created, and in 1653 England's first written constitution, the Instrument of Government, was promulgated. This was the first constitution in the world that featured explicit separation of powers between the executive and the legislative, an innovation from notions of “mixed government” (Vile 1967). These innovations ultimately took their final form after the Glorious Revolution of 1688.

这场斗争的一个主要部分，是说服更广泛的公众相信，替代文化结构的合理性和可取性。Hobbes & Locke为了人民主权而实现了这一目标。然而，为了使变革持久，它们必须制度化，这意味着政治权力的制度基础，必须同时改变。这意味着不仅需要文化企业家精神，还需要政治企业家精神，我们在这一历史事件中，也看到了这一点。内战结束后，英联邦成立，1653年，英国颁布了第一部成文宪法《政府文书》。这是世界上第一部明确分离在行政和立法之间力量的宪法，这是对“混合政府”概念的创新（Vile 1967）。这些创新，最终在1688年光荣革命后形成。

Overall, the English case illustrates yet another instance of the synergy between power and culture, and it also emphasizes that any path of political institutions that ended up accompanying economic changes was not an automatic process. Changes required intense struggle and various innovations from cultural and political entrepreneurs. 总的来说，英语案例，说明了权力和文化之间协同作用的另一个例子，它还强调了政治制度最终伴随经济变化的任何路径，都不是一个自动过程。变革，需要文化和政治企业家的激烈斗争和各种创新。

So even when we see something that looks like the predictions of modernization theory in the middle corridor (while it is completely absent in the rest of Figure 1), its nature is very different from what modernization theory claims. This last point is central: The emergence of a cultural configuration supporting political change is always contingent on the historical balance between state and society as well as cultural and political entrepreneurship. We cannot bank on the existence of such entrepreneurs

in all societies and epochs, and even when they exist, their ideas may not succeed in supplanting those enshrined in the older cultural configuration backed up by the prevailing distribution of **political power**. 因此, 即使我们在中间走廊看到一些, 看起来像现代化理论预测的东西 (而图 1 的其余部分完全没有), 它的性质也与现代化理论所声称的非常不同。最后一点是核心: 支持政治变革的文化结构的出现, 总是取决于国家和社会之间的历史平衡, 以及文化和政治创业精神。我们不能指望, 这些企业家在所有社会和时代都存在, 即使他们存在, 他们的思想, 也可能无法取代旧文化结构中所蕴含的思想, 而旧文化结构, 是由政治**权力**的普遍分布所支持的。

Let us finally emphasize that Figure 1 should not be read as suggesting unchanging **cultures**. While it is true that the cultural configuration supporting the Despotic Leviathan takes stronger root the longer the Despotic Leviathan remains in **power**, it never becomes completely immutable. 最后, 让我们强调, 图 1 不应被解读为暗示不变的文化。虽然支持专制 Leviathan 的文化结构, 确实会随着专制的 Leviathan 在**权力**中停留的时间越长, 其根基就越牢固, 但它永远不会完全不变。

This can be seen clearly in the case of Confucian **culture**. Despite Huntington's pronouncement that Confucian **culture** is antidemocratic, Confucius's teachings should not be viewed as rigidly authoritarian. As Goldin (2011, p. 10) observes, "Confucius wished his statements to remain fluid," and the Confucian attributes can be recombined to generate very different cultural configurations. Confucius (2003, 12.7, p. 128) also states that "a state cannot stand once it has lost the confidence of the people," which can clearly be given a democratic interpretation—a bad government will lose the confidence of the people and then can be brought down by the people.

这在儒家文化的情况下, 可以清楚地看到。尽管 Huntington 宣称儒家文化是反民主的, 但孔子的教义, 不应被视为僵化的威权主义。正如 Goldin (2011, 第10页) 所观察到的那样, “孔子希望他的言论保持流畅”, 儒家属性可以重新组合, 产生截然不同的文化结构。孔子 (2003, 12.7, 第128页) 还指出, “一个国家一旦失去了人民的信任就站不住脚”, 这显然可以从民主的角度来解释—一个坏政府会失去人民的信任, 然后被人民推翻。

This is exactly what happened in Taiwan, which has an even stronger Confucian **culture** than mainland China (not having suffered the Cultural Revolution). In the decades that followed the communist revolution, Taiwan, too, was ruled despotically by Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang (KMT). But the **political** equilibrium started shifting as a result of social and economic changes that followed land reforms and industrialization (which may themselves have been triggered by the KMT's efforts to deliver growth and a more egalitarian distribution of income in order to stave off any support for communism) and a new integration into the international system. By the 1990s, demand for a more democratic regime was growing in the population and forcing **political** change in Taiwan. 这正是台湾发生的事情, 它的儒家文化色彩比中国大陆 (没有经历过文化大革命) 更浓。在共产主义革命后的几十年里, 台湾也被蒋介石的国民党专制统治。但是, 由于土地改革和工业化之后的社会和经济变化 (这本身可能是由国民党努力实现增长和更平等的收入分配以避免对共产主义的任何支持而引发的) 以及与国际体系的新融合, 政治平衡开始转变。到20世纪90年代, 对更民主政权的需求在人口中不断增长, 迫使台湾发生政治变革。

Confirming our interpretation, changing politics brought rapid changes in the cultural configuration, still using the basic attributes of the Confucian **culture** set. **Political** participation was justified with the Confucian idea that nonvirtuous leaders cannot stand. In the words of Fetzer & Soper (2012, p. 3),

“the Confucian tradition is flexible—it allows for more than one interpretation, and it can be used as a basis for democracy and human rights.”

确认我们的解释，不断变化的政治，带来了文化结构的快速变化，仍然使用儒家文化集的基本属性。政治参与是有道理的，因为儒家思想认为，不道德的领导者是站不住脚的。用 Fetzer & Soper (2012, 第3页) 的话来说，“儒家传统是灵活的—它允许多种解释，可以作为民主和人权的基础。”

Could the Taiwanese case be interpreted as an example of modernization theory? The answer is once again no. Although economic modernization was one of the root causes of the changes that led to the emergence of democracy in Taiwan, what supported the newly emerging democratic institutions was not a wholesale political modernization but a recombination of Confucian attributes in order to create a new cultural configuration. 台湾的案例，可以被解释为现代化理论的一个例子吗？答案又是否定的。尽管经济现代化，是导致台湾民主出现的变革的根源之一，但支持新兴民主制度的，并不是全面的现代化，而是儒家属性的重组，以创造新的文化结构。

As in the English case, these changes were neither automatic nor inevitable. They required a certain degree of cultural entrepreneurship and, of course, the ability to leverage the fluidity of Confucian culture. 与英国的情况一样，这些变化既不是自动的，也不是不可避免的。他们需要一定程度的文化企业家精神，当然，还需要利用儒家文化的流动性。

§7 CONCLUSION † 结论

In this article, we have articulated a very different approach to political change than the popular and influential modernization theory. In comparison to the almost automatic link that this theory draws between economic modernization and a particular path of political institutions, we emphasize three different dynamics.

† 在这篇文章中，我们阐述了一种政治变革方法，它与大众化、有影响力的现代化理论相比，是截然不同的。与那种几乎自动的链接进行比较，理论把经济现代化与政治制度的特定路径联系起来，我们强调三种不同的动态。

First, the dynamics of political institutions need to be accompanied by changes in cultural configurations—by which we mean changes in how people use existing attributes of their culture set in order to generate social meaning, coordinate expectations, and justify various political and economic outcomes. † 首先，政治机构的动态，需要伴随文化结构的变化—我们指的是，人们利用已经存在的文化属性的变化，为了产生社会意义、协调期望，并为各种政治和经济结果辩护。

Second, the same economic changes may strengthen despotic rule and bolster the cultural configuration that supports despotic rule in some societies, while destabilizing them and paving the way to democratization in others. History, institutions, the exact balance of power between state and society (and between elites and citizens), and the nature of prevailing cultural configurations matter in determining which outcomes will ensue.

† 第二，同样的经济变化可以加强专制统治，并加强支持专制统治的文化结构一些社会，同时破坏了它们的稳定，为其他社会的民主化铺平了道路。历史，制度、国家与社会（以及精英与社会公民）之间的确切权力平衡，以及主流文化结构的性质在决定哪些结果方面很重要将随之而来。

Third, even when there are strong possibilities for a particular path of political institutions, like

democracy, whether this path will be followed depends on cultural entrepreneurs proposing new cultural configurations and political entrepreneurs coordinating political action. There should be no presumption that such entrepreneurship will immediately arise or necessarily succeed even when other conditions are suitable.

† 第三, 即使某条特定的政治道路有很大的可能性 制度, 如民主, 是否会遵循这条道路, 取决于文化企业家 提出新的文化结构和协调政治行动的政治企业家。不应假设, 这种创业精神会立即出现或必然出现, 即使在其他条件合适的情况下也能成功。

We developed these ideas by theoretically building and extending the framework of Acemoglu & Robinson (2019), which highlights how different state - society relations—corresponding to Despotic, Absent and Shackled Leviathans—can emerge and become self-sustaining.

† 我们通过理论构建和扩展 Acemoglu & Robinson (2019) 的框架, 来发展这些想法, 强调了不同的国家与社会关系, 如何对应专制、心不在焉和被束缚的 Leviathans—可以出现并自我维持。

Moving away from the simple framework of modernization theory not only is empirically compelling but also opens up a host of new areas for conceptual, theoretical, and historical studies. For example, what are the conditions that facilitate cultural and political entrepreneurship? What aspects of the balance of power between state and society matter most for culture and politics? What types of cultural configurations will be more enduring even when challenged by new models? And how useful will these ideas be in understanding various episodes of modernization and non-modernization in history?

† 摆脱现代化理论的简单框架, 不仅在经验上具有说服力, 而且为概念、理论和历史研究, 开辟了许多新领域。例如, 促进文化和政治创业的条件是什么? 国家和社会之间的权力平衡的哪些方面, 对文化和政治最重要? 哪种类型的文化构造, 即使受到新模式的挑战, 也会更持久? 这些想法, 如何有益于理解, 现代化情况和历史上的非现代化?

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


图 1 Varieties of Leviathans: Despotic (blue), Absent (red), and Shackled (yellow). The two axes represent two key dimensions of how a polity is organized (abstracted from several other relevant aspects for simplicity). The vertical axis represents the capacity of the state, which summarizes both the capacity of state institutions and the ability of these institutions and the elites in charge of them to impose their will and control over society. The horizontal axis shows the capacity of society, which represents the ability of society to organize (e.g., by solving its collective action problems) and to have its voice heard (either via institutionalized means or by protests and other noninstitutionalized actions). † Leviathans

的品种：专制（蓝色）、心不在焉（红色）和被束缚（黄色）。这两个轴代表了政体组织方式的两个关键维度（为简单起见，从其他几个相关方面抽象出来）。纵轴代表国家的能力，它总结了国家机构的能力，以及这些机构和负责这些机构的精英将自己的意愿和控制强加给社会的能力。横轴表示社会的能力，代表社会组织（例如，通过解决其集体行动问题）和发出声音（通过制度化手段或抗议和其他非制度化行动）的能力。

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